§973ΚΛ. πρὸς μὲν τὸ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἥκομεν ἅπαντες ὀρθῶς, ὦ ξένε, τρεῖς ὄντες, ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ Μέγιλλος ὅδε, τὸ τῆς φρονήσεως ἐπισκεψόμενοι τίνι ποτὲ χρὴ λόγῳ διεξελθεῖν, ὃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἕξιν φαμέν, ὅταν διανοηθῇ, κάλλιστʼ ἔχειν ποιεῖν πρὸς φρόνησιν ὅσην δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ σχεῖν.
CLEINIAS: We have all come rightly according to our agreement, Stranger, three of us, myself and you and Megillus here, to examine concerning wisdom in what way we must discourse upon it, which we say makes the human condition, when it has reasoned, best in respect of wisdom, as much as it is possible for a human to possess.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα, ὥς φαμεν, ἅπαντα διεξήλθομεν ὅσα ἦν περὶ νόμων θέσιν· ὃ δὲ μέγιστον εὑρεῖν τε καὶ εἰπεῖν, τί ποτε μαθὼν θνητὸς ἄνθρωπος σοφὸς ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο οὔτε εἴπομεν οὔτε ηὕρομεν, νῦν τε πειρώμεθα τοῦτο μὴ καταλιπεῖν· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀτελὲς ἂν πράξαιμεν οὗ χάριν ἅπαντες ὡρμήσαμεν, ὡς φανερὰ ποιήσοντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους.
For indeed all other things, as we say, we have discussed, as many as concerned the laying down of laws; but that which is greatest to find and to say, what on earth a mortal man should learn to be wise, this we have neither said nor found, and now let us try not to leave this behind; for we would do almost incomplete that for the sake of which we all set out, as if we were going to make it clear from the beginning to the end.
ΑΘ. ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, καλῶς μὲν λέγεις, ἄτοπον μὴν ἀκούσεσθαί σε λόγον οἶμαι, καί τινα τρόπον οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ.
ATHENIAN: My dear Cleinias, you speak well, yet I think you will hear a strange discourse, and yet in a way not strange.
πολλοὶ γὰρ δὴ προστυχεῖς τῷ βίῳ γιγνόμενοι τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον φέρουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἔσται μακάριον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος οὐδʼ εὔδαιμον.
For indeed many who have encountered life bring the same report, that the race of humans will not be blessed or happy.
ἕπου δὴ καὶ σύνιδε ἄν σοι δοκῶ κἀγὼ μετʼ αὐτῶν καλῶς τοῦ τοιούτου πέρι λέγειν.
Follow then and see if I too seem to you to speak well with them concerning such a matter.
οὔ φημι εἶναι δυνατὸν ἀνθρώποις μακαρίοις τε καὶ εὐδαίμοσιν γενέσθαι πλὴν ὀλίγων— μέχριπερ ἂν ζῶμεν τοῦτο διορίζομαι· καλὴ δὲ ἐλπὶς τελευτήσαντι τυχεῖν ἁπάντων ὧν ἕνεκά τις προθυμοῖτʼ ἂν ζῶν τε ὡς κάλλιστʼ ἂν ζῆν κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τελευτήσας τελευτῆς τοιαύτης τυχεῖν—λέγω δʼ οὐδὲν σοφόν, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἅπαντες Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι γιγνώσκομέν τινα τρόπον, ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν ἅπαντι ζῴῳ· πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μετασχεῖν τῆς τῶν κυουμένων ἕξεως, ἔπειτʼ αὖ τὸ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὸ τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, διὰ πόνων μυρίων ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι σύμπαντα, ὥς φαμεν ἅπαντες.
I say that it is not possible for humans to become blessed and happy, except for a few—I define this for as long as we live; but there is a good hope for one who has died to obtain all things for the sake of which one would be eager while living to live as beautifully as possible according to one's power, and after dying to obtain such an end—I say nothing wise, but what all of us, Greeks and barbarians alike, know in some way, that from the beginning coming into being is difficult for every living thing: first, to share in the state of being conceived, then again to be born, and further to be nourished and educated, and that all these things come about through countless labors as we all say.
§974ΑΘ. καὶ χρόνος βραχὺς ἄν τις εἴη πρὸς λογισμὸν μή τοι τῶν μοχθηρῶν, ἀλλʼ ὃ πᾶς ἂν ὑπολάβοι μέτριον.
ATHENIAN: And any time would be short for a calculation, not indeed of the miserable sort, but what anyone would understand as moderate.
