§313ΣΩ. ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: What is law for us?
ΕΤ. ὁποῖον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς τῶν νόμων;
COMPANION: What kind of laws do you mean?
ΣΩ. τί δʼ;
SOCRATES: How so?
ἔστιν ὅτι διαφέρει νόμος νόμου κατʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι;
Is there any way in which one law differs from another law in this respect, namely, in being a law?
σκόπει γὰρ δὴ ὃ τυγχάνω ἐρωτῶν σε.
For consider what I happen to be asking you.
ἐρωτῶ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνηρόμην τί ἐστιν χρυσός, εἴ με ὡσαύτως ἀνήρου ὁποῖον καὶ λέγω χρυσόν, οἴομαί σε οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐρέσθαι.
For I am asking—just as if I had asked what gold is, and you had asked me in turn what kind of gold I meant—I think you would not have asked correctly.
οὐδὲν γάρ που διαφέρει οὔτε χρυσὸς χρυσοῦ οὔτε λίθος λίθου κατά γε τὸ λίθος εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ χρυσός· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ νόμος που νόμου οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ πάντες εἰσὶν ταὐτόν.
For surely gold does not differ at all from gold, nor stone from stone, at least in being stone and in being gold; and so too law does not differ at all from law, but they are all the same.
νόμος γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστιν ὁμοίως, οὐχ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δʼ ἧττον·
For each of them is equally a law, not one more so and another less so.
τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ ἐρωτῶ, τὸ πᾶν τί ἐστιν νόμος.
This is the very thing I am asking: what is law as a whole?
εἰ οὖν σοι πρόχειρον, εἰπέ.
If, then, you have an answer ready, tell me.
ΕΤ. τί οὖν ἄλλο νόμος εἴη ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἢ τὰ νομιζόμενα;
COMPANION: What else could law be, Socrates, but what is customarily accepted?
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ λόγος σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα, ἢ ὄψις τὰ ὁρώμενα, ἢ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκουόμενα;
SOCRATES: Do you also think that speech is the things spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard?
ἢ ἄλλο μὲν λόγος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ὄψις, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἀκοή, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ νόμος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ νομιζόμενα;
Or is speech one thing and the things spoken another; and sight one thing and the things seen another; and hearing one thing and the things heard another; and so too, law one thing and the things customarily accepted another?
οὕτως ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;
Is it this way, or how does it seem to you?
ΕΤ. ἄλλο μοι νῦν ἐφάνη.
COMPANION: They seem to me now to be different.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα νόμος ἐστὶν τὰ νομιζόμενα.
SOCRATES: Then law is not the things customarily accepted.
ΕΤ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
COMPANION: It does not seem so to me.
§314ΣΩ. τί δῆτʼ ἂν εἴη νόμος;
SOCRATES: What then might law be?
ἐπισκεψώμεθʼ αὐτὸ ὧδε.
Let us examine it in this way.
εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεγόμενα ἀνήρετο,
ἐπειδὴ ὄψει φατὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ὄψει ὁρᾶται; ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλούσῃ τὰ πράγματα· εἰ δʼ αὖ ἤρετο ἡμᾶς,
τί δέ;
If someone had asked us about what we were just saying: "Since you say that things seen are seen by sight, by what being is it seen by sight?" We would have answered him: "By that sense which reveals things through the eyes." And if he asked us in turn: "What then?
ἐπειδὴ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα ἀκούεται, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ἀκοῇ; ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὤτων δηλούσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς φωνάς. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς,
ἐπειδὴ νόμῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίνι ὄντι τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται; πότερον αἰσθήσει τινὶ ἢ δηλώσει, ὥσπερ τὰ μανθανόμενα μανθάνεται δηλούσῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἢ εὑρέσει τινί, ὥσπερ τὰ εὑρισκόμενα εὑρίσκεται, οἷον τὰ μὲν ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἰατρικῇ, ἃ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ διανοοῦνται, ὥς φασιν οἱ μάντεις, μαντικῇ;
Since things heard are heard by hearing, by hearing, which is what being?" We would have answered him: "By that sense which reveals sounds to us through the ears." So likewise, if he should ask us: "Since things customarily accepted are accepted by law, by law, which is what being, are they accepted?" "Is it by some sense or disclosure, just as things learned are learned by knowledge which discloses them, or by some discovery, just as things discovered are discovered—for instance, healthy and diseased things by medicine, and what the gods intend, as the diviners say, by divination?
