§10.900ΑΘ. ἢ καὶ πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνθρώπους ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γηραιούς, παῖδας παίδων καταλιπόντας ἐν τιμαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις, ταράττῃ τὸ νῦν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδών, ἢ διʼ ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης, προστυχὴς πολλῶν ἀσεβημάτων καὶ δεινῶν γενομένων τισίν, διʼ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐκ σμικρῶν εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀφικομένους·
**ATH.**: "Or perhaps, seeing human beings who have reached old age and left children of their children in the greatest honors, you are disturbed by what you now see in all these cases, whether perceiving it by hearsay or even entirely as an eye-witness yourself—having encountered many impious and terrible things done by some, who through these very things have arrived from small beginnings at tyrannies and the greatest power.
τότε διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλος εἶ μέμφεσθαι μὲν θεοὺς ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων διὰ συγγένειαν οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλων, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε ἀλογίας ἅμα καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος δυσχεραίνειν θεούς, εἰς τοῦτο νῦν τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθας, ὥστʼ εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν αὐτούς, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων.
Then, through all such things, you are clearly unwilling to blame the gods as being the causes of such things because of your kinship, but being led at the same time by lack of reason and being unable to be displeased with the gods, you have now come to this state of mind, so that they seem indeed to exist, but to despise and neglect human affairs.
ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἔλθῃ σοι πάθος πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα, ἀλλʼ ἐάν πως οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι λόγοις αὐτὸ προσιὸν γενώμεθα δυνατοί, πειρώμεθα, συνάψαντες τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον ᾧ πρὸς τὸν τὸ παράπαν οὐχ ἡγούμενον θεοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διεπερανάμεθα, τούτῳ τὰ νῦν προσχρήσασθαι.
Therefore, in order that your present belief may not lead you to a greater state of impiety, but if in some way we might be able to ward it off by arguments as it approaches, let us try, by connecting the next argument with that by which we fully disputed from the beginning against the one who does not believe in gods at all, to make use of it for the present.
σὺ δʼ, ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Μέγιλλε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νέου καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἀποκρινόμενοι διαδέχεσθε· ἂν δέ τι δύσκολον ἐμπίπτῃ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ σφῷν ὥσπερ νυνδὴ δεξάμενος διαβιβῶ τὸν ποταμόν. ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ σύ τε οὕτω ταῦτα δρᾶ, ποιήσομέν τε ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἃ λέγεις. ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν τάχʼ ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσιν θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον, μᾶλλον δέ, ἢ τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων.
And you, Clinias and Megillus, answer and take over the dialogue on behalf of the youth just as in the previous parts; and if any difficulty falls upon the arguments, I will receive it and ferry you across the river, just as I did just now." **CL.**: "You speak correctly; do you do these things in this way, and we shall do what you say to the best of our power." **ATH.**: "But perhaps it would be not at all difficult to show this much, that gods are no less attentive to small things, or rather more so, than to those that excel in magnitude.
ἤκουε γάρ που καὶ παρῆν τοῖς νυνδὴ λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὑτῶν οὖσαν κέκτηνται. ΚΛ. καὶ σφόδρα γε ἐπήκουεν. ΑΘ. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν κοινῇ συνεξεταζόντων τίνα λέγοντες ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι.
For surely he heard and was present at what was said just now, that being good in every virtue they possess the care of all things as being most akin to themselves." **CL.**: "Indeed, he was listening very much." **ATH.**: "Next, then, let us examine in common what virtue we are speaking of when we agree that they are good.
φέρε, τὸ σωφρονεῖν νοῦν τε κεκτῆσθαί φαμεν ἀρετῆς, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία κακίας; ΚΛ. φαμέν. ΑΘ. τί δέ;
Come, do we say that being temperate and possessing intellect belong to virtue, and their opposites to vice?" **CL.**: "We say so." **ATH.**: "What then?
ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ κακίας; ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΑΘ. καὶ τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ τούτων, τὰ δὲ καλὰ φήσομεν; ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη. ΑΘ. καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, ὁπόσα φλαῦρα, θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἐροῦμεν; ΚΛ. καὶ ταῦθʼ οὕτως ὁμολογοῖ πᾶς ἄν. ΑΘ. τί δέ;
That courage belongs to virtue, and cowardice to vice?" **CL.**: "Very much so." **ATH.**: "And shall we say that some of these are shameful, and others beautiful?" **CL.**: "Of necessity." **ATH.**: "And shall we say that all such things as are worthless belong to us, if indeed they do, but that no part of them, whether great or small, belongs to the gods?" **CL.**: "Everyone would agree to this as well." **ATH.**: "What then?
ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ τρυφὴν εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς θήσομεν, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς; ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ εἰς τοὐναντίον; ΚΛ. ναί. §10.901ΑΘ. τἀναντία ἄρα τούτοις εἰς τοὐναντίον; ΚΛ. τοὐναντίον. ΑΘ. τί οὖν δή;
Shall we place neglect, idleness, and luxury as belonging to the virtue of the soul, or how do you say?" **CL.**: "How could we?" **ATH.**: "But rather to the opposite?" **CL.**: "Yes." **ATH.**: "Then the opposites of these to the opposite?" **CL.**: "The opposite." **ATH.**: "What then?
τρυφῶν καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε, ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς κηφῆσι κοθούροισι μάλιστα εἴκελον ἔφασκεν εἶναι, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν τοιοῦτος πᾶς ἡμῖν; ΚΛ. ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών. ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τόν γε θεὸν οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον, ὅ γέ τοι αὐτὸς μισεῖ, τῷ τέ τι τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι πειρωμένῳ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον. ΚΛ. οὐ μὲν δή· πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ΑΘ. ὧι δὴ προσήκει μὲν πράττειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διαφερόντως τινός, ὁ δὲ τούτου γε νοῦς τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖται, τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖ, κατὰ τίνα ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι πλημμελοῖμεν;
Would anyone who is luxurious, neglectful, and idle—whom the poet said was most like the stingless drones—become such a one for us?" **CL.**: "Speaking most correctly." **ATH.**: "Therefore, it must not be said that the god has such a character, which he himself at least hates, nor must we permit anyone who tries to utter such a thing." **CL.**: "Indeed not; for how could we?" **ATH.**: "For whom indeed it is fitting to act and to care for something in an outstanding way, but his intellect cares for great things and neglects small things, in what respect could we praise such an argument without being altogether in error?
σκοπῶμεν δὲ ὧδε.
Let us consider it thus.
ἆρʼ οὐ κατὰ δύο εἴδη τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει ὁ πράττων, εἴτε θεὸς εἴτʼ ἄνθρωπος; ΚΛ. ποίω δὴ λέγομεν; ΑΘ. ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ, εἰ διαφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ.
Does not the one who acts, whether god or human, act in this way according to two forms?" **CL.**: "Which two do we mean?" **ATH.**: "Either thinking that it makes no difference to the whole if the small things are neglected, or through laziness and luxury, if it does make a difference, yet he neglects them.
ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια;
Or is there any other way in which neglect arises?
οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ᾖ τῶν ἁπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων, μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ ὧν ἂν δυνάμει θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται. ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ΑΘ. νῦν δὴ δύʼ ὄντες τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν οἱ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι, παραιτητοὺς δὲ ἅτερος, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖς τῶν σμικρῶν.
For surely, when it is impossible to care for all things, then there will be no neglect of small or great things, for one who does not care for what a god, or some worthless person being deficient and unable to care, becomes unable to care for." **CL.**: "For how could there be?" **ATH.**: "Now indeed, let the two, answering us who are three, speak—both of whom agree that gods exist, but the one that they can be appeased, and the other that they are neglectful of small things.
πρῶτον μὲν θεοὺς ἀμφότεροί φατε γιγνώσκειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι τῶν ὁπόσων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι· ταύτῃ λέγετε ἔχειν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς; ΚΛ. οὕτως. ΑΘ. τί δέ;
First indeed, both of you say that you know, see, and hear all things, and that it is impossible for anything of all those things of which there are senses and knowledges to escape them; do you say that these things are so in this way, or how?" **CL.**: "In this way." **ATH.**: "What then?
δύνασθαι πάντα ὁπόσων αὖ δύναμίς ἐστιν θνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις; ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς γε καὶ ἀρίστους ὡμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πέντε ὄντες. ΚΛ. σφόδρα γε. ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατον αὐτοὺς ὁμολογεῖν πράττειν ὁτιοῦν τὸ παράπαν, ὄντας γε οἵους ὁμολογοῦμεν;
That they are able to do all things of which there is power for mortals and immortals?" **CL.**: "For how will they not agree that these things also are so?" **ATH.**: "And indeed we have agreed that they are good and best, we who are five." **CL.**: "Very much so." **ATH.**: "Is it not then impossible to agree that they, being such as we agree they are, do anything at all through laziness and luxury?
δειλίας γὰρ ἔκγονος ἔν γε ἡμῖν ἀργία, ῥᾳθυμία δὲ ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς. ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. ΑΘ. ἀργίᾳ μὲν δὴ καὶ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ οὐδεὶς ἀμελεῖ θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ μέτεστιν αὐτῷ που δειλίας. ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
For among us indeed, idleness is the offspring of cowardice, and laziness is the offspring of idleness and luxury." **CL.**: "You speak most truly." **ATH.**: "Therefore indeed, no one of the gods neglects things through idleness and laziness; for surely no part of cowardice belongs to him." **CL.**: "You speak most correctly."