§1.1.28#1Κατασκευάζειν μὲν οὖν βουλομένοις κατά τινος ὅλου τοῦ μὲν κατασκευαζομένου βλεπτέον εἰς τὰ ὑποκείμενα καθʼ ὧν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει λεγόμενον, οὗ δὲ δεῖ κατηγορεῖσθαι, ὅσα τούτῳ ἕπεται·
Therefore, for those who wish to establish something universally of something else, they must look, in the case of what is to be established, to the subjects of which it happens to be said, and in the case of that of which it must be predicated, to whatever follows this; for if any of these is the same, it is necessary that the one belongs to the other.
ἂν γάρ τι τούτων ᾖ ταὐτόν, ἀνάγκη θάτερον θατέρῳ ὑπάρχειν. ἢν δὲ μὴ ὅτι παντὶ ἀλλʼ ὅτι τινί, οἷς ἕπεται ἑκάτερον· εἰ γάρ τι τούτων ταὐτόν, ἀνάγκη τινὶ ὕπάρχειν.
But if not universally but particularly, they must look to those things which each follows; for if any of these is the same, it is necessary that it belongs to some.
ὅταν δὲ μηδενὶ δέῃ ὑπάρχειν, ᾧ μὲν οὐ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν, εἰς τὰ ἑπόμενα, ὃ δὲ δεῖ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, εἰς ἃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ παρεῖναι· ἢ ἀνάπαλιν, ᾧ μὲν δεῖ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, εἰς ἃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ παρεῖναι, ὃ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, εἰς τὰ ἑπόμενα.
But when it must belong to none, in the case of that to which it must not belong, one must look to its consequents, and in the case of that which must not belong, to those things which cannot be present to it; or conversely, in the case of that to which it must not belong, to those things which cannot be present to it, and in the case of that which must not belong, to its consequents.
τούτων γὰρ ὄντων τῶν αὐτῶν ὁποτερωνοῦν, οὐδενὶ ἐνδέχεται θατέρῳ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν· γίνεται γὰρ ὁτὲ μὲν ὁ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι συλλογισμός, ὁτὲ δʼ ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.
For if any of these on either side are the same, it is not possible for the one to belong to the other; for sometimes a syllogism in the first figure is produced, and sometimes one in the middle figure.
ἐὰν δὲ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ᾧ μὲν δεῖ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷς ἕπεται, ὃ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἃ μὴ δυνατὸν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γάρ τι τούτων εἴη ταὐτόν, ἀνάγκη τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
And if it must not belong to some, in the case of that to which it must not belong, one must look to those things which it follows, and in the case of that which must not belong, to those things which cannot belong to it; for if any of these is the same, it is necessary that it does not belong to some.
Μᾶλλον δʼ ἴσως ὧδ᾿ ἔσται τῶν λεγομένων ἕκαστον φανερόν.
But perhaps each of these points will be clearer in the following way.
ἔστω γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἑπόμενα τῷ ἐφʼ ὧν Β, οἷς δʼ αὐτὸ ἕπεται, ἐφʼ ᾧν Γ, ἃ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, ἐφʼ ὧν Δ· πάλιν δὲ τῷ Ε τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχοντα, ἐφʼ οἷς Ζ, οἷς δʼ αὐτὸ ἕπεται, ἐφʼ οἷς Η, ἃ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, ἐφʼ οἷς Θ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταὐτό τί ἐστι τῶν Γ τινὶ τῶν Ζ, ἀνάγκη τὸ παντὶ τῷ Ε ὑπάρχειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ Ζ παντὶ τῷ Ε, τῷ δὲ Γ παντὶ τὸ Α, ὥστε παντὶ τῷ Ε τὸ Α. εἰ δὲ τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Η ταὐτόν, ἀνάγκη τινὶ τῷ τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ Γ τὸ Α, τῷ δὲ Η τὸ παντὶ ἀκολουθεῖ.
Let those things which follow A be B, and those things which A itself follows be Γ, and those which cannot belong to A be Δ; and again, for E, let those things which belong to it be Z, and those which E itself follows be H, and those which cannot belong to it be Θ. Now, if some one of the Γ is the same as some one of the Z, it is necessary that A belongs to every E; for Z belongs to every E, and A to every Γ, so that A belongs to every E. But if Γ and H are the same, it is necessary that A belongs to some E; for A follows Γ, and E follows every H.
