Humanitext Reader

Plato · Republic §4.444-4.445

Justice as Health of the Soul and the Five Constitutions

Passage 66 of 153 · Greek

Summary

Socrates and Glaucon establish that justice is a healthy state of the soul where its parts harmoniously perform their natural functions, while injustice is a diseased state caused by internal strife and rebellion. They then propose that the forms of the soul correspond to the five types of constitution, identifying their currently described just state (monarchy or aristocracy) as the first form.

§4.444παντάπασιν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
"Entirely so, Socrates, you speak the truth," he said.
εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
"Very well," I said.
τὸν μὲν δίκαιον καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ὃ τυγχάνει ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄν, εἰ φαῖμεν ηὑρηκέναι, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τι οἶμαι δόξαιμεν ψεύδεσθαι. μὰ Δία οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη.
"If we should say we have found both the just man and the just city, and justice, which happens to be in them, I do not think we would seem to be lying at all." "By Zeus, certainly not," he said.
φῶμεν ἄρα; φῶμεν. ἔστω δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
"Shall we assert it then?" "Let us assert it." "So let it be then," I said.
μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο σκεπτέον οἶμαι ἀδικίαν. δῆλον. οὐκοῦν στάσιν τινὰ αὖ τριῶν ὄντων τούτων δεῖ αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐπανάστασιν μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἵνʼ ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐ προσῆκον, ἀλλὰ τοιούτου ὄντος φύσει οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν, τῷ δʼ οὐ δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι; τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα οἶμαι φήσομεν καὶ τὴν τούτων ταραχὴν καὶ πλάνην εἶναι τήν τε ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶσαν κακίαν. αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, ἔφη.
"For after this, I think we must consider injustice." "Clearly." "Must it not, in turn, be a certain civil strife among these three parts, a meddling and interference in others' affairs, and a rebellion of a certain part against the whole of the soul, so that it may rule in it when it is not proper, but this part being of such a nature that it is fitting for it to be a slave, whereas it is not fitting for the other part, which is of the ruling class, to be a slave?" "Such things, I think, and the confusion and wandering of these parts we shall say are injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, ignorance, and, in a word, all vice." "Precisely these things," he said.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἄδικα πράττειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ αὖ τὸ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ταῦτα πάντα τυγχάνει ὄντα κατάδηλα ἤδη σαφῶς, εἴπερ καὶ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη; πῶς δή; ὅτι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τυγχάνει οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῶν ὑγιεινῶν τε καὶ νοσωδῶν, ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἐν σώματι, ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῇ. πῇ; ἔφη.
"Then," I said, "to do unjust things, to act unjustly, and in turn to do just things—are not all these things already clearly obvious, if indeed injustice and justice also are?" "How so?" "Because," I said, "they happen to differ in no way from healthy and diseased things, as those are in the body, so these are in the soul." "In what way?" he said.
τὰ μέν που ὑγιεινὰ ὑγίειαν ἐμποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ νοσώδη νόσον. ναί. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαια πράττειν δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖ, τὸ δʼ ἄδικα ἀδικίαν; ἀνάγκη. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπʼ ἄλλου. ἔστι γάρ. οὐκοῦν αὖ, ἔφην, τὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ ἀδικίαν παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπʼ ἄλλου; κομιδῇ, ἔφη.
"Presumably, healthy things produce health, and diseased things disease." "Yes." "Does not, then, acting justly produce justice, and acting unjustly injustice?" "Necessarily." "And to produce health is to establish the things in the body so that they rule and are ruled by one another according to nature, and to produce disease is to rule and be ruled by one another contrary to nature." "Indeed it is." "Therefore, in turn," I said, "to produce justice is to establish the things in the soul so that they rule and are ruled by one another according to nature, and to produce injustice is to rule and be ruled by one another contrary to nature?" "Completely so," he said.
ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια. ἔστιν οὕτω. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα εἰς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν φέρει, τὰ δʼ αἰσχρὰ εἰς κακίας; ἀνάγκη. §4.445τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν ἤδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἐστι σκέψασθαι πότερον αὖ λυσιτελεῖ δίκαιά τε πράττειν καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἐάντε λανθάνῃ ἐάντε μὴ τοιοῦτος ὤν, ἢ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενος. ἀλλʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γελοῖον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ σκέμμα γίγνεσθαι ἤδη, εἰ τοῦ μὲν σώματος τῆς φύσεως διαφθειρομένης δοκεῖ οὐ βιωτὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ μετὰ πάντων σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ παντὸς πλούτου καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς, τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου ᾧ ζῶμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται, ἐάνπερ τις ποιῇ ὃ ἂν βουληθῇ ἄλλο πλὴν τοῦτο ὁπόθεν κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγήσεται, δικαιοσύνην δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν κτήσεται, ἐπειδήπερ ἐφάνη γε ὄντα ἑκάτερα οἷα ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν. γελοῖον γάρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
"Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a certain health and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice a disease and ugliness and weakness." "It is so." "Does it not then follow that beautiful practices lead to the acquisition of virtue, and ugly ones to vice?" "Necessarily." "What remains for us now, as it seems, is to consider whether, in turn, it is profitable to do just things and to practice beautiful things and to be just, whether one is undetected or not being such, or to act unjustly and to be unjust, provided one does not pay the penalty and does not become better by being punished." "But, Socrates," he said, "the inquiry seems to me to become ridiculous already, if, when the nature of the body is being destroyed, life does not seem to be livable even with all kinds of foods and drinks and all wealth and all power, but when the nature of that very thing by which we live is being troubled and destroyed, life will indeed be livable, if indeed one does whatever else he wishes except that which will rid him of vice and injustice, and acquire justice and virtue, since both have indeed appeared to be such as we have described." "Yes, it is ridiculous," I said.
ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐπείπερ ἐνταῦθα ἐληλύθαμεν, ὅσον οἷόν τε σαφέστατα κατιδεῖν ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει οὐ χρὴ ἀποκάμνειν. ἥκιστα, νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, πάντων ἀποκμητέον. δεῦρό νυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς ὅσα καὶ εἴδη ἔχει ἡ κακία, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἅ γε δὴ καὶ ἄξια θέας. ἕπομαι, ἔφη· μόνον λέγε.
"But nevertheless, since we have come to this point, we must not grow weary of observing as clearly as possible that these things are so." "Least of all, by Zeus," he said, "must we grow weary." "Come here then," I said, "so that you may also see how many forms vice has, as it seems to me, those indeed which are also worth seeing." "I follow," he said, "only speak." "And indeed," I said, "as if from a watchtower, it appears to me, since we have climbed up to this point in the argument, that while the form of virtue is one, those of vice are infinite, but there are four among them which are also worth mentioning." "How do you mean?" he said.
καὶ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς μοι φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἓν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἄπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας, τέτταρα δʼ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄττα ὧν καὶ ἄξιον ἐπιμνησθῆναι. πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. ὅσοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πολιτειῶν τρόποι εἰσὶν εἴδη ἔχοντες, τοσοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι.
"As many as there are constitutions that have distinct forms, just so many are likely to be the types of soul," I said.
πόσοι δή; πέντε μέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πολιτειῶν, πέντε δὲ ψυχῆς. λέγε, ἔφη, τίνες. λέγω, εἶπον, ὅτι εἷς μὲν οὗτος ὃν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν πολιτείας εἴη ἂν τρόπος, ἐπονομασθείη δʼ ἂν καὶ διχῇ· ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος βασιλεία ἂν κληθείη, πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία. ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.
"How many then?" "Five of constitutions," I said, "and five of the soul." "Tell me," he said, "which ones?" "I say," I said, "that this one which we have described would be one type of constitution, but it could be named in two ways: for if one outstanding man arises among the rulers, it would be called a kingdom; but if more than one, an aristocracy." "True," he said.
τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἓν εἶδος λέγω·
"This, then, I call one form," I said.
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν πλείους οὔτε εἷς ἐγγενόμενοι κινήσειεν ἂν τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως, τροφῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ χρησάμενος ᾗ διήλθομεν. οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ἔφη.
"For neither many nor one arising would disturb any of the laws of the city that are worth mentioning, if they used the nurture and education we have described." "No, indeed, it is not likely," he said.

