§5ἐν δεξιᾷ τις ἀνὴρ κάθηται τὰ ὦτα παμμεγέθη ἔχων μικροῦ δεῖν τοῖς τοῦ Μίδου προσεοικότα, τὴν χεῖρα προτείνων πόρρωθεν ἔτι προσιούσῃ τῇ Διαβολῇ.
On the right sits a man with very large ears, almost resembling those of Midas, stretching out his hand to Slander who is still approaching from afar.
περὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἑστᾶσι δύο γυναῖκες, Ἄγνοιά μοι δοκεῖ καὶ Ὑπόληψις·
Around him stand two women, who seem to me to be Ignorance and Suspicion.
ἑτέρωθεν δὲ προσέρχεται ἡ Διαβολή, γύναιον ἐς ὑπερβολὴν πάγκαλον, ὑπόθερμον δὲ καὶ παρακεκινημένον, οἷον δὴ τὴν λύτταν καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν δεικνύουσα, τῇ μὲν ἀριστερᾷ δᾷδα καιομένην ἔχουσα, τῇ ἑτέρᾳ δὲ νεανίαν τινὰ τῶν τριχῶν σύρουσα τὰς χεῖρας ὀρέγοντα εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ μαρτυρόμενον τοὺς θεούς.
From the other side approaches Slander, a young woman exceedingly beautiful, but heated and agitated, showing as it were her madness and wrath, having in her left hand a burning torch, and with the other dragging a certain youth by the hair, who is stretching his hands to heaven and calling the gods to witness.
ἡγεῖται δὲ ἀνὴρ ὠχρὸς καὶ ἄμορφος, ὀξὺ δεδορκὼς καὶ ἐοικὼς τοῖς ἐκ νόσου μακρᾶς κατεσκληκόσι.
Leading the way is a pale and ugly man, with a sharp gaze, resembling those who are wasted from a long sickness.
τοῦτον οὖν εἶναι τὸν Φθόνον ἄν τις εἰκάσειε.
One might therefore guess this to be Envy.
καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς δύο παρομαρτοῦσι προτρέπουσαι καὶ περιστέλλουσαι καὶ κατακοσμοῦσαι τὴν Διαβολήν.
And indeed, two other women accompany Slander, encouraging, arranging, and adorning her.
ὡς δέ μοι καὶ ταύτας ἐμήνυσεν ὁ περιηγητὴς τῆς εἰκόνος, ἡ μέν τις Ἐπιβουλὴ ἦν, ἡ δὲ Ἀπάτη.
As the guide of the painting pointed out these also to me, one was Conspiracy and the other Deceit.
κατόπιν δὲ ἠκολούθει πάνυ πενθικῶς τις ἐσκευασμένη, μελανείμων καὶ κατεσπαραγμένη, Μετάνοια, οἶμαι, αὕτη ἐλέγετο· ἐπεστρέφετο γοῦν εἰς τοὐπίσω δακρύουσα καὶ μετʼ αἰδοῦς πάνυ τὴν Ἀλήθειαν προσιοῦσαν ὑπέβλεπεν.
Behind followed someone dressed in a very mournful way, clothed in black and torn, Repentance, I think, she was called; at any rate she was turning backward weeping and with great shame stole a glance at Truth who was approaching.
οὕτως μὲν Ἀπελλῆς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κίνδυνον ἐπὶ τῆς γραφῆς ἐμιμήσατο.
In this way Apelles represented his own danger in the painting.
§6φέρε δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς, εἰ δοκεῖ, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἐφεσίου ζωγράφου τέχνην διέλθωμεν τὰ προσόντα τῇ διαβολῇ, πρότερόν γε ὅρῳ τινὶ περιγράψαντες αὐτήν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἡμῖν ἡ εἰκὼν γένοιτο φανερωτέρα.
Come then, let us also, if it seems good, go through the characteristics of slander according to the art of the Ephesian painter, having first defined it by some limit; for thus the image would become clearer to us.
ἔστι τοίνυν διαβολὴ κατηγορία τις ἐξ ἐρημίας γινομένη, τὸν κατηγορούμενον λεληθυῖα, ἐκ τοῦ μονομεροῦς ἀναντιλέκτως πεπιστευμένη.
Slander, then, is an accusation made in the absence of the accused, unknown to the accused, and believed without contradiction from one side.
τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ ὑπόθεσις τοῦ λόγου.
This is the subject of our discourse.
τριῶν δʼ ὄντων προσώπων, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις, τοῦ διαβάλλοντος καὶ τοῦ διαβαλλομένου καὶ τοῦ πρὸς ὃν ἡ διαβολὴ γίνεται, καθʼ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐπισκοπήσωμεν οἷα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ γινόμενα.
Since there are three characters, just as in comedies—the slanderer, the slandered, and the one to whom the slander is made—let us examine what sort of things naturally happen in the case of each of them.
§7πρῶτον μὲν δή, εἰ δοκεῖ, παραγάγωμεν τὸν πρωταγωνιστὴν τοῦ δράματος, λέγω δὲ τὸν ποιητὴν τῆς διαβολῆς.
First, then, if it seems good, let us bring forward the protagonist of the drama, I mean the author of the slander.
οὗτος δὲ δὴ ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, πᾶσιν οἶμαι γνώριμον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἀγαθὸς κακῶν αἴτιος γένοιτο τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀφʼ ὧν εὖ ποιοῦσιν αὐτοὶ τοὺς φίλους, οὐκ ἀφʼ ὧν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀδικοῦντες αἰτιῶνται καὶ μισεῖσθαι παρασκευάζουσιν, εὐδοκιμεῖν δόξαν εὐνοίας προσλαβόντες.
