§10.605παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Absolutely.
ὁ δὴ μιμητικὸς ποιητὴς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκέ τε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν, εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος διὰ τὸ εὐμίμητον εἶναι.
It is clear, then, that the imitative poet is not naturally directed toward this part of the soul, nor is his wisdom established to please it if he is to have a good reputation among the many, but rather toward the fretful and varied character, because of its being easy to imitate.
δῆλον.
Clear.
οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐπιλαμβανοίμεθα, καὶ τιθεῖμεν ἀντίστροφον αὐτὸν τῷ ζωγράφῳ· καὶ γὰρ τῷ φαῦλα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἔοικεν αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ὁμιλεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, καὶ ταύτῃ ὡμοίωται.
Therefore, we would already be justified in laying hold of him, and placing him as a counterpart to the painter; for he resembles him both in making things that are inferior with respect to truth, and in associating with another part of the soul that is of this sort and not with the best, and in this way he is like him.
καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἂν ἐν δίκῃ οὐ παραδεχοίμεθα εἰς μέλλουσαν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν, ὅτι τοῦτο ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει ὅταν τις μοχθηροὺς ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῶν παραδιδῷ τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ χαριεστέρους φθείρῃ·
And thus we would already be justified in not receiving him into a city that is to be well-governed, because he awakens and nurtures this part of the soul, and by making it strong, destroys the rational part, just as in a city when someone makes the wicked powerful and hands over the city, while destroying the more refined.
ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν μεγάλα ἡγουμένῳ, τοτὲ δὲ σμικρά, εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα.
We shall say that the imitative poet does the very same thing, producing a bad constitution in the soul of each individual, by gratifying its foolish part, which does not distinguish the greater from the less, but considers the same things at one time great and at another small, making images and standing very far indeed from the truth.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Absolutely.
οὐ μέντοι πω τό γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς.
But we have not yet made the greatest accusation against it.
τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάνδεινόν που.
For that it is able to corrupt even the decent, except for a very few, is surely a terrible thing.
τί δʼ οὐ μέλλει, εἴπερ γε δρᾷ αὐτό;
How could it not be, if it indeed does that?
ἀκούων σκόπει.
Listen and consider.
οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθʼ ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ.
For the best of us, when we listen to Homer or some other of the tragic poets imitating one of the heroes who is in grief and stretching out a long speech in lamentations, or even singing and beating their breasts, you know that we rejoice and, giving ourselves up, follow along, suffering with them and eagerly praising as a good poet whoever affects us as much as possible in this way.
οἶδα· πῶς δʼ οὔ;
I know; how could I not?
ὅταν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς αὖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν δυνώμεθα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ καρτερεῖν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, ὃ τότε ἐπῃνοῦμεν.
But when some private sorrow happens to one of us, you notice, on the other hand, that we pride ourselves on the opposite, if we are able to keep quiet and endure, since we believe this is the part of a man, and the other, which we praised then, is that of a woman.
ἐννοῶ, ἔφη.
I notice, he said.
ἦ καλῶς οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ ἔπαινος ἔχει, τὸ ὁρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτόν τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ εἶναι ἀλλʼ αἰσχύνοιτο ἄν, μὴ βδελύττεσθαι ἀλλὰ χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν;
Is this praise, then, a good one, I said, when someone, seeing such a man as he would not think worthy of himself but would be ashamed of, does not feel disgust but rejoices and praises him?
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐκ εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν.
No, by Zeus, he said, it does not seem reasonable.
§10.606ναί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ ἐκείνῃ γʼ αὐτὸ σκοποίης.
Yes, I said, if you would consider it in that way.
πῇ;
In what way?
εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὂν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότʼ ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαῖρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίησιν τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνώδους τούτου, ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ὂν εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαίρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο κερδαίνειν ἡγεῖται, τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι καταφρονήσας ὅλου τοῦ ποιήματος.
If you would bear in mind that the part which was forcibly held back then in our private misfortunes, and which was hungry for weeping and lamenting sufficiently and being satisfied, being by nature such as to desire these things, is then the very part that is satisfied and rejoiced by the poets; while that which is by nature best in us, since it has not been sufficiently educated by reason or habit, relaxes its guard over this lamenting part, because it is contemplating another's sufferings, and it is not shameful to itself if another man, claiming to be good, grieves unseasonably, to praise and pity him, but rather it considers that it gains this, namely the pleasure, and would not choose to be deprived of it by despising the whole poem.
λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι ὀλίγοις τισὶν μέτεστιν ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα· θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεινὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν.
For I think it belongs to only a few to calculate that it is necessary to reap the fruits from other people's affairs for one's own; for having nurtured the pitiful part strong in those cases, it is not easy to restrain it in one's own sufferings.
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.
Most true, he said.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου;
Does not, then, the same argument apply also to the laughable?
ὅτι, ἃν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμῳδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῇς καὶ μὴ μισῇς ὡς πονηρά, ταὐτὸν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις;
That if you yourself would be ashamed of making people laugh, but in comic imitation or in private hearing you should rejoice greatly and not hate it as wicked, you are doing the very same thing as in the case of pities?
ὃ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ αὖ κατεῖχες ἐν σαυτῷ βουλόμενον γελωτοποιεῖν, φοβούμενος δόξαν βωμολοχίας, τότʼ αὖ ἀνιεῖς, καὶ ἐκεῖ νεανικὸν ποιήσας ἔλαθες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐξενεχθεὶς ὥστε κωμῳδοποιὸς γενέσθαι.
For that which you held back in yourself by reason, wishing to make people laugh, fearing the reputation of buffoonery, you then release on the other hand, and having made it vigorous there, you often do not notice that you have been carried away in your private affairs so as to become a comic poet.
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
Quite so, he said.
καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἡδέων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἃ δή φαμεν πάσῃ πράξει ἡμῖν ἕπεσθαι, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιητικὴ μίμησις ἐργάζεται· τρέφει γὰρ ταῦτα ἄρδουσα, δέον αὐχμεῖν, καὶ ἄρχοντα ἡμῖν καθίστησιν, δέον ἄρχεσθαι αὐτὰ ἵνα βελτίους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἀντὶ χειρόνων καὶ ἀθλιωτέρων γιγνώμεθα.
And concerning sex and anger and all the desiring, painful, and pleasant things in the soul, which we say indeed accompany our every action, that imitative poetry works such things upon us; for it nurtures them by watering them when they ought to be dried up, and establishes them as rulers over us when they ought to be ruled, so that we may become better and happier instead of worse and more wretched.
οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως φάναι, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
I cannot say otherwise, he said.
οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅταν Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέταις ἐντύχῃς λέγουσιν ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ πρὸς διοίκησίν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἄξιος ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν τε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον κατασκευασάμενον ζῆν, φιλεῖν μὲν χρὴ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται, καὶ συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν·
Therefore, I said, Glaucon, when you meet with praisers of Homer who say that this poet has educated Greece, and that for the administration and education of human affairs he is worthy to be taken up for study and to arrange one's whole life in accordance with this poet and live so, we must love and embrace them as being the best they can be, and agree that Homer is the most poetic and the first of the tragic poets, but we must know that only as much of poetry as is hymns to the gods and encomiums to the good is to be received into the city.