§4.441ἆρʼ οὖν ἕτερον ὂν καὶ τούτου, ἢ λογιστικοῦ τι εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ τρία ἀλλὰ δύο εἴδη εἶναι ἐν ψυχῇ, λογιστικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν;
"Is it then different from this as well, or is it a kind of the rational part, so that there are not three but two forms in the soul, the rational and the appetitive?
ἢ καθάπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει συνεῖχεν αὐτὴν τρία ὄντα γένη, χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρητικόν, βουλευτικόν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπίκουρον ὂν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῇ; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τρίτον.
Or, just as three classes held the city together, the money-making, the auxiliary, and the deliberative, is the spirited part likewise a third thing in the soul, being by nature an auxiliary to the rational part, unless it is corrupted by bad rearing?" "Necessarily a third," he said.
ναί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἄν γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἄλλο τι φανῇ, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἐφάνη ἕτερον ὄν. ἀλλʼ οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη, φανῆναι·
"Yes," I said, "if indeed it should appear to be something other than the rational part, just as it appeared to be different from the appetitive." "But it is not difficult," he said, "for it to appear so.
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτό γʼ ἄν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γενόμενα μεστά ἐστι, λογισμοῦ δʼ ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε. ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καλῶς γε εἶπες.
For even in children one can see this, that immediately from birth they are full of spirit, but as for rational calculation, some, I think, never share in it, while the majority do so quite late." "Yes, by Zeus," I said, "you have spoken well.
ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἄν τις ἴδοι ὃ λέγεις, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.
And one can also see what you say in wild beasts, that it is so.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὃ ἄνω που εἴπομεν, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου μαρτυρήσει, τὸ—
"
στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· "
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ σαφῶς ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἐπιπλῆττον πεποίηκεν Ὅμηρος τὸ ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ. κομιδῇ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις. ταῦτα μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μόγις διανενεύκαμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπιεικῶς ὡμολόγηται τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν ἐν πόλει, τὰ αὐτὰ δʼ ἐν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ γένη ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμόν. ἔστι ταῦτα. οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνό γε ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς πόλις ἦν σοφὴ καὶ ᾧ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τούτῳ σοφὸν εἶναι; τί μήν; καὶ ᾧ δὴ ἀνδρεῖος ἰδιώτης καὶ ὥς, τούτῳ καὶ πόλιν ἀνδρείαν καὶ οὕτως, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὡσαύτως ἀμφότερα ἔχειν; ἀνάγκη. καὶ δίκαιον δή, ὦ Γλαύκων, οἶμαι φήσομεν ἄνδρα εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ πόλις ἦν δικαία. καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. ἀλλʼ οὔ πῃ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἐπιλελήσμεθα, ὅτι ἐκείνη γε τῷ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττειν τριῶν ὄντων γενῶν δικαία ἦν. οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, ἐπιλελῆσθαι.
And in addition to these, what we said somewhere above will bear witness, that passage of Homer: 'He smote his breast and rebuked his heart with words.' For there Homer has clearly represented one part chiding another— that which has calculated about the better and the worse chiding that which is irrationally spirited." "Most certainly," he said, "you are right." "These things, then," I said, "we have with difficulty swum through, and it is fairly agreed between us that the same classes, and equal in number, exist both in the city and in the soul of each individual." "That is so." "Is it not then already necessary that, in the manner and by that by which the city was wise, so also the individual is wise, and by the same?" "Of course." "And that by which and in the manner the individual is brave, by this and in this manner the city also is brave, and that in all other things regarding virtue both stand in the same relation?" "Necessarily." "And indeed, Glaucon, I think we shall say a man is just in the same way in which a city was just." "This too is entirely necessary." "But surely we have not in any way forgotten this, that the city was just by each of the three classes within it doing its own work." "I do not think we have forgotten," he said.