οὗτος δὲ σχεδὸν ἀναπνοὴν δοκεῖ ποιεῖν τινα κατὰ μέσον πῃ βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον· ταχύ γε μὴν ἐπιλαβὸν γῆρας ὁντινοῦν ποιήσειʼ ἂν μήποτʼ ἐθελῆσαι πάλιν ἀναβιῶναι, λογισάμενον τὸν βεβιωμένον ἑαυτῷ βίον, ὅστις μὴ τυγχάνει παιδικῆς δόξης μεστὸς ὤν.
And this seems to bring a certain breathing space roughly around the middle of human life; but old age, taking hold quickly of anyone whatsoever, would make them never wish to live again, when they calculate the life they have lived, unless they happen to be full of childish opinion.
τούτων δὴ τί ποτέ μοι τεκμήριον;
What indeed is my proof of these things?
ὅτι πέφυκεν ταύτῃ τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον τῷ λόγῳ.
That what is now being sought in our discourse is naturally in this condition.
ζητοῦμεν δὲ δὴ τίνα τρόπον σοφοὶ γενησόμεθα, ὡς οὔσης τινὸς ἑκάστοις ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως· ἡ δὲ φυγῇ φεύγει τότε ὅταν τις πρός τινα φρόνησιν ἴῃ τῶν λεγομένων τεχνῶν ἢ φρονήσεων ἤ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων ὡς οἰόμεθα ἐπιστημῶν, ὡς ἀξίας τούτων οὐδεμιᾶς οὔσης ἐπίκλησιν ῥηθῆναι τῆς περὶ ταῦτα σοφίας τἀνθρώπινα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς σφόδρα πεποιθυίας καὶ μαντευομένης ὡς οὔσης αὐτῇ κατά τινα φύσιν ταύτης, τίς δέ ἐστιν καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς, οὐ πάνυ δυναμένης ἐξευρίσκειν.
For we are seeking in what way we shall become wise, as if this power were present in each of us; but it flees in swift flight whenever one goes toward any of the so-called arts or practical wisdoms or other such things which we think are sciences, since none of these is worthy to be called by the name of wisdom concerning these human affairs, while the soul is strongly confident and divining that this power belongs to it by some nature, though it is not at all able to discover what it is, and when and how.
ἆρʼ οὐ τούτῳ σφόδρα προσέοιχʼ ἡμῶν ἡ περὶ σοφίαν ἀπορία καὶ ζήτησις, πλείων τῆς ἐλπίδος ἑκάστῳ γιγνομένη τῶν ὅσοι ἐν ἡμῖν δυνατοὶ γίγνονται φρονίμως αὑτοὺς ἄλλους τε ἐξετάσαι συμφώνως διὰ λόγων πάντων καὶ πάντῃ λεγομένων;
Does not our perplexity and search concerning wisdom strongly resemble this, becoming greater than hope for each of those among us who become able to examine themselves and others wisely and harmoniously through all discourses spoken in every way?
ταῦτα οὐχ οὕτως ἢ ταύτῃ συμφήσομεν ἔχειν;
Shall we agree that these things are so, or in this way?
ΚΛ. συμφήσομεν ἐπʼ ἐλπίδι σοι ἴσως ταῦτʼ, ὦ ξένε, τῇ μετὰ σοῦ κατὰ χρόνον ἂν γενομένῃ, δοξάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εἰς αὖθις τὸ ἀληθέστατον.
CLEINIAS: We shall agree, perhaps on the strength of hope, Stranger, which in your company would come about in time, to form the truest opinion about them in the future.
ΑΘ. τὰς ἄλλας τοίνυν ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαι μέν εἰσιν λεγόμεναι, σοφὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀποτελοῦσιν τὸν λαμβάνοντά τε αὐτὰς καὶ ἔχοντα, πρῶτον διεξιτέον, ὅπως ταύτας ἐκποδὼν θέμενοι, πειρώμεθα ἐκείνας ὧν δεόμεθα παραθέσθαι τε καὶ παραθέμενοι μανθάνειν.
ATHENIAN: The other sciences then, as many as are called sciences indeed but do not make wise the one who receives and possesses them, we must first run through, so that putting these out of the way, we may try to set before us those of which we stand in need, and having set them before us, to learn them.
πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ὧν πρῶτον δεῖ θνητῷ γένει, ἴδωμεν ὡς εἰσὶ μὲν ἀναγκαιόταται σχεδὸν ἀληθῶς τε πρῶται, ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος, εἰ καὶ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἔδοξέν τις εἶναί ποτε σοφός, οὔκουν νῦν γε οὔτε σοφὸς εἶναι δοξάζεται ὀνείδη τε ἴσχει μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστήμης.
First, then, of the things that are first necessary for the mortal race, let us see how they are most necessary and almost truly first, but the one who becomes knowledgeable of them, even if at the beginning he seemed to someone once to be wise, is certainly not now thought to be wise, and rather incurs reproach from such knowledge.