§1.1.12Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν ὑπάρχειν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός, ἐὰν μὴ ἀμφότεραι ὦσιν αἰ προτάσεις ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ. δʼ ἀναγκαίου ἔστι καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας μόνον ἀναγκαίας οὔσης.
It is clear, then, that a syllogism of belonging does not come about unless both premises are in belonging, but a syllogism of the necessary is possible even when only one of the two premises is necessary.
ἐν ἀμφοτέροις δέ, καὶ καταφατικῶν καὶ στερητικῶν ὄντων τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν ὁμοίαν εἶναι τῷ συμπεράσματι.
In both cases, however, whether the syllogisms are affirmative or privative, it is necessary for one premise to be similar to the conclusion.
λέγω δὲ τὸ ὁμοίαν, εἰ μὲν ὑπάρχον, ὑπάρχουσαν, εἰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀναγκαίαν.
I mean by "similar" that if [the conclusion] is belonging, the [premise] is belonging, and if necessary, necessary.
ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα οὔτʼ ἀναγκαῖον οὔθʼ ὑπάρχον εἶναι μὴ ληφθείσης ἀναγκαίας ἢ ὑπαρχούσης προτάσεως.
So this is also clear: that the conclusion will not be either necessary or belonging without a necessary or belonging premise being assumed.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀναγκαίου, πῶς γίγνεται καὶ τίνα διαφορὰν §1.1.13ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὑπάρχον, εἴρηται σχεδὸν ἱκανῶς· περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου μετὰ ταῦτα λέγωμεν πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται συλλογισμός.
Concerning the necessary, then, how it comes about and what difference it has in relation to belonging, it has been said almost sufficiently; let us speak next about the possible—when, how, and through what things there will be a syllogism.
λέγω δʼ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, οὗ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, τεθέντος δʼ ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτʼ ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ὁμωνύμως ἐνδέχεσθαι λέγομεν.
I mean by "to be possible" and "the possible" that which, not being necessary, but being assumed to belong, nothing impossible will result because of this; for we say that the necessary is possible homonymously.
συμβαίνει δὲ πάσας τὰς κατὰ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι προτάσεις ἀντιστρέφειν ἀλλήλαις.
And it happens that all premises according to possibility convert with one another.
λέγω δὲ οὐ τὰς καταφατικὰς ταῖς ἀποφατικαῖς, ἀλλʼ ὅσαι καταφατικὸν ἔχουσι τὸ σχῆμα κατὰ τὴν ἀντίθεσιν, οἷον τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ παντὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι τῷ ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενὶ καὶ μὴ παντί, καὶ τὸ τινὶ τῷ μὴ τινί.
I do not mean the affirmative with the negative, but those that have the affirmative form in opposition, such as "to be possible to belong" with "to be possible not to belong", and "to be possible for all" with "to be possible for none" and "not for all", and "for some" with "not for some".
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And in the same way also for the others.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἐγχωρεῖ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, φανερὸν ὅτι, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· καὶ εἰ παντὶ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, καὶ παντὶ ἐνδέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
For since the possible is not necessary, and the non-necessary can not belong, it is clear that if A can belong to B, it can also not belong; and if it can belong to all, it can also not belong to all.
ὁμοίως δὲ κἀπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει καταφάσεων· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἀπόδειξις.
Similarly also for particular affirmations; for the proof is the same.
εἰσὶ δʼ αἱ τοιαῦται προτάσεις κατηγορικαὶ καὶ οὐ στερητικαί· τὸ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι τῷ εἶναι ὁμοίως τάττεται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον.
And such premises are affirmative and not privative; for "to be possible" is ordered similarly to "to be", just as was said before.
Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων πάλιν λέγωμεν ὅτι τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι κατὰ δύο λέγεται τρόπους, ἕνα μὲν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεσθαι καὶ διαλείπειν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον τὸ πολιοῦσθαι ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ φθίνειν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ πεφυκὸς ὑπάρχειν (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ συνεχὲς μὲν ἔχει τὸ ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὄντος μέντοι ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστιν), ἄλλον δὲ τὸ ἀόριστον, ὃ καὶ οὕτως καὶ μὴ οὕτως δυνατόν, οἷον τὸ βαδίζειν ζῷον ἢ βαδίζοντος γενέσθαι σεισμόν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενον· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον οὕτως πέφυκεν ἢ ἐναντίως.
