§7.534ἀρκέσει οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ τὸ πρότερον, τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δευτέραν δὲ διάνοιαν, τρίτην δὲ πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην· καὶ συναμφότερα μὲν ταῦτα δόξαν, συναμφότερα δʼ ἐκεῖνα νόησιν· καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν· καὶ ὅτι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὅτι νόησις πρὸς δόξαν, ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν·
"Therefore," I said, "as before, it will be sufficient to call the first part knowledge, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth conjecture; and both of these latter together opinion, and both of those former together intellect; and opinion as being concerned with becoming, and intellect with reality; and as reality is to becoming, so is intellect to opinion, and as intellect is to opinion, so is knowledge to belief and understanding to conjecture.
τὴν δʼ ἐφʼ οἷς ταῦτα ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῇ ἑκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ τε καὶ νοητοῦ, ἐῶμεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρεληλυθότες. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγʼ, ἔφη, τά γε ἄλλα, καθʼ ὅσον δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι, συνδοκεῖ. ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας;
But as for the proportion of the things these are over, and the division into two of each of the two fields, the opinable and the intelligible, let us leave them aside, Glaucon, so that they do not fill us with many times more discussions than those we have already gone through." "At any rate, for my part," he said, "as far as I am able to follow, I agree in the other respects." "And do you also call a dialectician the one who grasps the account of the reality of each thing?
καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθʼ ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν; πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, φαίην; οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως·
And the one who is unable to do so, insofar as he cannot give an account to himself and to another, to that extent will you not say that he lacks intellect concerning it?" "How indeed," he said, "could I say otherwise?" "Then is it not the same also concerning the good?
ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιών, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατʼ οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλʼ εἴ πῃ εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ, οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον ὀνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδʼ ἐξεγρέσθαι, εἰς Ἅιδου πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθεῖν; νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, σφόδρα γε πάντα ταῦτα φήσω. ἀλλὰ μὴν τούς γε σαυτοῦ παῖδας, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς, ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.
Whoever is unable to define by account, separating from all other things, the idea of the good, and, as if in a battle, going through all tests, eager to examine not according to opinion but according to reality, and passes through all these with an unwavering account—will you not say that the one who is in this state knows neither the good itself nor any other good, but if he grasps some image of it, he grasps it by opinion and not by knowledge, and that he dreams and sleeps through his present life, and before waking up here, arrives in Hades first to fall completely asleep there?" "By Zeus," he said, "I will certainly say all these things very strongly." "But indeed, your own children, whom you are rearing and educating in speech, if you should ever rear them in fact, you would not, I think, allow them, while being as irrational as lines, to be rulers in the city and to have authority over the greatest matters." "No indeed," he said.
νομοθετήσεις δὴ αὐτοῖς ταύτης μάλιστα τῆς παιδείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐξ ἧς ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστημονέστατα οἷοί τʼ ἔσονται; νομοθετήσω, ἔφη, μετά γε σοῦ. §7.535ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτʼ ἄλλο τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων; ἔμοιγʼ, ἔφη.
"Then will you lay it down as a law for them to apply themselves especially to this education, from which they will be able to question and answer in the most scientific way?" "I will lay it down as a law," he said, "at least with you." "Does it then seem to you," I said, "that dialectic lies at the top of our studies like a coping-stone, and that no other study could rightly be placed higher than this, but that the matters of our studies now have their completion?" "To me at least," he said.
διανομὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ λοιπόν σοι, τίσιν ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα δώσομεν καὶ τίνα τρόπον. δῆλον, ἔφη.
"Then the distribution is what remains for you," I said, "to whom we shall give these studies and in what manner." "Clearly," he said.
μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἵους ἐξελέξαμεν; πῶς γάρ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὔ;
"Do you remember, then, the former election of the rulers, what kind of people we chose?" "Of course," he said.