μνημονευτέον ἄρα ἡμῖν ὅτι καὶ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος, ὅτου ἂν τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττῃ, οὗτος δίκαιός τε ἔσται καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων. καὶ μάλα, ἦ δʼ ὅς, μνημονευτέον. οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόῳ εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου; πάνυ γε. §4.442ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κρᾶσις σύμφωνα αὐτὰ ποιήσει, τὸ μὲν ἐπιτείνουσα καὶ τρέφουσα λόγοις τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθήμασιν, τὸ δὲ ἀνιεῖσα παραμυθουμένη, ἡμεροῦσα ἁρμονίᾳ τε καὶ ῥυθμῷ; κομιδῇ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
"We must remember then that each of us also, in whom each of the parts within him does its own work, will be just and doing his own work." "Indeed," he said, "we must remember it." "Therefore, does it not belong to the rational part to rule, since it is wise and has the care for the entire soul, and to the spirited part to be obedient to and an ally of this?" "Certainly." "Will not then, as we were saying, a mixture of music and gymnastics make them concordant, tightening and nourishing the one with beautiful words and teachings, and relaxing, comforting, and soothing the other with harmony and rhythm?" "Most certainly," he said.
καὶ τούτω δὴ οὕτω τραφέντε καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὑτῶν μαθόντε καὶ παιδευθέντε προστήσεσθον τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ—ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον—ὃ τηρήσετον μὴ τῷ πίμπλασθαι τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλουμένων ἡδονῶν πολὺ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν γενόμενον οὐκ αὖ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ καταδουλώσασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσῆκον αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ σύμπαντα τὸν βίον πάντων ἀνατρέψῃ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
"And these two, having been thus reared and having truly learned and been educated in their own work, will preside over the appetitive part—which is the largest part of the soul in each person and by nature most insatiable for wealth—which they will watch lest, being filled with the so-called pleasures of the body, it becomes large and strong and no longer does its own work, but attempts to enslave and rule over those things which do not belong to it by nature, and overturns the whole life of all." "Most certainly," he said.
ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πολεμίους τούτω ἂν κάλλιστα φυλαττοίτην ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον, τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν, ἑπόμενον τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιτελοῦν τὰ βουλευθέντα; ἔστι ταῦτα. καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ οἶμαι τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασῴζῃ διά τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μή. ὀρθῶς γʼ, ἔφη.
"Would not these two then," I said, "also guard most excellently against enemies from without on behalf of the entire soul and body, the one deliberating, the other fighting in defense, following the ruler and by its courage executing what has been deliberated?" "That is so." "And a man, I think, we call brave by this part, when his spirited part preserves through both pains and pleasures the command of reason concerning what is to be feared and what is not." "Correct," he said.
σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, τῷ ὃ ἦρχέν τʼ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν, ἔχον αὖ κἀκεῖνο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὑτῷ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἑκάστῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. τί δέ;
"And wise by that small part, which ruled in him and gave these commands, possessing in its turn within itself the knowledge of what is beneficial to each part and to the whole community of these three." "Most certainly." "And what of temperate?
σώφρονα οὐ τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τὼ ἀρχομένω τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζωσιν αὐτῷ; σωφροσύνη γοῦν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ τοῦτο, πόλεώς τε καὶ ἰδιώτου. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ δίκαιός γε, ᾧ πολλάκις λέγομεν, τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως ἔσται. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. τί οὖν; εἶπον ἐγώ·
Is it not by the friendship and concord of these very parts, when the ruling part and the two ruled parts agree that the rational part must rule and do not raise faction against it?" "Temperance indeed," he said, "is nothing else than this, both of a city and of an individual." "But indeed, he will be just by that which and in the manner we have often said." "Most necessarily." "What then?" I said.
μή πῃ ἡμῖν ἀπαμβλύνεται ἄλλο τι δικαιοσύνη δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐφάνη; οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.
"Does justice in any way become blurred for us, so as to seem to be anything else than what it appeared to be in the city?" "Not to me at least," he said.
ὧδε γάρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, παντάπασιν ἂν βεβαιωσαίμεθα εἴ τι ἡμῶν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμφισβητεῖ, τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες. ποῖα δή;
"For in this way," I said, "we could entirely confirm it, if any part of us still doubts in the soul, by bringing to bear upon it the vulgar tests." "What kind of tests do you mean?"