§4.437οὐδὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τῶν τοιούτων λεγόμενον ἐκπλήξει, οὐδὲ μᾶλλόν τι πείσει ὥς ποτέ τι ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὂν ἅμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τἀναντία πάθοι ἢ καὶ εἴη ἢ καὶ ποιήσειεν. οὔκουν ἐμέ γε, ἔφη.
"Therefore," I said, "none of these objections will frighten us, nor will they any more convince us that the same thing being the same could ever at the same time in the same respect in relation to the same thing undergo, or be, or do opposites." "Not me, at any rate," he said.
ἀλλʼ ὅμως, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ ἀναγκαζώμεθα πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐπεξιόντες καὶ βεβαιούμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς οὔσας μηκύνειν, ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προΐωμεν, ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐάν ποτε ἄλλῃ φανῇ ταῦτα ἢ ταύτῃ, πάντα ἡμῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τούτου συμβαίνοντα λελυμένα ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.
"But nevertheless," I said, "in order that we may not be compelled to go through all such objections and waste time by confirming that they are not true, let us proceed forward on the hypothesis that this is so, having agreed that, if these things should ever appear otherwise than this, all the consequences we have drawn from this will be undone." "That is what we must do," he said.
ἆρʼ ἂν οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ἀνανεύειν καὶ τὸ ἐφίεσθαί τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις θείης εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων;
"Would you then," I said, "class assenting and dissenting, desiring to take something and rejecting it, and drawing something to oneself and repelling it—would you class all these as opposites to one another, whether they are actions or passions?
οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτῃ διοίσει. ἀλλʼ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, τῶν ἐναντίων. τί οὖν; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
For that will make no difference." "Yes," he said, "as opposites." "What then?" I said.
διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὐ πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνά ποι ἂν θείης τὰ εἴδη τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα;
"Thirst and hunger and generally the desires, and again willing and wishing, would you not class all these somewhere in those classes we have just mentioned?
οἷον ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἐφίεσθαι φήσεις ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ, ἢ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν βούληταί οἱ γενέσθαι, ἢ αὖ, καθʼ ὅσον ἐθέλει τί οἱ πορισθῆναι, ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο πρὸς αὑτὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος, ἐπορεγομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσεως; ἔγωγε.
For instance, would you not say that the soul of one who desires always either strives for that which it desires, or draws to itself that which it wishes to have, or again, insofar as it wills something to be provided for itself, assents to this within itself as if someone were asking a question, reaching out for its realization?" "I would," he said.
τί δέ;
"And what of not wishing, not willing, and not desiring?
τὸ ἀβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μηδʼ ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἀπʼ αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντα τἀναντία ἐκείνοις θήσομεν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἐπιθυμιῶν τι φήσομεν εἶναι εἶδος, καὶ ἐναργεστάτας αὐτῶν τούτων ἥν τε δίψαν καλοῦμεν καὶ ἣν πεῖναν; φήσομεν, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
Shall we not class these under repelling and driving away from oneself, and under the complete opposites of the former?" "Of course we shall." "This being so, shall we say that there is a certain class of desires, and that the most distinct of these are what we call thirst and hunger?" "We shall," he said.
οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ποτοῦ, τὴν δʼ ἐδωδῆς; ναί. ἆρʼ οὖν, καθʼ ὅσον δίψα ἐστί, πλέονος ἄν τινος ἢ οὗ λέγομεν ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴη, οἷον δίψα ἐστὶ δίψα ἆρά γε θερμοῦ ποτοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, ἢ πολλοῦ ἢ ὀλίγου, ἢ καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινος πώματος;
"The one being for drink, the other for food?" "Yes." "Would then thirst, insofar as it is thirst, be a desire in the soul for anything more than what we say? For instance, is thirst thirst for a hot drink or a cold one, or for much or little, or, in a word, for a drink of some particular quality?
ἢ ἐὰν μέν τις θερμότης τῷ δίψει προσῇ, τὴν τοῦ ψυχροῦ ἐπιθυμίαν προσπαρέχοιτʼ ἄν, ἐὰν δὲ ψυχρότης, τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ;
Or is it that, if some heat is added to the thirst, it would also bring with it the desire for a cold drink, and if cold is added, the desire for a hot one?
ἐὰν δὲ διὰ πλήθους παρουσίαν πολλὴ ἡ δίψα ᾖ, τὴν τοῦ πολλοῦ παρέξεται, ἐὰν δὲ ὀλίγη, τὴν τοῦ ὀλίγου;
And if the thirst is great because of the presence of quantity, will it provide the desire for much, and if small, for little?
αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ διψῆν οὐ μή ποτε ἄλλου γένηται ἐπιθυμία ἢ οὗπερ πέφυκεν, αὐτοῦ πώματος, καὶ αὖ τὸ πεινῆν βρώματος; οὕτως, ἔφη, αὐτή γε ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάστη αὐτοῦ μόνον ἑκάστου οὗ πέφυκεν, τοῦ δὲ τοίου ἢ τοίου τὰ προσγιγνόμενα.
But thirsting itself will never be a desire for anything other than what it is naturally for, namely drink itself, and likewise hungering for food itself?" "Yes," he said, "each desire itself is only for that each thing itself which it is naturally for, but the desires for a drink of this or that quality are due to additions."