§4.439τὸ δὲ δὴ δίψος, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐ τούτων θήσεις τῶν τινὸς εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν;
"But now," I said, "as for thirst, will you not class it among those things that are related to something?
ἔστι δὲ δήπου δίψος— ἔγωγε, ἦ δʼ ὅς· πώματός γε. οὐκοῦν ποιοῦ μέν τινος πώματος ποιόν τι καὶ δίψος, δίψος δʼ οὖν αὐτὸ οὔτε πολλοῦ οὔτε ὀλίγου, οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ, οὐδʼ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινος, ἀλλʼ αὐτοῦ πώματος μόνον αὐτὸ δίψος πέφυκεν; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἡ ψυχή, καθʼ ὅσον διψῇ, οὐκ ἄλλο τι βούλεται ἢ πιεῖν, καὶ τούτου ὀρέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὁρμᾷ. δῆλον δή. οὐκοῦν εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτὴν ἀνθέλκει διψῶσαν, ἕτερον ἄν τι ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν;
Thirst is surely—" "I will indeed," he said, "related to drink." "Therefore, is not a thirst of a particular quality for a drink of a particular quality, but thirst itself by itself is neither of much nor of little, nor of good nor of bad, nor, in a word, of any particular quality, but is by nature simply thirst itself for drink itself?" "Most certainly." "Therefore, the soul of the thirsty person, insofar as he thirsts, wishes for nothing else than to drink, and desires this and rushes toward this?" "Clearly." "Therefore, if anything ever pulls it back when it is thirsty, would there not be something different in it from that very part which thirsts and leads it like a beast to drink?
οὐ γὰρ δή, φαμέν, τό γε αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμʼ ἂν τἀναντία πράττοι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνταί τε καὶ προσέλκονται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χείρ, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ προσαγομένη. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
For, we say, the same thing would not perform contrary actions at the same time with the same part of itself in relation to the same object." "No, indeed." "Just as, I think, it is not well said of the archer that his hands at the same time push away and draw back the bow, but that one is the hand that pushes away, and the other is the hand that draws back." "Most certainly," he said.
πότερον δὴ φῶμέν τινας ἔστιν ὅτε διψῶντας οὐκ ἐθέλειν πιεῖν; καὶ μάλα γʼ, ἔφη, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις. τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, φαίη τις ἂν τούτων πέρι;
"Should we say then that there are times when people who are thirsty are unwilling to drink?" "Yes, indeed," he said, "many people and many times." "What then," I said, "should one say about them?
οὐκ ἐνεῖναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελεῦον, ἐνεῖναι δὲ τὸ κωλῦον πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὂν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύοντος; ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.
Is it not that there is in their soul something bidding them to drink, and also something forbidding them to drink, which is different from and rules over that which bids?" "I think so," he said.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, ὅταν ἐγγένηται, ἐκ λογισμοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄγοντα καὶ ἕλκοντα διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων παραγίγνεται; φαίνεται. οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτὰ διττά τε καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἑταῖρον. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ εἰκότως, ἔφη, ἡγοίμεθʼ ἂν οὕτως. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δύο ἡμῖν ὡρίσθω εἴδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα·
"Does not that which forbids such things arise, when it does, from rational calculation, while the things that lead and draw them are present through passions and diseases?" "It seems so." "Then not unreasonably," I said, "shall we claim that they are two and distinct from one another, calling the part of the soul with which it calculates the rational part, and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and is excited about the other desires, the irrational and appetitive part, the companion of certain replenishments and pleasures." "No, but rather reasonably," he said, "should we hold it so." "Let these two forms, then," I said, "be defined by us as being in the soul.
τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμούμεθα πότερον τρίτον, ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ ἂν εἴη ὁμοφυές; ἴσως, ἔφη, τῷ ἑτέρῳ, τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ. §4.440ἀλλʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ· ὡς ἄρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιὼν ἐκ Πειραιῶς ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους, ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δὲ αὖ δυσχεραίνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτόν, καὶ τέως μὲν μάχοιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοιτο, κρατούμενος δʼ οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διελκύσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, προσδραμὼν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς,
ἰδοὺ ὑμῖν,
ἔφη,
ὦ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος. ἤκουσα, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός.