ἡ γάρ που τέχνη ἡμῖν εὕρεσίς ἐστιν τῶν πραγμάτων· ἦ γάρ; ΕΤ. πάνυ γε.
For surely an art is for us a discovery of things, is it not?" COMPANION: Certainly.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν ἂν τούτων ὑπολάβοιμεν μάλιστα τὸν νόμον εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Which of these, then, should we especially suppose law to be?
ΕΤ. τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
COMPANION: These decrees and resolutions, it seems to me.
τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τις φαίη νόμον εἶναι;
For what else could one say law is?
ὥστε κινδυνεύει, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο, νόμος, δόγμα πόλεως εἶναι.
So that, what you are asking about, this whole thing, "law", is likely to be a decree of the state.
ΣΩ. δόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον.
SOCRATES: You mean, it seems, that law is a political opinion.
ΕΤ. ἔγωγε.
COMPANION: I do.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἴσως καλῶς λέγεις· τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἄμεινον εἰσόμεθα.
SOCRATES: And perhaps you speak well; but we shall know better in this way.
λέγεις τινὰς σοφούς;
Do you say that there are some wise people?
ΕΤ. ἔγωγε.
COMPANION: I do.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ σοφοί εἰσιν σοφίᾳ σοφοί;
SOCRATES: Are not the wise wise by wisdom?
ΕΤ. ναί.
COMPANION: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: And what?
οἱ δίκαιοι δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοι;
Are the just just by justice?
ΕΤ. πάνυ γε.
COMPANION: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι;
SOCRATES: Are not also the law-abiding law-abiding by law?
ΕΤ. ναί.
COMPANION: Yes.
ΣΩ. οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἀνομίᾳ ἄνομοι;
SOCRATES: And the lawless lawless by lawlessness?
ΕΤ. ναί.
COMPANION: Yes.
ΣΩ. οἱ δὲ νόμιμοι δίκαιοι;
SOCRATES: And the law-abiding just?
ΕΤ. ναί.
COMPANION: Yes.
ΣΩ. οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἄδικοι;
SOCRATES: And the lawless unjust?
ΕΤ. ἄδικοι.
COMPANION: Unjust.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος;
SOCRATES: Then are not justice and law most noble?
ΕΤ. οὕτως.
COMPANION: They are.
ΣΩ. αἴσχιστον δὲ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ ἡ ἀνομία;
SOCRATES: And injustice and lawlessness most shameful?
ΕΤ. ναί.
COMPANION: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ μὲν σῴζει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀνατρέπει;
SOCRATES: And the former preserves cities and all other things, while the latter destroys and subverts them?
ΕΤ. ναί.
COMPANION: Yes.
ΣΩ. ὡς περὶ καλοῦ ἄρα τινὸς ὄντος δεῖ τοῦ νόμου διανοεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, one must think of law as being something noble, and seek it as a good.
ΕΤ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
COMPANION: How could one not?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δόγμα ἔφαμεν εἶναι πόλεως τὸν νόμον;
SOCRATES: Now, did we not say that law is a decree of the state?
ΕΤ. ἔφαμεν γάρ.
COMPANION: Yes, we said so.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά;
SOCRATES: Well then, are there not some decrees that are good and others that are bad?
ΕΤ. ἔστιν μὲν οὖν.
COMPANION: Yes, there are.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν νόμος γε οὐκ ἦν πονηρός.
SOCRATES: And yet, law indeed was not bad.
ΕΤ. οὐ γάρ.
COMPANION: No, indeed.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἀποκρίνεσθαι οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι νόμος ἐστὶ δόγμα πόλεως.
SOCRATES: Then it is not correct to answer so simply that law is a decree of the state.
ΕΤ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
COMPANION: It does not seem so to me.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ἁρμόττοι ἂν τὸ πονηρὸν δόγμα νόμος εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Then a bad decree would not fittingly be law.
ΕΤ. οὐ δῆτα.
COMPANION: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν δόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι·
SOCRATES: And yet, indeed, law itself appears to me to be a sort of opinion.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ ἡ πονηρὰ δόξα, ἆρα οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο κατάδηλον, ὡς ἡ χρηστή, εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί;
And since it is not the bad opinion, is it not already clear that it must be the good one, if indeed law is an opinion?
ΕΤ. ναί.
COMPANION: Yes.
ΣΩ. δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: And what is a good opinion?
οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής;
Is it not the true one?