§3.408δῆλον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς καὶ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐφάνησαν, καὶ τῇ ἰατρικῇ, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐχρῶντο;
"Clearly," I said; "and don't you see that his sons too, because he was such a man, showed themselves good in the war at Troy, and made use of medicine in the way I am saying?
ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι ὅτι καὶ τῷ Μενέλεῳ ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος οὗ ὁ Πάνδαρος ἔβαλεν—
"
αἷμʼ ἐκμυζήσαντες ἐπʼ ἤπια φάρμακʼ ἔπασσον,
"
ὅτι δʼ ἐχρῆν μετὰ τοῦτο ἢ πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ Εὐρυπύλῳ προσέταττον, ὡς ἱκανῶν ὄντων τῶν φαρμάκων ἰάσασθαι ἄνδρας πρὸ τῶν τραυμάτων ὑγιεινούς τε καὶ κοσμίους ἐν διαίτῃ, κἂν εἰ τύχοιεν ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα κυκεῶνα πιόντες, νοσώδη δὲ φύσει τε καὶ ἀκόλαστον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ᾤοντο λυσιτελεῖν ζῆν, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν τέχνην δεῖν εἶναι, οὐδὲ θεραπευτέον αὐτούς, οὐδʼ εἰ Μίδου πλουσιώτεροι εἶεν. πάνυ κομψούς, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιοῦ παῖδας. πρέπει, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καίτοι ἀπειθοῦντές γε ἡμῖν οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί τε καὶ Πίνδαρος Ἀπόλλωνος μέν φασιν Ἀσκληπιὸν εἶναι, ὑπὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πεισθῆναι πλούσιον ἄνδρα θανάσιμον ἤδη ὄντα ἰάσασθαι, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κεραυνωθῆναι αὐτόν.
Or do you not remember that also for Menelaus, from the wound which Pandarus inflicted, they— 'sucked out the blood and sprinkled soothing medicines upon it'— but that after this they no more prescribed what he must drink or eat than they did for Eurypylus, on the ground that the medicines were sufficient to cure men who, before their wounds, were healthy and orderly in their diet, even if they happened to have drunk a kykeon at that very moment; but for one who was diseased by nature and intemperate, they thought it profited neither themselves nor others for him to live, and that the art ought not to exist for these, nor should they be treated, even if they were richer than Midas." "Very clever sons of Asclepius," he said, "you describe." "It is fitting," I said, "although the tragedy writers and Pindar disagree with us, saying that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, but was persuaded by gold to cure a rich man who was already at death's door, whence indeed he was struck by lightning.
ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα οὐ πεισόμεθα αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ἦν, οὐκ ἦν, φήσομεν, αἰσχροκερδής· εἰ δʼ αἰσχροκερδής, οὐκ ἦν θεοῦ. ὀρθότατα, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ταῦτά γε.
But we, in accordance with what was said before, will not believe them on both counts; but if he was the son of a god, we will say he was not avaricious; and if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god." "Most correct," he said, "at least in this.
ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦδε τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
But about this point what do you say, Socrates?
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκτῆσθαι ἰατρούς;
Is it not necessary to acquire good physicians in the city?
εἶεν δʼ ἄν που μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι ὅσοι πλείστους μὲν ὑγιεινούς, πλείστους δὲ νοσώδεις μετεχειρίσαντο, καὶ δικασταὶ αὖ ὡσαύτως οἱ παντοδαπαῖς φύσεσιν ὡμιληκότες. καὶ μάλα, εἶπον, ἀγαθοὺς λέγω.
And such would surely be especially those who have handled the greatest number of healthy and the greatest number of sick people, and likewise judges who have associated with all kinds of natures." "Indeed," I said, "I mean very good ones.
ἀλλʼ οἶσθα οὓς ἡγοῦμαι τοιούτους; ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔφη.
But do you know whom I hold to be such?" "If you tell me," he said.
ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· σὺ μέντοι οὐχ ὅμοιον πρᾶγμα τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἤρου. πῶς; ἔφη.
"Well, I will try," I said; "however, you asked about two things that are not alike under the same argument." "How so?" he said.
ἰατροὶ μέν, εἶπον, δεινότατοι ἂν γένοιντο, εἰ ἐκ παίδων ἀρξάμενοι πρὸς τῷ μανθάνειν τὴν τέχνην ὡς πλείστοις τε καὶ πονηροτάτοις σώμασιν ὁμιλήσειαν καὶ αὐτοὶ πάσας νόσους κάμοιεν καὶ εἶεν μὴ πάνυ ὑγιεινοὶ φύσει.
"Physicians," I said, "would become most clever if, starting from childhood, in addition to learning their art, they associated with as many and as bad bodies as possible, and themselves suffered all illnesses and were not altogether healthy by nature.
οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι σώματι σῶμα θεραπεύουσιν—οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὰ ἐνεχώρει κακὰ εἶναί ποτε καὶ γενέσθαι—ἀλλὰ ψυχῇ σῶμα, ᾗ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ κακὴν γενομένην τε καὶ οὖσαν εὖ τι θεραπεύειν. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
For I do not think they treat body with body—for then it would not be admissible for those bodies themselves ever to be bad or to become so—but they treat body with soul, for which it is not admissible, if it has become and is bad, to treat anything well." "Correctly," he said.
§3.409δικαστὴς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, ψυχῇ ψυχῆς ἄρχει, ᾗ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ ἐκ νέας ἐν πονηραῖς ψυχαῖς τεθράφθαι τε καὶ ὡμιληκέναι καὶ πάντα ἀδικήματα αὐτὴν ἠδικηκυῖαν διεξεληλυθέναι, ὥστε ὀξέως ἀφʼ αὑτῆς τεκμαίρεσθαι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικήματα οἷον κατὰ σῶμα νόσους· ἀλλʼ ἄπειρον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκέραιον δεῖ κακῶν ἠθῶν νέαν οὖσαν γεγονέναι, εἰ μέλλει καλὴ κἀγαθὴ οὖσα κρινεῖν ὑγιῶς τὰ δίκαια.
"But a judge, my friend, rules soul with soul; for which it is not admissible to have been brought up and to have associated with wicked souls from youth, and to have itself run through and committed every injustice, so as to infer quickly from itself the injustices of others, like diseases in the body; but it must, while young, have been inexperienced and untainted by bad characters, if it is to judge what is just soundly, being itself noble and good.
διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις νέοι ὄντες οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς φαίνονται καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδίκων, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς παραδείγματα ὁμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς. καὶ μὲν δή, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε αὐτὸ πάσχουσι. τῷ τοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐ νέον ἀλλὰ γέροντα δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν δικαστὴν εἶναι, ὀψιμαθῆ γεγονότα τῆς ἀδικίας οἷόν ἐστιν, οὐκ οἰκείαν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ ψυχῇ ἐνοῦσαν ᾐσθημένον, ἀλλʼ ἀλλοτρίαν ἐν ἀλλοτρίαις μεμελετηκότα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διαισθάνεσθαι οἷον πέφυκε κακόν, ἐπιστήμῃ, οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ οἰκείᾳ κεχρημένον. γενναιότατος γοῦν, ἔφη, ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ τοιοῦτος δικαστής. καὶ ἀγαθός γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὃ σὺ ἠρώτας· ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν ἀγαθός.
For this very reason, indeed, decent people, when they are young, appear simple-minded and easily deceived by the unjust, inasmuch as they do not have in themselves patterns of feelings similar to those of the wicked." "And indeed," he said, "they suffer that very thing intensely." "Therefore," I said, "the good judge must be not young but old, having become a late learner of what injustice is, not having perceived it as residing in his own soul, but having studied it as an alien thing in alien souls over a long time, so as to discern what kind of evil it naturally is, employing knowledge, not his own experience." "At any rate, such a judge," he said, "seems to be most noble." "And good, too," I said, "which is what you asked; for he who has a good soul is good.
ὁ δὲ δεινὸς ἐκεῖνος καὶ καχύποπτος, ὁ πολλὰ αὐτὸς ἠδικηκὼς καὶ πανοῦργός τε καὶ σοφὸς οἰόμενος εἶναι, ὅταν μὲν ὁμοίοις ὁμιλῇ, δεινὸς φαίνεται ἐξευλαβούμενος, πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὑτῷ παραδείγματα ἀποσκοπῶν· ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτέροις ἤδη πλησιάσῃ, ἀβέλτερος αὖ φαίνεται, ἀπιστῶν παρὰ καιρὸν καὶ ἀγνοῶν ὑγιὲς ἦθος, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχων παράδειγμα τοῦ τοιούτου.
But that clever and suspicious man, who has himself committed many injustices and is a rogue, thinking himself wise, when he associates with his like, appears clever, being on his guard and looking to the patterns within himself; but when he approaches good men and those who are already older, he appears foolish again, mistrusting out of season and ignorant of healthy character, inasmuch as he has no pattern of such a thing.
πλεονάκις δὲ πονηροῖς ἢ χρηστοῖς ἐντυγχάνων σοφώτερος ἢ ἀμαθέστερος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ.
And since he encounters wicked people more often than useful ones, he seems to be wiser rather than more ignorant, both to himself and to others." "Entirely true, indeed," he said.
οὐ τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοιοῦτον χρὴ τὸν δικαστὴν ζητεῖν τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ σοφόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν πρότερον· πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετήν τε καὶ αὑτὴν οὔποτʼ ἂν γνοίη, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἅμα αὑτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην λήψεται. σοφὸς οὖν οὗτος, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται. καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, συνδοκεῖ.
"Therefore," I said, "we must not look for the good and wise judge in such a man, but in the former one; for vice could never know both virtue and itself, but virtue of a educated nature will in time acquire a knowledge both of itself and of vice at the same time." "This man, then, as it seems to me, becomes wise, but not the bad one." "And I agree," he said.