§10.603τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν.
Therefore, the part of the soul that opines contrary to the measurements would not be the same as that which opines in accordance with the measurements.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Indeed not.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦον βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη τῆς ψυχῆς.
But surely, the part that trusts in measurement and calculation would be the best part of the soul.
τί μήν;
Of course.
τὸ ἄρα τούτῳ ἐναντιούμενον τῶν φαύλων ἄν τι εἴη ἐν ἡμῖν.
Therefore, that which opposes this part would be some inferior part in us.
ἀνάγκη.
Necessarily.
τοῦτο τοίνυν διομολογήσασθαι βουλόμενος ἔλεγον ὅτι ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ μιμητικὴ πόρρω μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας ὂν τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, πόρρω δʼ αὖ φρονήσεως ὄντι τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν προσομιλεῖ τε καὶ ἑταίρα καὶ φίλη ἐστὶν ἐπʼ οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ οὐδʼ ἀληθεῖ.
This, then, is what I wanted to reach agreement on when I said that painting and imitation as a whole produce their work far from the truth, and associate with that part in us which is far from wisdom, being its companion and friend for no healthy or true purpose.
παντάπασιν, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
Absolutely, he said.
φαύλη ἄρα φαύλῳ συγγιγνομένη φαῦλα γεννᾷ ἡ μιμητική.
Imitation, then, being inferior itself and associating with an inferior part, generates inferior things.
ἔοικεν.
It seems so.
πότερον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον, ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἣν δὴ ποίησιν ὀνομάζομεν;
Is it, I said, only the imitation concerned with sight, or also that concerned with hearing, which we call poetry?
εἰκός γʼ, ἔφη, καὶ ταύτην.
It is likely, he said, that this is also the case.
μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τῷ εἰκότι μόνον πιστεύσωμεν ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτὸ αὖ ἔλθωμεν τῆς διανοίας τοῦτο ᾧ προσομιλεῖ ἡ τῆς ποιήσεως μιμητική, καὶ ἴδωμεν φαῦλον ἢ σπουδαῖόν ἐστιν.
Let us not, then, I said, rely only on the resemblance derived from painting, but let us also go to that very part of the intellect with which the imitation of poetry associates, and see whether it is inferior or serious.
ἀλλὰ χρή.
Indeed, we must.
ὧδε δὴ προθώμεθα· πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν ἢ λυπουμένους ἢ χαίροντας.
Let us put it this way: imitation, we say, imitates human beings performing actions, whether forced or voluntary, and as a result of these actions, believing themselves to have done well or ill, and in all these circumstances, either grieving or rejoicing.
μή τι ἄλλο ἦν παρὰ ταῦτα;
Was there anything else besides these?
οὐδέν.
Nothing.
ἆρʼ οὖν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ὁμονοητικῶς ἄνθρωπος διάκειται;
Is a human being, then, in all these situations, in a state of inner harmony?
ἢ ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἐστασίαζεν καὶ ἐναντίας εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δόξας ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι στασιάζει τε καὶ μάχεται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ;
Or, just as in the case of sight he was in a state of faction and had opposite opinions in himself at the same time about the same things, does he also in his actions experience faction and fight with himself?
ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι δὲ ὅτι τοῦτό γε νῦν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἡμᾶς διομολογεῖσθαι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις ἱκανῶς πάντα ταῦτα διωμολογησάμεθα, ὅτι μυρίων τοιούτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἡ ψυχὴ γέμει ἡμῶν.
But I remember that there is no need for us to reach agreement on this now; for in our earlier discussions we sufficiently agreed on all these things—that our soul is full of a myriad of such contradictions occurring at the same time.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
Correctly, he said.
ὀρθῶς γάρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἀλλʼ ὃ τότε ἀπελίπομεν, νῦν μοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διεξελθεῖν.
Yes, correctly, I said; but what we left out then, now seems to me necessary to go through.
τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.
What kind of thing? he said.
ἀνήρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐπιεικὴς τοιᾶσδε τύχης μετασχών, ὑὸν ἀπολέσας ἤ τι ἄλλο ὧν περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖται, ἐλέγομέν που καὶ τότε ὅτι ῥᾷστα οἴσει τῶν ἄλλων.
A decent man, I said, who experiences such a fortune as to lose a son or something else he values most, we said, I believe, even then that he will bear it more easily than others.
πάνυ γε.
Certainly.
νῦν δέ γε τόδʼ ἐπισκεψώμεθα, πότερον οὐδὲν ἀχθέσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον, μετριάσει δέ πως πρὸς λύπην.
But now let us examine this: will he feel no grief at all, or is that impossible, and will he instead keep his grief within bounds in some way?
οὕτω μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τό γε ἀληθές.
