§5.733ΑΘ. δεῖ δὴ τὸν κάλλιστον βίον ἐπαινεῖν, μὴ μόνον ὅτι τῷ σχήματι κρατεῖ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς, ἄν τις ἐθέλῃ γεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ νέος ὢν φυγὰς ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ γένηται, κρατεῖ καὶ τούτῳ ὃ πάντες ζητοῦμεν, τῷ χαίρειν πλείω, ἐλάττω δὲ λυπεῖσθαι παρὰ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα.
ATH.: Indeed, we must praise the most beautiful life, not only because in its outward form it excels with respect to reputation, but also because, if anyone is willing to taste it and does not become a fugitive from it when young, it excels also in this which we all seek, namely, in rejoicing more and grieving less throughout the whole of life.
ὡς δὲ ἔσται τοῦτο σαφές, ἂν γεύηταί τις ὀρθῶς, ἑτοίμως καὶ σφόδρα φανήσεται.
And how this will be clear, if one tastes it rightly, will appear readily and exceedingly.
ἡ δὲ ὀρθότης τίς;
But what is this rightness?
τοῦτο ἤδη παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρὴ λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν· εἴτε οὕτως ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν εἴτε ἄλλως παρὰ φύσιν, βίον χρὴ παρὰ βίον ἡδίω καὶ λυπηρότερον ὧδε σκοπεῖν.
This indeed one must grasp from the argument and examine; whether it is naturally inborn in us in this way or otherwise contrary to nature, we must examine one life against another as more pleasant and more painful in the following manner.
ἡδονὴν βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν εἶναι, λύπην δὲ οὔθʼ αἱρούμεθα οὔτε βουλόμεθα, τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον ἀντὶ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐ βουλόμεθα, λύπης δὲ ἀλλάττεσθαι βουλόμεθα· λύπην δʼ ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος ἡδονῆς βουλόμεθα, ἡδονὴν δʼ ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος λύπης οὐ βουλόμεθα, ἴσα δὲ ἀντὶ ἴσων ἑκάτερα τούτων οὐχ ὡς βουλόμεθα ἔχοιμεν ἂν διασαφεῖν.
We want pleasure to be present for us, but pain we neither choose nor want, and the neither-of-the-two state we do not want in place of pleasure, but we do want to exchange it for pain; and we want smaller pain with greater pleasure, but we do not want smaller pleasure with greater pain, and as for equal amounts of each of these in place of equals, we cannot clearly say that we want them.
ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ σφοδρότησιν ἰσότησίν τε, καὶ ὅσα ἐναντία ἐστὶν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς βούλησιν, διαφέροντά τε καὶ μηδὲν διαφέροντα πρὸς αἵρεσιν ἑκάστων.
All these things exist in quantity, magnitude, intensity, and equality, and all those things that are opposite to all such things affect our willing, differing or not differing at all with respect to the choice of each.
οὕτω δὴ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης διακεκοσμημένων, ἐν ᾧ μὲν βίῳ ἔνεστι πολλὰ ἑκάτερα καὶ μεγάλα καὶ σφοδρά, ὑπερβάλλει δὲ τὰ τῶν ἡδονῶν, βουλόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐ βουλόμεθα· καὶ αὖ ἐν ᾧ ὀλίγα ἑκάτερα καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ ἠρεμαῖα, ὑπερβάλλει δὲ τὰ λυπηρά, οὐ βουλόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τἀναντία, βουλόμεθα.
In this way indeed, these things being of necessity arranged, in whichever life both are present in great quantity, magnitude, and intensity, but the pleasures exceed, we want it, but in whichever the opposites exceed, we do not want it; and again, in whichever both are few, small, and gentle, but the painful things exceed, we do not want it, but in whichever the opposites exceed, we want it.
ἐν ᾧ δʼ αὖ βίῳ ἰσορροπεῖ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι· τὸν ἰσόρροπον βίον ὡς τῶν μὲν ὑπερβαλλόντων τῷ φίλῳ ἡμῖν βουλόμεθα, τῶν δʼ αὖ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς οὐ βουλόμεθα.