Notes

  1. 444bδεῖ αὐτὴν εἶναι — The accusative pronoun `αὐτήν` refers to `ἀδικίαν` (injustice) mentioned in the previous sentence, serving as the subject of the infinitive `εἶναι`. This is an accusative with infinitive (A.C.I.) construction governed by the impersonal verb `δεῖ`.
  2. 444bοὐ προσῆκον — This is the neuter singular participle (nominative) of the impersonal verb `προσήκει`. Here, it agrees in gender, number, and case with the preceding neuter noun `μέρος` (part), functioning as the subject of the subordinate clause `ἵνʼ ἄρχῃ`.
  3. 444bτοιούτου ὄντος φύσει οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν — A genitive participial phrase agreeing with the preceding `μέρους`. The relative pronoun `οἵου` expresses quality and governs the impersonal infinitive `πρέπειν`, which in turn takes the dative `αὐτῷ` and the infinitive `δουλεύειν` ("of such a nature as is fitting for it to serve").
  4. 445aδοκεῖ οὐ βιωτὸν εἶναι — The verbal adjective `βιωτόν` means "livable" or "worth living". Its neuter singular form is used impersonally as `βιωτόν ἐστι` ("life is worth living"), and here its infinitive form `εἶναι` serves as the complement of `δοκεῖ` ("it does not seem that life is worth living").
  5. 445dἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς — The participle `ἐγγενομένου` (aorist of `ἐγγίγνομαι`) forms a genitive absolute construction with the noun `ἀνδρὸς ἑνός` ("one man having arisen"), which here functions conditionally ("for if one man should arise").

Cite this passage

Plato, Republic §4.444-4.445. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.humanitext-grc2:4.444-4.445

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