The latter is more likely, he said, that is indeed the truth.
§10.604τόδε νῦν μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέ· πότερον μᾶλλον αὐτὸν οἴει τῇ λύπῃ μαχεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν, ὅταν ὁρᾶται ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἢ ὅταν ἐν ἐρημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς καθʼ αὑτὸν γίγνηται;
Now tell me this about him: do you think he will fight and resist his grief more when he is seen by his peers, or when he is alone by himself in solitude?
πολύ που, ἔφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὁρᾶται.
It will make a great difference, I suppose, he said, when he is seen.
μονωθεὶς δέ γε οἶμαι πολλὰ μὲν τολμήσει φθέγξασθαι, ἃ εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἀκούοι αἰσχύνοιτʼ ἄν, πολλὰ δὲ ποιήσει, ἃ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτό τινα ἰδεῖν δρῶντα.
But when left alone, I think he will venture to utter many things which he would be ashamed for anyone to hear, and will do many things which he would not allow anyone to see him doing.
οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη.
That is how it is, he said.
οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀντιτείνειν διακελευόμενον λόγος καὶ νόμος ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ ἕλκον ἐπὶ τὰς λύπας αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος;
Now, is not that which commands him to resist reason and law, while that which drags him toward grief is the affection itself?
ἀληθῆ.
True.
ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα, δύο φαμὲν αὐτὼ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.
And when opposite impulses occur in a human being at the same time concerning the same thing, we say that there must be two distinct parts in him.
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
How could it be otherwise?
οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἕτοιμον πείθεσθαι, ᾗ ὁ νόμος ἐξηγεῖται;
Is not one of them, then, ready to obey the law, in the way the law guides?
πῶς;
How?
λέγει που ὁ νόμος ὅτι κάλλιστον ὅτι μάλιστα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐν ταῖς συμφοραῖς καὶ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὡς οὔτε δήλου ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων, οὔτε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαῖνον τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι, οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἄξιον ὂν μεγάλης σπουδῆς, ὅ τε δεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅτι τάχιστα παραγίγνεσθαι ἡμῖν, τούτῳ ἐμποδὼν γιγνόμενον τὸ λυπεῖσθαι.
The law says, I suppose, that it is best to keep as quiet as possible in misfortunes and not to be vexed, since the good and bad in such things are not clear, and no progress is made for the future by taking things hard, and nothing in human affairs is worthy of great concern, and grieving stands in the way of that which ought to come to our assistance in these situations as quickly as possible.
τίνι, ἦ δʼ ὅς, λέγεις;
What is it you mean? he said.
τῷ βουλεύεσθαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὑτοῦ πράγματα, ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ βέλτιστʼ ἂν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπταίσαντας καθάπερ παῖδας ἐχομένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοᾶν διατρίβειν, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ ἐθίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ὅτι τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἰᾶσθαί τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ νοσῆσαν, ἰατρικῇ θρηνῳδίαν ἀφανίζοντα.
Deliberation, I said, about what has happened, and, as in a fall of dice, to settle one's affairs in accordance with the way the dice have fallen, as reason dictates would be best; and not, like children who have stumbled, to waste time in crying out while holding the hurt part, but always to accustom the soul to turn as quickly as possible to healing and restoring what has fallen and is diseased, banishing lamentation by medical art.
ὀρθότατα γοῦν ἄν τις, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰς τύχας οὕτω προσφέροιτο.
At any rate, one would face fortunes most correctly in this way, he said.
οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὸ μὲν βέλτιστον τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐθέλει ἕπεσθαι.
Then we say that the best part is willing to follow this calculation.
δῆλον δή.
Clearly so.
τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναμνήσεις τε τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς ἄγον καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχον αὐτῶν ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀλόγιστόν τε φήσομεν εἶναι καὶ ἀργὸν καὶ δειλίας φίλον;
But that which leads to the recollections of the suffering and to lamentations, and is insatiable for them, shall we not say that it is irrational, idle, and a friend of cowardice?
φήσομεν μὲν οὖν.
We certainly shall.
οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν πολλὴν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλην ἔχει, τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν, τὸ δὲ φρόνιμόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος, παραπλήσιον ὂν ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον μιμήσασθαι οὔτε μιμουμένου εὐπετὲς καταμαθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς θέατρα συλλεγομένοις·
Does not, then, the rebellious character admit of much and varied imitation, whereas the wise and quiet character, being always nearly equal to itself, is neither easy to imitate nor, when imitated, easy to understand, especially for a festive assembly and all sorts of human beings gathered in theaters?
ἀλλοτρίου γάρ που πάθους ἡ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται.
For the imitation is of an affection alien to them.