Humanitext Reader

Lucian · Slander §25-32

Evils of Credulity and Scrutiny of Slander by Reason

Passage 6 of 6 · Greek

Summary

Discusses the evils arising from easily believing slander through historical and mythical examples, and argues that when facing slander, one should use reason as a doorkeeper and strictly examine the matter itself.

§25εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ κἂν μάθωσιν ὕστερον ἀδίκως διαβεβλημένους παρʼ αὐτοῖς τοὺς φίλους, ὅμως ὑπʼ αἰσχύνης ὧν ἐπίστευσαν οὐδʼ ἔτι προσίεσθαι οὐδὲ προσβλέπειν τολμῶσιν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἠδικημένοι, ὅτι μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας ἐπέγνωσαν.
But there are some who, even if they learn later that their friends were unjustly slandered in their presence, nevertheless, out of shame for what they believed, no longer dare to admit them or even look them in the face, as if they themselves had been wronged, because they recognized that those friends did nothing wrong.
§26τοιγαροῦν πολλῶν κακῶν ὁ βίος ἐπλήσθη ὑπὸ τῶν οὕτω ῥᾳδίως καὶ ἀνεξετάστως πεπιστευμένων διαβολῶν.
Therefore, life has been filled with many evils by slanders so easily and without examination believed.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ Ἄντεια " τεθναίης (φησίν), ὦ Προῖτʼ, ἢ κάκτανε Βελλεροφόντην, ὅς μʼ ἔθελεν φιλότητι μιγήμεναι οὐκ ἐθελούσῃ " αὐτὴ προτέρα ἐπιχειρήσασα καὶ ὑπεροφθεῖσα.
For Anteia indeed says: "May you die, O Proetus, or else slay Bellerophon, who wished to couple with me in love against my will," she herself having first made the attempt and been disdained.
καὶ μικροῦ ὁ νεανίας ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὴν Χίμαιραν συμπλοκῇ διεφθάρη ἐπιτίμιον σωφροσύνης ὑποσχὼν καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν ξένον αἰδοῦς ὑπὸ μάχλου γυναικὸς ἐπιβεβουλευμένος.
And the young man was almost destroyed in the encounter with the Chimera, paying the penalty for his moderation and his respect for his host, having been plotted against by a lustful woman.
ἡ δὲ Φαίδρα, κἀκείνη τὰ ὅμοια κατειποῦσα τοῦ προγόνου, ἐπάρατον ἐποίησε τὸν Ἱππόλυτον γενέσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐδέν, ὦ θεοί, οὐδὲν ἀνόσιον εἰργασμένον.
And Phaedra, she too having accused her stepson in like manner, caused Hippolytus to be cursed by his father, though he had done nothing, O gods, nothing unholy.
§27ναί, φήσει τις· ἀλλʼ ἀξιόπιστός ἐστιν ἐνίοτε ὁ διαβάλλων ἀνὴρ τά τε ἄλλα δίκαιος καὶ συνετὸς εἶναι δοκῶν, καὶ ἐχρῆν προσέχειν αὐτῷ ἅτε μηδὲν ἂν τοιοῦτο κακουργήσαντι. ἆρʼ οὖν τοῦ Ἀριστείδου ἔστι τις δικαιότερος;
"Yes," someone will say; "but the slanderer is sometimes trustworthy, seeming to be in other respects just and wise, and it was right to attend to him, on the ground that he would do no such mischief." Is there then anyone more just than Aristides?
ἀλλʼ ὅμως κἀκεῖνος συνέστη ἐπὶ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα καὶ συμπαρώξυνε τὸν δῆμον, ἧς, φασίν, ἐκεῖνος πολιτικῆς φιλοτιμίας ὑποκεκνισμένος.
Yet even he conspired against Themistocles and helped to incite the people, being stung, they say, by his political rivalry.
δίκαιος μὲν γὰρ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀριστείδης, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν καὶ χολὴν εἶχε, καὶ ἠγάπα τινὰ καὶ ἐμίσει.
For Aristides, though just in relation to others, was also himself a man and had gall, and loved some and hated others.
§28καὶ εἴ γε ἀληθής ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τοῦ Παλαμήδους λόγος, ὁ συνετώτατος τῶν Ἀχαιῶν κἀν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄριστος τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν καὶ ἐνέδραν ὑπὸ φθόνου φαίνεται συντεθεικὼς κατὰ ἀνδρὸς ὁμαίμου καὶ φίλου καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν κίνδυνον ἐκπεπλευκότος·
And if the story about Palamedes is true, the wisest of the Achaeans and in other things the best is seen to have contrived the plot and ambush out of envy against a kinsman and friend, and one who had sailed out to the same danger.
οὕτως ἔμφυτον ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἁμαρτία.
So innate in all men is error in such matters.
§29τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἢ τὸν Σωκράτην λέγοι τὸν ἀδίκως πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διαβεβλημένον ὡς ἀσεβῆ καὶ ἐπίβουλον;
For why should anyone speak of Socrates, who was unjustly slandered to the Athenians as impious and scheming?
ἢ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα ἢ τὸν Μιλτιάδην, τοὺς μετὰ τηλικαύτας νίκας ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπόπτους γενομένους;
Or of Themistocles or Miltiades, who after such great victories became suspected of betraying Greece?
μυρία γὰρ τὰ παραδείγματα καὶ σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα ἤδη γνώριμα.
For the examples are myriad, and almost most of them are already well known.
§30τί οὖν χρὴ καὶ ποιεῖν τόν γε νοῦν ἔχοντα ἢ ἀρετῆς ἢ ἀληθείας ἀμφισβητοῦντα;
What then should a sensible person do, or one who lays claim to virtue or truth?
ὅπερ, οἶμαι, καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τῷ περὶ Σειρήνων μύθῳ ᾐνίξατο παραπλεῖν κελεύσας τὰς ὀλεθρίους ταύτας τῶν ἀκουσμάτων ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀποφράττειν τὰ ὦτα καὶ μὴ ἀνέδην αὐτὰ ἀναπεταννύειν τοῖς πάθει προειλημμένοις, ἀλλʼ ἐπιστήσαντα ἀκριβῆ θυρωρὸν τὸν λογισμὸν ἅπασι τοῖς λεγομένοις τὰ μὲν ἄξια προσίεσθαι καὶ παραβάλλεσθαι, τὰ φαῦλα δὲ ἀποκλείειν καὶ ἀπωθεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη γελοῖον τῆς μὲν οἰκίας θυρωροὺς καθιστάναι, τὰ ὦτα δὲ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀνεῳγμένα ἐᾶν.
Just what, I think, Homer also hinted at in the myth of the Sirens, when he commanded to sail past these destructive pleasures of hearing, and to block up the ears and not to open them unconditionally to those already seized by passion, but having set reason as a strict doorkeeper over all that is said, to admit and welcome what is worthy, but to shut out and repel what is worthless; for indeed it would be ridiculous to set doorkeepers for one's house, but to leave one's ears and mind open.
§31ἐπειδὰν τοίνυν τοιαῦτα προσίῃ τις λέγων, αὐτὸ ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ χρὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐξετάζειν, μήτε ἡλικίαν τοῦ λέγοντος ὁρῶντα μήτε τὸν ἄλλον βίον μήτε τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀγχίνοιαν.
Therefore, when someone comes saying such things, we must examine the matter itself on its own merits, looking neither at the age of the speaker, nor at his other life, nor at his cleverness in speech.
ὅσῳ γάρ τις πιθανώτερος, τοσούτῳ ἐπιμελεστέρας δεῖται τῆς ἐξετάσεως.
For the more persuasive someone is, the more careful an examination is needed.
οὐ δεῖ τοίνυν πιστεύειν ἀλλοτρίᾳ κρίσει, μᾶλλον δὲ μίσει τοῦ κατηγοροῦντος, ἀλλʼ ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἐξέτασιν φυλακτέον τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀποδόντα καὶ τῷ διαβάλλοντι τὸν φθόνον καὶ ἐν φανερῷ ποιησάμενον τὸν ἔλεγχον τῆς ἑκατέρου διανοίας, καὶ μισεῖν οὕτω καὶ ἀγαπᾶν τὸν δεδοκιμασμένον.
One must not, therefore, trust another's judgment, or rather the hatred of the accuser, but must reserve the examination of the truth for oneself, attributing envy also to the slanderer, and making a public test of the disposition of each, and thus hate and love the one who has been tested.
πρὶν δὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῆς πρώτης διαβολῆς κεκινημένον, Ἡράκλεις, ὡς μειρακιῶδες καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶ πάντων οὐχ ἥκιστα ἄδικον.
But before doing this, to be moved by the first slander—O Heracles, how childish and base and, most of all, unjust!
§32ἀλλὰ τούτων ἁπάντων αἴτιον, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔφημεν, ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ τὸ ἐν σκότῳ που εἶναι τὸν ἑκάστου τρόπον· ὡς εἴ γε θεῶν τις ἀποκαλύψειεν ἡμῶν τοὺς βίους, οἴχοιτο ἂν φεύγουσα ἐς τὸ βάραθρον ἡ διαβολὴ χώραν οὐκ ἔχουσα, ὡς ἂν πεφωτισμένων τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας.
But the cause of all these things, as we said in the beginning, is ignorance and the fact that each person's character is in darkness; so that if some god were to reveal our lives, slander would vanish, fleeing into the abyss, having no place, inasmuch as things would be illuminated by the truth.

