§9.875ΑΘ. προρρητέον δή τι περὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τοιόνδε, ὡς ἄρα νόμους ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαῖον τίθεσθαι καὶ ζῆν κατὰ νόμους ἢ μηδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν πάντῃ ἀγριωτάτων θηρίων.
ATH. Indeed, something of this sort must be declared beforehand concerning all such matters, namely, that it is necessary for humans to establish laws and to live according to laws, or else to differ in no way from the most savage beasts of all.
ἡ δὲ αἰτία τούτων ἥδε, ὅτι φύσις ἀνθρώπων οὐδενὸς ἱκανὴ φύεται ὥστε γνῶναί τε τὰ συμφέροντα ἀνθρώποις εἰς πολιτείαν καὶ γνοῦσα, τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ δύνασθαί τε καὶ ἐθέλειν πράττειν.
And the reason for this is as follows: because no one's human nature is born capable enough both to know what is advantageous for humans for a state, and, having known it, to be always able and willing to do what is best.
γνῶναι μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον χαλεπὸν ὅτι πολιτικῇ καὶ ἀληθεῖ τέχνῃ οὐ τὸ ἴδιον ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὸν ἀνάγκη μέλειν—τὸ μὲν γὰρ κοινὸν συνδεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον διασπᾷ τὰς πόλεις—καὶ ὅτι συμφέρει τῷ κοινῷ τε καὶ ἰδίῳ, τοῖν ἀμφοῖν, ἢν τὸ κοινὸν τιθῆται καλῶς μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἴδιον·
For first, it is difficult to know that the political and true art must necessarily care not for the private but for the common—for the common binds, but the private tears states apart—and that it is advantageous to both, both the common and the private, if the common is established well rather than the private.
δεύτερον δέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ τὸ γνῶναί τις ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτω πέφυκεν λάβῃ ἱκανῶς ἐν τέχνῃ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀνυπεύθυνός τε καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ ἄρξῃ πόλεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο ἐμμεῖναι τούτῳ τῷ δόγματι καὶ διαβιῶναι τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἡγούμενον τρέφων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἑπόμενον τῷ κοινῷ, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν καὶ ἰδιοπραγίαν ἡ θνητὴ φύσις αὐτὸν ὁρμήσει ἀεί, φεύγουσα μὲν ἀλόγως τὴν λύπην, διώκουσα δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν, τοῦ δὲ δικαιοτέρου τε καὶ ἀμείνονος ἐπίπροσθεν ἄμφω τούτω προστήσεται, καὶ σκότος ἀπεργαζομένη ἐν αὑτῇ πάντων κακῶν ἐμπλήσει πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὑτήν τε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην.
And secondly, even if someone should sufficiently grasp in his art the knowledge that these things are naturally so, and after this should rule a state as one unaccountable and autocratic, he would never be able to abide by this doctrine and to live out his life nurturing the common as leading in the state, and the private as following the common; but mortal nature will always urge him towards greed and self-seeking, irrationally fleeing pain and pursuing pleasure, and will place both of these before what is more just and better, and by working darkness in itself, will at last fill both itself and the whole state with all evils.
ἐπεὶ ταῦτα εἴ ποτέ τις ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἱκανὸς θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γεννηθεὶς παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς εἴη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο τῶν ἀρξόντων ἑαυτοῦ· ἐπιστήμης γὰρ οὔτε νόμος οὔτε τάξις οὐδεμία κρείττων, οὐδὲ θέμις ἐστὶν νοῦν οὐδενὸς ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ δοῦλον ἀλλὰ πάντων ἄρχοντα εἶναι, ἐάνπερ ἀληθινὸς ἐλεύθερός τε ὄντως ᾖ κατὰ φύσιν.
For if ever some human, being born capable by nature through a divine portion, should be able to receive these things, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for no law or order is stronger than knowledge, nor is it right for intellect to be subject or slave to anyone, but to be ruler of all, if indeed it is true and really free according to nature.
νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ βραχύ· διὸ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἱρετέον, τάξιν τε καὶ νόμον, ἃ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁρᾷ καὶ βλέπει, τὸ δʼ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀδυνατεῖ.
But as it is, for it is nowhere in any way, except to a small degree; wherefore indeed we must choose the second-best, order and law, which indeed look and see for the most part, but are unable to do so for all cases.
ταῦτα δὴ τῶνδε εἵνεκα εἴρηται· νῦν ἡμεῖς τάξομεν τί χρὴ τὸν τρώσαντα ἤ τι βλάψαντα ἕτερον ἄλλον παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίνειν.
These things have indeed been said for the sake of the following: now we shall arrange what the one who has wounded or in some way harmed another must suffer or pay.
πρόχειρον δὴ παντὶ περὶ παντὸς ὑπολαβεῖν ὀρθῶς,
τὸν τί τρώσαντα ἢ τίνα ἢ πῶς ἢ πότε λέγεις;
Indeed, it is easy for anyone to conceive rightly about anything: 'Whom do you mean by the one who wounded what, or whom, or how, or when?
μυρία γὰρ ἕκαστά ἐστι τούτων καὶ πάμπολυ διαφέροντα ἀλλήλων. ταῦτʼ οὖν δὴ δικαστηρίοις ἐπιτρέπειν κρίνειν πάντα ἢ μηδὲν ἀδύνατον.
For each of these is myriad and exceedingly different from one another.' Therefore, to permit courts to judge all these things, or to permit them to judge nothing, is impossible.