These things having been defined, let us say again that "to be possible" is said in two ways: one, that which happens for the most part and falls short of the necessary, such as a human becoming gray-haired or growing or decaying, or in general that which is natural to belong (for this does not have a continuous necessity because a human does not always exist, but when a human exists, it is of necessity or for the most part); the other, the indefinite, which is possible both in this way and not in this way, such as an animal walking or an earthquake occurring while it is walking, or in general that which happens by chance; for it is not more natural in this way than in the opposite.
ἀντιστρέφει μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀντικειμένας προτάσεις ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, οὐ μὴν τὸν αὐτόν γε τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πεφυκὸς εἶναι τῷ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μὴ πολιοῦσθαι ἄνθρωπον), τὸ δʼ ἀόριστον τῷ μηδὲν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως.
Each of the possibles, then, converts also according to the opposite premises, not indeed in the same way, but the natural with "not belonging of necessity" (for in this way it is possible for a human not to become gray-haired), and the indefinite with "nothing more in this way than in that".
ἐπιστήμη δὲ καὶ συλλογισμός ἀποδεικτικὸς τῶν μὲν ἀορίστων οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ ἄτακτον εἶναι τὸ μέσον, τῶν δὲ πεφυκότων ἔστι, καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ σκέψεις γίνονται περὶ τῶν οὕτως ἐνδεχομένων· ἐκείνων δʼ ἐγχωρεῖ μὲν γενέσθαι συλλογισμόν, οὐ μὴν εἴωθέ γε ζητεῖσθαι.
And there is no science or demonstrative syllogism of the indefinite because the middle term is irregular, but there is of the natural, and almost all arguments and inquiries are about things that are possible in this way; of the former, it is indeed possible for a syllogism to come about, but it is not indeed customary to be investigated.
Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διορισθήσεται μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις· νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ τίς ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων προτάσεων.
These things, then, will be defined more in what follows; now let us say when, how, and what syllogism there will be from possible premises.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι τόδε τῷδε ὑπάρχειν διχῶς ἔστιν ἐκλαβεῖν· ἢ γὰρ ᾧ ὑπάρχει τόδε ἢ ᾧ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν—τὸ γάρ, καθʼ οὗ τὸ Β, τὸ Α ἐνδέγεσθαι τούτων σημαίνει θάτερον, ἢ καθʼ οὗ λέγεται τὸ Β ἢ καθʼ οὗ ἐνδέχεται λέγεσθαι τὸ δέ, καθʼ οὗ τὸ Β, τὸ Α ἐνδέχεσθαι ἢ παντὶ τῷ τὸ Α ἐγχωρεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρειφανερὸν ὅτι διχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο τὸ Α τῷ Β παντὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν.
Since "to be possible for this to belong to this" can be understood in two ways (for either to that to which this belongs or to that to which it is possible for it to belong—for "that A is possible for that of which B" signifies one of these: either of that of which B is said or of that of which B is possible to be said; and "that A is possible of that of which B" or "to be possible for all that is possible for A" is no different), it is clear that "A is possible to belong to all B" would be said in two ways.
πρῶτον οὖν εἴπωμεν, εἰ καθʼ οὗ τὸ Γ τὸ Β ἐνδέχεται, καὶ καθʼ οὗ τὸ Β τὸ Α, τίς ἔσται καὶ ποῖος συλλογισμός· οὕτω γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις ἀμφότεραι λαμβάνονται κατὰ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι, ὅταν δὲ καθʼ οὗ τὸ Β ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐνδέχηται, ἡ μὲν ὑπάρχουσα ἡ δʼ ἐνδεχομένη.
First, then, let us say, if B is possible of that of which Γ is, and A of that of which B is, what and of what kind the syllogism will be; for in this way both premises are taken according to possibility, but when it is possible of that of which B belongs, one is belonging and the other possible.
ὥστʼ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοιοσχημόνων ἀρκτέον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.
So we must start from those of similar form, just as in the other cases.