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις οἴου δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι· τούς τε γὰρ βεβαιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρειοτάτους προαιρετέον, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τοὺς εὐειδεστάτους·
"Then, in other respects," I said, "consider that those natures must be selected; for the most steadfast and the most courageous must be preferred, and, as far as possible, the most handsome.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ζητητέον μὴ μόνον γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἤθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ τῇδε τῇ παιδείᾳ τῆς φύσεως πρόσφορα ἑκτέον αὐτοῖς. ποῖα δὴ διαστέλλῃ; δριμύτητα, ὦ μακάριε, ἔφην, δεῖ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς μανθάνειν.
And in addition to these, we must seek not only those who are noble and rugged in their characters, but they must also possess the natural qualities suitable for this education." "What kinds, then, do you distinguish?" "Keenness, my blessed friend," I said, "must be present in them for their studies, and they must not learn with difficulty.
πολὺ γάρ τοι μᾶλλον ἀποδειλιῶσι ψυχαὶ ἐν ἰσχυροῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις· οἰκειότερος γὰρ αὐταῖς ὁ πόνος, ἴδιος ἀλλʼ οὐ κοινὸς ὢν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος. ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.
For souls are much more cowardly in severe studies than in gymnastics; for the labor is more intimate to them, being private and not shared with the body." "True," he said.
καὶ μνήμονα δὴ καὶ ἄρρατον καὶ πάντῃ φιλόπονον ζητητέον.
"And indeed we must seek one who is mindful, unshakeable, and in every way lover of labor.
ἢ τίνι τρόπῳ οἴει τά τε τοῦ σώματος ἐθελήσειν τινὰ διαπονεῖν καὶ τοσαύτην μάθησίν τε καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν; οὐδένα, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἐὰν μὴ παντάπασί γʼ ᾖ εὐφυής. τὸ γοῦν νῦν ἁμάρτημα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ ταῦτα προσπέπτωκεν, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι οὐ κατʼ ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἅπτονται· οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει ἅπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γνησίους. πῶς; ἔφη.
Or in what way do you think someone will be willing to undergo the labors of the body and at the same time complete so much learning and practice?" "No one," he said, "unless he is altogether well-endowed by nature." "At any rate, the present error," I said, "and the dishonor have fallen upon philosophy because of these things, which we also said before, because people lay hold of her not according to her worth; for it was not bastards who should lay hold of her, but the legitimate." "How?" he said.
πρῶτον μέν, εἶπον, φιλοπονίᾳ οὐ χωλὸν δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἁψόμενον, τὰ μὲν ἡμίσεα φιλόπονον ὄντα, τὰ δʼ ἡμίσεα ἄπονον.
"First of all," I said, "the one who is to lay hold of her must not be lame in his love of labor, being half-loving of labor and half-idle.
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν τις φιλογυμναστὴς μὲν καὶ φιλόθηρος ᾖ καὶ πάντα τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος φιλοπονῇ, φιλομαθὴς δὲ μή, μηδὲ φιλήκοος μηδὲ ζητητικός, ἀλλʼ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις μισοπονῇ·
This happens when someone is a lover of gymnastics and a lover of hunting, and loves labor in all things through the body, but is not a lover of learning, nor a lover of listening, nor inquisitive, but hates labor in all these things.
χωλὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ τἀναντία τούτου μεταβεβληκὼς τὴν φιλοπονίαν. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.
And the one who has changed his love of labor to the opposite of this is also lame." "You speak most truly," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἀνάπηρον ψυχὴν θήσομεν, ἣ ἂν τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον ψεῦδος μισῇ καὶ χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτή τε καὶ ἑτέρων ψευδομένων ὑπεραγανακτῇ, τὸ δʼ ἀκούσιον εὐκόλως προσδέχηται καὶ ἀμαθαίνουσά που ἁλισκομένη μὴ ἀγανακτῇ, ἀλλʼ εὐχερῶς ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνηται;
"Then also with regard to truth," I said, "shall we not likewise consider that soul crippled which hates voluntary falsehood and takes it hard and is exceedingly angry when others tell lies, but easily accepts involuntary falsehood and is not angry when caught being ignorant, but is easily defiled in ignorance like a swinish beast?"