εἰ δὲ τὸ Ζ καὶ τὸ Δ ταὐτόν, οὐδενὶ τῶν Ε τὸ Α ὑπάρξει ἐκ προσυλλογισμοῦ· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει τὸ στερητικὸν καὶ τὸ Ζ τῷ Δ ταὐτόν, οὐδενὶ τῶν Ζ ὑπάρξει τὸ Α, τὸ δὲ Ζ παντὶ τῷ Ε. πάλιν εἰ τὸ Β καὶ τὸ Θ ταὐτόν, οὐδενὶ τῶν Ε τὸ Α ὑπάρξει· τὸ γὰρ Β τῷ μὲν Α παντί, τῷ δʼ ἐφʼ ᾧ τὸ Ε οὐδενὶ ὑπάρξει· ταὐτὸ γὰρ ἦν τῷ Θ, τὸ δὲ Θ οὐδενὶ τῶν Ε ὑπῆρχεν.
But if Z and Δ are the same, A will belong to no E by a pro-syllogism; for since the negative proposition is convertible and Z is the same as Δ, A will belong to no Z, and Z belongs to every E. Again, if B and Θ are the same, A will belong to no E; for B belongs to every A, but to none of that which E represents; for it was the same as Θ, and Θ belonged to no E.
εἰ δὲ τὸ Δ καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν, τὸ τινὶ τῷ Ε οὐχ ὑπάρξει· τῷ γὰρ Η οὐχ ὑπάρξει, ὅτι οὐδὲ τῷ Δ· τὸ δὲ Η ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τὸ Ε, ὥστε τινὶ τῶν οὐχ ὑπάρξει.
But if Δ and H are the same, A will not belong to some E; for it will not belong to H, because it does not belong to Δ either; and H is under E, so that it will not belong to some E.
εἰ δὲ τῷ Η τὸ Β ταὐτόν, ἀντεστραμμένος ἔσται συλλογισμός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ Ε τῷ Α ὑπάρξει παντί–τὸ γὰρ Β τῷ Α, τὸ δὲ Ε τῷ Β (ταὐτὸ γὰρ ἦν τῷ Η)—τὸ δὲ τῷ Ε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν, τινὶ δʼ ἀνάγκη διὰ τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν καθόλου κατηγορίαν τῇ κατὰ μέρος.
And if B is the same as H, there will be a converted syllogism; for E will belong to every A—for B belongs to A, and E belongs to B (for it was the same as H)—but it is not necessary for A to belong to every E, though it is necessary for it to belong to some, because the universal affirmation is convertible with the particular.
Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι εἰς τὰ προειρημένα βλεπτέον ἑκατέρου καθʼ ἕκαστον πρόβλημα· διὰ τούτων γὰρ ἅπαντες οἱ συλλογισμοί.
It is clear, then, that one must look to the aforementioned things for each problem on both sides; for through these are all syllogisms.
δεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων, καὶ οἷς ἕπεται ἕκαστον, εἰς τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα βλέπειν, οἷον τοῦ μὲν Ε μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ Κ Ζ ἢ εἰς τὸ Ζ μόνον, τοῦ δὲ Α εἰς τὸ Κ Γ ἢ εἰς τὸ Γ μόνον.
But both for the consequents and for those things which each follows, one must look especially to the first and the most universal—for example, in the case of E, rather to K and Z than to Z alone, and in the case of A, to K and Γ than to Γ alone.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ Ζ ὑπάρχει τὸ Α, καὶ τῷ Ζ καὶ τῷ Ε ὑπάρχει· εἰ δὲ τούτῳ μὴ ἕπεται, ἐγχωρεῖ τῷ Ζ ἕπεσθαι.
For if A belongs to Z, it belongs both to Z and to E; but if it does not follow this, it is possible for it to follow Z.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐφʼ ὧν αὐτὸ ἀκολουθεῖ σκεπτέον· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πρώτοις, καὶ τοῖς ὑπʼ ἐκεῖνα ἕπεται, εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπὸ ταῦτα ἐγχωρεῖ.
In the same way, one must also consider those things which the subject itself follows; for if it follows the first things, it also follows those under them, but if it does not follow these, it is possible for it to follow those under them.