But in whichever life they are balanced, just as in the previous cases we must think: we want the balanced life if the exceeding elements are friendly to us, but on the other hand, we do not want it if they are friendly to our enemies.
πάντας δὴ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι τοὺς βίους ἡμῶν ὡς ἐν τούτοις ἐνδεδεμένοι πεφύκασιν, καὶ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ποίους φύσει βουλόμεθα· εἰ δέ τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄρα φαμὲν βούλεσθαι, διά τινα ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀπειρίαν τῶν ὄντων βίων αὐτὰ λέγομεν.
Indeed, we must think of all our lives as being by nature bound up in these things, and we must think of what kind of lives we naturally want; and if we say we want anything besides these, we say it through some ignorance and inexperience of the existing lives.
τίνες δὴ καὶ πόσοι εἰσὶ βίοι, ὧν πέρι δεῖ προελόμενον τὸ βούλητόν τε καὶ ἀκούσιον ἰδόντα εἰς νόμον ἑαυτῷ ταξάμενον, τὸ φίλον ἅμα καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἄριστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἑλόμενον, ζῆν ὡς οἷόν τʼ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπον μακαριώτατα;
What kind indeed, and how many are the lives concerning which one must choose, after seeing what is voluntary and involuntary, and establishing it as a law for oneself, and choosing what is at once friendly, pleasant, best, and most beautiful, so as to live as far as possible most happily as a human being?
λέγωμεν δὴ σώφρονα βίον ἕνα εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον ἕνα καὶ ἕνα τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, καὶ τὸν ὑγιεινὸν βίον ἕνα ταξώμεθα· §5.734ΑΘ. καὶ τούτοις οὖσιν τέτταρσιν ἐναντίους ἄλλους τέτταρας, ἄφρονα, δειλόν, ἀκόλαστον, νοσώδη.
Let us say that the temperate life is one, the prudent life is one, and the courageous life is one, and let us arrange the healthy life as one; ATH.: And to these being four, another four opposites, the foolish, the cowardly, the licentious, the diseased.
σώφρονα μὲν οὖν βίον ὁ γιγνώσκων θήσει πρᾷον ἐπὶ πάντα, καὶ ἠρεμαίας μὲν λύπας, ἠρεμαίας δὲ ἡδονάς, μαλακὰς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἔρωτας οὐκ ἐμμανεῖς παρεχόμενον, ἀκόλαστον δέ, ὀξὺν ἐπὶ πάντα, καὶ σφοδρὰς μὲν λύπας, σφοδρὰς δὲ ἡδονάς, συντόνους δὲ καὶ οἰστρώδεις ἐπιθυμίας τε καὶ ἔρωτας ὡς οἷόν τε ἐμμανεστάτους παρεχόμενον, ὑπερβαλλούσας δὲ ἐν μὲν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ τὰς ἡδονὰς τῶν ἀχθηδόνων, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ τὰς λύπας τῶν ἡδονῶν μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει καὶ πυκνότησιν.
The one who understands, therefore, will establish the temperate life as gentle in all things, providing gentle pains and gentle pleasures, mild desires and loves that are not mad; but the licentious life as sharp in all things, providing intense pains and intense pleasures, and high-strung and frenzied desires and loves as mad as possible, and with pleasures exceeding pains in the temperate life, but pains exceeding pleasures in the licentious life, in magnitude, quantity, and density.
ὅθεν ὁ μὲν ἡδίων ἡμῖν τῶν βίων, ὁ δὲ λυπηρότερος ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τόν γε βουλόμενον ἡδέως ζῆν οὐκέτι παρείκει ἑκόντα γε ἀκολάστως ζῆν, ἀλλʼ ἤδη δῆλον ὡς, εἰ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον ὀρθόν, πᾶς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄκων ἐστὶν ἀκόλαστος·
Whence indeed one of these lives happens of necessity to become by nature more pleasant for us, and the other more painful, and it is no longer open to one who wishes to live pleasantly to live licentiously of his own free will.
