§1.1.11#1Ἐν δὲ τῷ τελευταίῳ σχήματι καθόλου μέν ὄντων τῶν ὅρων πρός τὸ μέσον καὶ κατηγορικῶν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν προτάσεων, ἐὰν ὁποτερονοῦν ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔσται ἀναγκαῖον.
In the last figure, when the terms are universal in relation to the middle term and both premises are affirmative, if either of them is necessary, the conclusion will also be necessary.
ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν ᾖ στερητικὸν τὸ δὲ κατηγορικόν, ὅταν μὲν τὸ στερητικόν ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔσται ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν δὲ τὸ κατηγορικόν, οὐκ ἔσται ἀναγκαῖον.
But if one is privative and the other affirmative, when the privative is necessary, the conclusion will also be necessary; but when the affirmative is necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary.
ἔστωσαν γὰρ ἀμφότεραι κατηγορικαὶ πρῶτον αἱ προτάσεις, καὶ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπαρχέτω, ἀναγκαῖον δʼ ἔστω τὸ Α Γ. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρξει διὰ τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν τὸ καθόλου τῷ κατὰ μέρος, ὥστʼ εἰ παντὶ τῷ Γ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ Γ τῷ Β τινί, καὶ τῷ Β τινὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν τὸ Α· τὸ γὰρ Β ὑπὸ τὸ Γ ἐστίν.
For let both premises first be affirmative, and let both A and B belong to every Γ, and let A belonging to Γ be necessary of necessity. Since, then, B belongs to every Γ, Γ also will belong to some B, because the universal converts into the particular; so that if A belongs to every Γ of necessity and Γ to some B, A must also belong to some B of necessity; for B is under Γ.
γίγνεται οὖν τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα.
Thus the first figure comes about.
ὁμοίως δὲ δειχθήσεται καὶ εἰ τὸ Β Γ ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον· ἀντιστρέφει γὰρ τὸ Γ τῷ Α τινί, ὥστʼ εἰ παντὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Β ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ Α τινὶ ὑπάρξει ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
It will be shown in the same way also if B belonging to Γ is necessary; for Γ converts to some A, so that if B belongs to every Γ of necessity, it will also belong to some A of necessity.
Πάλιν ἔστω τὸ μὲν Γ στερητικόν, τὸ δὲ Β Γ καταφατικόν, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸ στερητικόν.
Again, let the [A]Γ be privative and BΓ affirmative, and let the privative be necessary.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀντιστρέφει τινὶ τῶ Β τὸ Γ, τὸ δὲ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐδὲ τῷ Β τινὶ ὑπάρξει ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ Α· τὸ γὰρ Β ὑπὸ τὸ Γ ἐστίν.
Since, then, Γ converts to some B, and A belongs to no Γ of necessity, A will also not belong to some B of necessity; for B is under Γ.
εἰ δὲ τὸ κατηγορικὸν ἀναγκαῖον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀναγκαῖον.
But if the affirmative is necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ Β Γ κατηγορικὸν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ Γ στερητικὸν καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον.
For let BΓ be affirmative and necessary, and let [A]Γ be privative and not necessary.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀντιστρέφει τὸ καταφατικόν, ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὥστʼ εἰ τὸ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ Γ τὸ δὲ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β, τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β οὐχ ὑπάρξει· ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· δέδεικται γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι ὅτι τῆς στερητικῆς προτάσεως μὴ ἀναγκαίας οὔσης οὐδὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔσται ἀναγκαῖον.
Since, then, the affirmative converts, Γ also will belong to some B of necessity, so that if A belongs to no Γ and Γ to some B, A will not belong to some B; but not of necessity; for it has been shown in the first figure that when the privative premise is not necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary either.
ἔτι κἂν διὰ τῶν ὅρων εἴη φανερόν.
Further, it would also be clear through the terms.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ μὲν Α ἀγαθόν, τὸ δʼ ἐφʼ Β ζῷον, τὸ δὲ Γ ἵππος.
For let A be good, B animal, and Γ horse.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθὸν ἐνδέχεται μηδενὶ ἵππῳ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ ζῷον ἀνάγκη παντὶ ὑπάρχειν· ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ζῷόν τι μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πᾶν εἶναι ἀγαθόν.
It is possible, then, for good to belong to no horse, but animal must belong to every horse of necessity; but it is not necessary for some animal not to be good, if indeed it is possible for all to be good.
ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ τὸ καθεύδειν ὅρον θετέον· ἅπαν γὰρ ζῷον δεκτικὸν τούτων.
Or if this is not possible, one must set "being awake" or "sleeping" as the term; for every animal is receptive of these.