Notes

  1. §25ὧν — The relative pronoun ὧν undergoes case attraction. The antecedent (a neuter plural demonstrative like τούτων, representing the things they believed) is omitted, and the pronoun is attracted into the genitive. Alternatively, since πιστεύω normally governs the dative (οἷς ἐπίστευσαν), the relative pronoun is attracted to the genitive required by the governing noun αἰσχύνης ('shame for...').
  2. §26μικροῦ — An idiomatic expression meaning 'almost' or 'within a little of.' It originally derives from the phrase μικροῦ δεῖν ('lacking little'), but here δεῖν is omitted, leaving the genitive μικροῦ to function adverbially on its own.
  3. §27ἧς, φασίν, ἐκεῖνος πολιτικῆς φιλοτιμίας ὑποκεκνισμένος — A construction where the antecedent πολιτικῆς φιλοτιμίας is incorporated into the relative clause introduced by ἧς. The participle ὑποκεκνισμένος ('stung/irritated') governs the genitive to denote the cause of the irritation, meaning 'he (Aristides) being stung by his (Themistocles') political rivalry.'
  4. §31ἀποδόντα — An anacoluthon where the participle is in the accusative case (ἀποδόντα) instead of the dative (ἀποδόντι), even though it refers back to the dative agent ἑαυτῷ governed by the verbal adjective φυλακτέον. This shift occurs because φυλακτέον (meaning 'one must guard/keep') is treated as equivalent to an impersonal construction like δεῖ with an accusative and infinitive, leading to the accusative case for the virtual subject of the action.

Cite this passage

Lucian, Slander §25-32. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg013.humanitext-grc2:25-32

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