ἢ γὰρ διʼ ἀμαθίαν ἢ διʼ ἀκράτειαν ἢ διʼ ἀμφότερα, τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἐνδεὴς ὢν ζῇ ὁ πᾶς ἀνθρώπινος ὄχλος.
Rather, it is already clear that, if what is now being said is correct, every man is of necessity licentious against his will; for either through ignorance or through lack of self-control, or through both, the whole multitude of mankind lives being deficient in temperance.
ταὐτὰ δὲ περὶ νοσώδους τε καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ βίου διανοητέον, ὡς ἔχουσι μὲν ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, ὑπερβάλλουσι δὲ ἡδοναὶ μὲν λύπας ἐν ὑγιείᾳ, λῦπαι δὲ ἡδονὰς ἐν νόσοις.
And the very same things must be thought concerning the diseased and the healthy life, namely, that they have pleasures and pains, but pleasures exceed pains in health, while pains exceed pleasures in diseases.
ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ βούλησις τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν βίων οὐχ ἵνα τὸ λυπηρὸν ὑπερβάλλῃ· ὅπου δʼ ὑπερβάλλεται, τοῦτον τὸν βίον ἡδίω κεκρίκαμεν.
And our will in the choice of lives is not that the painful should exceed; but where it is exceeded, this life we have judged as more pleasant.
ὁ δὴ σώφρων τοῦ ἀκολάστου καὶ ὁ φρόνιμος τοῦ ἄφρονος, φαῖμεν ἄν, καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀνδρείας τοῦ τῆς δειλίας ἐλάττονα καὶ σμικρότερα καὶ μανότερα ἔχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάτερος ἑκάτερον ὑπερβάλλων, τῇ τῆς λύπης ἐκείνων ὑπερβαλλόντων αὐτούς, ὁ μὲν ἀνδρεῖος τὸν δειλόν, ὁ δὲ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα νικῶσιν, ὥστε ἡδίους εἶναι τοὺς βίους τῶν βίων, σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ ὑγιεινὸν δειλοῦ καὶ ἄφρονος καὶ ἀκολάστου καὶ νοσώδους, καὶ συλλήβδην τὸν ἀρετῆς ἐχόμενον κατὰ σῶμα ἢ καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν τοῦ τῆς μοχθηρίας ἐχομένου βίου ἡδίω τε εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπερέχειν ἐκ περιττοῦ κάλλει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδοξίᾳ, ὥστε τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὸν ζῆν εὐδαιμονέστερον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῦ ἐναντίου τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ.
Therefore, the temperate than the licentious, and the prudent than the foolish, we should say, and the courageous than the cowardly, having both of them fewer, smaller, and rarer, each surpassing the other in the abundance of pleasures, while in the abundance of pain those others surpass them—the courageous conquers the cowardly, and the prudent the foolish, so that these lives are more pleasant than those lives: namely, the temperate, courageous, prudent, and healthy than the cowardly, foolish, licentious, and diseased; and in short, the life adhering to virtue, whether of body or of soul, is more pleasant than the life adhering to vice, and excels also in the other things beyond measure in beauty, correctness, virtue, and reputation, so that it makes the one who possesses it live more happily than the opposite in every way and altogether.
καὶ τὸ μὲν προοίμιον τῶν νόμων ἐνταυθοῖ λεχθὲν τῶν λόγων τέλος ἐχέτω, μετὰ δὲ τὸ προοίμιον ἀναγκαῖόν που νόμον ἕπεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς νόμους πολιτείας ὑπογράφειν.
And let the prelude to the laws, having been spoken up to this point, have the end of its discourse, and after the prelude, it is necessary, I suppose, for the law to follow, or rather, in truth, to outline the laws of the constitution.