That this man is not a good person, is, I think, clear to all; for no good man would be the cause of evils to his neighbor, but it is characteristic of good men that they themselves do good to their friends, not that they accuse others by doing them injustice and make them hated, while they themselves enjoy a reputation for goodwill.
§8ἔπειτα δὲ ὡς ἄδικος ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ παράνομός ἐστι καὶ ἀσεβὴς καὶ τοῖς χρωμένοις ἐπιζήμιος, ῥᾴδιον καταμαθεῖν.
Next, that such a man is unjust, lawless, impious, and harmful to those who associate with him, is easy to understand.
τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειε τὴν μὲν ἰσότητα ἐν ἅπαντι καὶ τὸ μηδὲν πλέον δικαιοσύνης ἔργα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἄνισόν τε καὶ πλεονεκτικὸν ἀδικίας;
For who would not agree that equality in everything and seeking no advantage are the works of justice, while inequality and greed are those of injustice?
ὁ δὲ τῇ διαβολῇ κατὰ τῶν ἀπόντων λάθρᾳ χρώμενος πῶς οὐ πλεονέκτης ἐστὶν ὅλον τὸν ἀκροατὴν σφετεριζόμενος καὶ προκαταλαμβάνων αὐτοῦ τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἀποφράττων καὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ λόγῳ παντελῶς ἄβατα κατασκευάζων αὐτὰ ὑπὸ τῆς διαβολῆς προεμπεπλησμένα;
And how is he who uses slander secretly against those who are absent not greedy, since he appropriates the whole hearer, pre-occupies his ears, blocks them, and makes them entirely inaccessible to the second speech, having pre-filled them with slander?
ἐσχάτης ἀδικίας τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς φαῖεν ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄριστοι τῶν νομοθετῶν, οἷον ὁ Σόλων καὶ ὁ Δράκων, ἔνορκον ποιησάμενοι τοῖς δικασταῖς τὸ ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν ἀκροᾶσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν εὔνοιαν ἴσην τοῖς κρινομένοις ἀπονέμειν, ἄχρι ἂν ὁ τοῦ δευτέρου λόγος παρατεθεὶς θατέρου χείρων ἢ ἀμείνων φανῇ· πρὶν δέ γε ἀντεξετάσαι τὴν ἀπολογίαν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ, παντελῶς ἀσεβῆ καὶ ἀνόσιον ἡγήσαντο ἔσεσθαι τὴν κρίσιν.
Such a thing is of the ultimate injustice, as even the best of lawgivers would say, such as Solon and Draco, who made it an oath for the judges to hear both sides equally and to award equal goodwill to those who are being judged, until the speech of the second, being presented, appears worse or better than the other; but before comparing the defense with the accusation, they thought that the judgment would be entirely impious and unholy.
καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀγανακτῆσαι τοὺς θεοὺς εἴποιμεν, εἰ τῷ κατηγόρῳ μετʼ ἀδείας ἃ θέλει λέγειν ἐπιτρέποιμεν, ἀποφράξαντες δὲ τῷ κατηγορουμένῳ τὰ ὦτα ἢ τῷ στόματι σιωπῶντος καταψηφιζοίμεθα τῷ προτέρῳ λόγῳ κεχειρωμένοι, ὥστε οὐ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸν ὅρκον τὸν δικαστικὸν φαίη τις ἂν γίγνεσθαι τὰς διαβολάς.
Indeed, we might say that even the gods themselves would be indignant if we should permit the accuser to say what he wishes with impunity, but blocking the ears of the accused or condemning him while he is silent, vanquished by the former speech, so that one would say that slanders do not occur in accordance with justice, law, and the judicial oath.
εἰ δέ τῳ μὴ ἀξιόπιστοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ νομοθέται παραινοῦντες οὕτω δικαίας καὶ ἀμερεῖς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς κρίσεις, ποιητήν μοι δοκῶ τὸν ἄριστον ἐπάγειν τῷ λόγῳ εὖ μάλα περὶ τούτων ἀποφηνάμενον, μᾶλλον δὲ νομοθετήσαντα.
And if the lawgivers do not seem trustworthy to someone when they advise making judgments so just and impartial, I think I can bring the best poet to our discourse, who has declared very well about these things, or rather, has made a law.
φησὶ δέ,
"μήτε δίκην δικάσῃς, πρὶν ἄμφω μῦθον ἀκούσῃς. "
ἠπίστατο γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ οὗτος ὡς πολλῶν ὄντων ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀδικημάτων οὐδὲν ἄν τις εὕροι χεῖρον οὐδὲ ἀδικώτερον ἢ ἀκρίτους τινὰς καὶ ἀμοίρους λόγων καταδεδικάσθαι· ὅπερ ἐξ ἅπαντος ὁ διαβάλλων ἐπιχειρεῖ ποιεῖν ἄκριτον ὑπάγων τὸν διαβαλλόμενον τῇ τοῦ ἀκούοντος ὀργῇ καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν τῷ λαθραίῳ τῆς κατηγορίας παραιρούμενος.
He says, "Do not judge a cause before you have heard the speech of both." For he too knew, I think, that although there are many injustices in life, one could find nothing worse or more unjust than that some should be condemned unheard and without a share in speech; which is exactly what the slanderer attempts to do in every way, bringing the slandered unheard to the wrath of the hearer and depriving him of his defense by the secrecy of the accusation.