But as for the spirit, or that with which we are spirited, is it a third part, or would it be of the same nature as one of these two?" "Perhaps," he said, "with the latter, the appetitive part." "But," I said, "having once heard a story, I believe it: that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up from the Piraeus under the outside of the northern wall, perceiving dead bodies lying by the executioner, at the same time desired to look at them, and at the same time was disgusted and turned himself away, and for a time fought and covered his face, but being overcome by the desire, he forced his eyes open, ran to the dead bodies, and said, 'Look, you miserable wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!' ""I have heard it too," he said.
οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφην, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὡς ἄλλο ὂν ἄλλῳ. σημαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.
"But this story," I said, "indicates that anger sometimes wars against the desires, as one thing against another." "It does indeed," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἔφην, πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζωνταί τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμίαι, λοιδοροῦντά τε αὑτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντοιν σύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου;
"And do we not also perceive elsewhere in many cases," I said, "when desires force someone contrary to rational calculation, that he reviles himself and is angry at that which forces him within him, and that his spirit becomes an ally to reason, as if there were two factions fighting?
ταῖς δʼ ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινωνήσαντα, αἱροῦντος λόγου μὴ δεῖν ἀντιπράττειν, οἶμαί σε οὐκ ἂν φάναι γενομένου ποτὲ ἐν σαυτῷ τοῦ τοιούτου αἰσθέσθαι, οἶμαι δʼ οὐδʼ ἐν ἄλλῳ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη.
But as for the spirit making common cause with the desires, when reason decides that it must not oppose, I think you would not say that you have ever perceived such a thing happening in yourself, nor, I think, in anyone else." "No, by Zeus," he said.
τί δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅταν τις οἴηται ἀδικεῖν;
"And what," I said, "when someone thinks he is in the wrong?
οὐχ ὅσῳ ἂν γενναιότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ ἧττον δύναται ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ πεινῶν καὶ ῥιγῶν καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων πάσχων ὑπʼ ἐκείνου ὃν ἂν οἴηται δικαίως ταῦτα δρᾶν, καί, ὃ λέγω, οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός; ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.
The more noble he is, is he not so much the less able to be angry, even though he suffers hunger and cold and whatever other such things from him whom he thinks does this justly, and, as I say, his spirit refuses to be aroused against him?" "True," he said.
τί δὲ ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαί τις ἡγῆται;
"But what when a man thinks he is wronged?
οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ συμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ καί, διὰ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν, ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξηται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρʼ αὑτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς πραϋνθῇ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔοικε τούτῳ ᾧ λέγεις·
Does he not in this case boil and chafe, and ally himself with what seems just, and, through suffering hunger and cold and all such things, holding out, does he not conquer, and the noble man does not cease until he either achieves his end or dies, or is recalled by the reason within him and quieted, like a dog by a shepherd?" "Certainly," he said, "it is exactly like what you say.
καίτοι γʼ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει τοὺς ἐπικούρους ὥσπερ κύνας ἐθέμεθα ὑπηκόους τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ποιμένων πόλεως. καλῶς γάρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, νοεῖς ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν.
And indeed, in our city, we set the auxiliaries like dogs obedient to the rulers as shepherds of the city." "You understand well," I said, "what I want to say.
ἀλλʼ ἦ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τόδε ἐνθυμῇ; τὸ ποῖον; ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἢ ἀρτίως ἡμῖν φαίνεται περὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς.
But do you also consider this in addition?" "What is that?" "That the opposite of what we thought just now appears to us concerning the spirited part.
τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικόν τι αὐτὸ ᾠόμεθα εἶναι, νῦν δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖν φαμεν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν. παντάπασιν, ἔφη.
For then we thought it was something appetitive, but now we say it is far from it, but much rather in the faction of the soul it aligns its arms with the rational part." "Most certainly," he said.