§409ΚΛΕΙ.
εἰ δʼ ἐπανηρόμεθα τὸν ταῦθʼ ἡμᾶς προτρέποντα· λέγεις δὲ εἶναι τίνας ταύτας τὰς τέχνας; εἶπεν ἂν ἴσως ὅτι γυμναστικὴ καὶ ἰατρική. καὶ νῦν δὴ τίνα φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετῇ τέχνην;
Cleitophon: And if we had further questioned the one who was exhorting us to these things, "And what do you say these arts are?" he would perhaps have said, "gymnastics and medicine." And now, indeed, what do we say is the art that is directed toward the virtue of the soul?
λεγέσθω.
Let it be told.
ὁ δὴ δοκῶν αὐτῶν ἐρρωμενέστατος εἶναι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπέν μοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην εἶναι ἥνπερ ἀκούεις σὺ λέγοντος, ἔφη, Σωκράτους, οὐκ ἄλλην ἢ δικαιοσύνην.
Then, the one of them who seemed to be the most vigorous in answering these questions said to me that this art was no other than justice, the very one which, he said, you hear Socrates speaking of.
εἰπόντος δʼ ἐμοῦ
μή μοι τὸ ὄνομα μόνον εἴπῃς, ἀλλὰ ὧδε. ἰατρική πού τις λέγεται τέχνη· ταύτης δʼ ἐστὶν διττὰ τὰ ἀποτελούμενα, τὸ μὲν ἰατροὺς ἀεὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὖσιν ἑτέρους ἐξεργάζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ὑγίειαν·
And when I said: "Do not tell me the name only, but in this way: medicine is surely said to be a certain art; and its results are twofold: the one is to produce other doctors continually in addition to those already existing, and the other is health.
ἔστιν δὲ τούτων θάτερον οὐκέτι τέχνη, τῆς τέχνης δὲ τῆς διδασκούσης τε καὶ διδασκομένης ἔργον, ὃ δὴ λέγομεν ὑγίειαν.
And one of these is no longer an art, but the product of the art that teaches and is taught, which we indeed call health.
καὶ τεκτονικῆς δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ οἰκία τε καὶ τεκτονικὴ τὸ μὲν ἔργον, τὸ δὲ δίδαγμα.
And in the case of carpentry likewise, a house and carpentry are the results, the one being the product, the other the instruction.
τῆς δὴ δικαιοσύνης ὡσαύτως τὸ μὲν δικαίους ἔστω ποιεῖν, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ τοὺς τεχνίτας ἑκάστους· τὸ δʼ ἕτερον, ὃ δύναται ποιεῖν ἡμῖν ἔργον ὁ δίκαιος, τί τοῦτό φαμεν;
So too for justice, let the one be to make men just, just as in the other cases each of the craftsmen is made; but the other, which the just man can produce as a product for us, what do we say this is?
εἰπέ. οὗτος μέν, ὡς οἶμαι, τὸ συμφέρον ἀπεκρίνατο, ἄλλος δὲ τὸ δέον, ἕτερος δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, ὁ δὲ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν. ἐπανῄειν δὴ ἐγὼ λέγων ὅτι
κἀκεῖ τά γε ὀνόματα ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν, ὀρθῶς πράττειν, λυσιτελοῦντα, ὠφέλιμα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα τείνει, ἐρεῖ τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστη ἡ τέχνη, οἷον ἡ τεκτονικὴ τὸ εὖ, τὸ καλῶς, τὸ δεόντως, ὥστε τὰ ξύλινα, φήσει, σκεύη γίγνεσθαι, ἃ δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη.
Tell me." This man, I believe, answered "the expedient," another "the fitting," another "the beneficial," and another "the profitable." So I went back to them, saying: "In those other cases too, these names are indeed present in each of the arts—acting rightly, profitable, beneficial, and all other such things; but to what all these things tend, each art will state its own peculiar product; for instance, carpentry will say that acting well, beautifully, and fittingly is for the sake of wooden utensils being produced, which indeed are not the art itself.
λεγέσθω δὴ καὶ τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὡσαύτως. τελευτῶν ἀπεκρίνατό τις ὦ Σώκρατές μοι τῶν σῶν ἑταίρων, ὃς δὴ κομψότατα ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῦτʼ εἴη τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἴδιον ἔργον, ὃ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμιᾶς, φιλίαν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ποιεῖν.
Let the result of justice, then, be stated likewise." At last, Socrates, one of your companions answered me—the one who indeed seemed to speak most elegantly—that this was the peculiar product of justice, which belongs to no other art: to produce concord in cities.
οὗτος δʼ αὖ ἐρωτώμενος τὴν φιλίαν ἀγαθόν τʼ ἔφη εἶναι καὶ οὐδέποτε κακόν, τὰς δὲ τῶν παίδων φιλίας καὶ τὰς τῶν θηρίων, ἃς ἡμεῖς τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἐπονομάζομεν, οὐκ ἀπεδέχετο εἶναι φιλίας ἐπανερωτώμενος· συνέβαινε γὰρ αὐτῷ τὰ πλείω τὰς τοιαύτας βλαβερὰς ἢ ἀγαθὰς εἶναι.
And this man, in turn, being asked, said that concord was a good thing and never bad; but the friendships of children and those of wild beasts, which we call by this name, he would not admit to be concord when he was further questioned; for it turned out for him that most of such relationships are harmful rather than good.
φεύγων δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲ φιλίας ἔφη τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι, ψευδῶς δὲ ὀνομάζειν αὐτὰς τοὺς οὕτως ὀνομάζοντας· τὴν δὲ ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς φιλίαν εἶναι σαφέστατα ὁμόνοιαν.
Fleeing from such a conclusion, he said that such things are not even concord, and that those who call them so call them falsely; and that what is really and truly friendship is most clearly concord.
τὴν δὲ ὁμόνοιαν ἐρωτώμενος εἰ ὁμοδοξίαν εἶναι λέγοι ἢ ἐπιστήμην, τὴν μὲν ὁμοδοξίαν ἠτίμαζεν· ἠναγκάζοντο γὰρ πολλαὶ καὶ βλαβεραὶ γίγνεσθαι ὁμοδοξίαι ἀνθρώπων, τὴν δὲ φιλίαν ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήκει πάντως εἶναι καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἔργον, ὥστε ταὐτὸν ἔφησεν εἶναι ὁμόνοιαν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν, ἀλλʼ οὐ δόξαν.
And being asked about concord, whether he meant agreement of opinion or knowledge, he dishonored agreement of opinion; for many and harmful agreements of opinion among men were forced to come about, whereas he had agreed that friendship was entirely a good thing and the product of justice, so that he said concord was the same thing, being knowledge and not opinion.