Humanitext Reader

Plato · Ion §537-538

Distinct Domains of Arts and Judging Homeric Verses

Passage 6 of 8 · Greek

Summary

Socrates explains to Ion that each art has its own domain of knowledge, meaning that only an expert in a given art can judge the validity of descriptions related to it. To illustrate this, he quotes verses from Homer concerning charioteering, medicine, and fishing.

§537ΣΩ. οὐ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν μέντοι λέγει πολλαχοῦ Ὅμηρος καὶ πολλά;
SOC: Does not Homer speak in many places and of many things concerning arts?
οἷον καὶ περὶ ἡνιοχείας—ἐὰν μνησθῶ τὰ ἔπη, ἐγώ σοι φράσω.
For example, concerning charioteering—if I recall the verses, I will tell you.
ΙΩΝ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· ἐγὼ γὰρ μέμνημαι.
ION: But I will say them; for I remember them.
ΣΩ. εἰπὲ δή μοι ἃ λέγει Νέστωρ Ἀντιλόχῳ τῷ ὑεῖ, παραινῶν εὐλαβηθῆναι περὶ τὴν καμπὴν ἐν τῇ ἱπποδρομίᾳ τῇ ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ.
SOC: Tell me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, advising him to be careful about the turn in the horse-race in honor of Patroclus.
ΙΩΝ. " κλινθῆναι δέ, φησί, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐυξέστῳ ἐνὶ δίφρῳ ἦκʼ ἐπʼ ἀριστερὰ τοῖιν· ἀτὰρ τὸν δεξιὸν ἵππον κένσαι ὁμοκλήσας, εἶξαί τέ οἱ ἡνία χερσίν.
ION: "Lean," he says, "yourself also in the well-polished chariot slightly to the left of them; but the right horse urge with a shout, and give him rein with your hands.
ἐν νύσσῃ δέ τοι ἵππος ἀριστερὸς ἐγχριμφθήτω, ὡς ἄν τοι πλήμνη γε δοάσσεται ἄκρον ἱκέσθαι κύκλου ποιητοῖο· λίθου δʼ ἀλέασθαι ἐπαυρεῖν. " ΣΩ. ἀρκεῖ.
At the turning-post let the left horse draw close, so that the hub of the well-made wheel seems to reach the edge; but avoid touching the stone, lest you harm it." SOC: That is enough.
ταῦτα δή, ὦ Ἴων, τὰ ἔπη εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή, πότερος ἂν γνοίη ἄμεινον, ἰατρὸς ἢ ἡνίοχος;
Whether Homer speaks correctly or not in these verses, Ion, who would know better, a doctor or a charioteer?
ΙΩΝ. Ἡνίοχος δήπου.
ION: A charioteer, surely.
ΣΩ. πότερον ὅτι τέχνην ταύτην ἔχει ἢ κατʼ ἄλλο τι;
SOC: Is it because he has this art, or for some other reason?
ΙΩΝ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ ὅτι τέχνην.
ION: No, but because of his art.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἀποδέδοταί τι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἔργον οἵᾳ τε εἶναι γιγνώσκειν;
SOC: Then to each of the arts has there been assigned by the god a certain task to be able to know?
οὐ γάρ που ἃ κυβερνητικῇ γιγνώσκομεν, γνωσόμεθα καὶ ἰατρικῇ.
For surely what we know by the art of steering, we shall not know also by the art of medicine.
ΙΩΝ. οὐ δῆτα.
ION: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε ἃ ἰατρικῇ, ταῦτα καὶ τεκτονικῇ.
SOC: Nor what we know by medicine, shall we know also by carpentry.
ΙΩΝ. οὐ δῆτα.
ION: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν, ἃ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ τέχνῃ γιγνώσκομεν, οὐ γνωσόμεθα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ;
SOC: Then is it so for all the arts, that what we know by one art, we shall not know by the other?
τόδε δέ μοι πρότερον τούτου ἀπόκριναι· τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν φῂς εἶναί τινα τέχνην, τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν;
But answer me this first before that: do you say that one art is one thing, and another is another?
ΙΩΝ. ναί.
ION: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρα ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τεκμαιρόμενος, ὅταν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρων πραγμάτων ᾖ ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δʼ ἑτέρων, οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην τέχνην, οὕτω καὶ σύ;
SOC: Do you, like me, call one art different from another when one is the knowledge of certain things, and the other of other things?
ΙΩΝ. ναί.
ION: Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ γάρ που τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμη εἴη τις, τί ἂν τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν φαῖμεν εἶναι, τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν, ὁπότε γε ταὐτὰ εἴη εἰδέναι ἀπʼ ἀμφοτέρων;
SOC: For if there were some knowledge of the same things, why should we say one is one art, and the other another, when the same things could be known from both?
ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε γιγνώσκω ὅτι πέντε εἰσὶν οὗτοι οἱ δάκτυλοι, καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ ἐγώ, περὶ τούτων ταὐτὰ γιγνώσκεις· καὶ εἴ σε ἐγὼ ἐροίμην εἰ τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ γιγνώσκομεν τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἢ ἄλλῃ, φαίης ἂν δήπου τῇ αὐτῇ.
Just as I know that these are five fingers, and you, like me, know the same about them; and if I were to ask you whether we know the same things by the same art of arithmetic, or by another, you would surely say by the same.
ΙΩΝ. ναί.
ION: Yes.
§538ΣΩ. ὃ τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔμελλον ἐρήσεσθαί σε, νυνὶ εἰπέ, εἰ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ, τῇ μὲν αὐτῇ τέχνῃ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι γιγνώσκειν, τῇ δʼ ἑτέρᾳ μὴ τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ ἄλλη ἐστίν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἕτερα γιγνώσκειν.
SOC: What I was just about to ask you, tell me now, whether you think it is so for all the arts: that by the same art it is necessary to know the same things, and by another not the same, but if it is indeed another, it is necessary to know other things.
ΙΩΝ. οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ION: It seems so to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅστις ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ τινὰ τέχνην, ταύτης τῆς τέχνης τὰ λεγόμενα ἢ πραττόμενα καλῶς γιγνώσκειν οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσται;
SOC: Then whoever does not possess a certain art will not be able to know well the things said or done belonging to this art?
ΙΩΝ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ION: You say what is true.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν περὶ τῶν ἐπῶν ὧν εἶπες, εἴτε καλῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή, σὺ κάλλιον γνώσῃ ἢ ἡνίοχος;
SOC: Then concerning the verses which you spoke, whether Homer speaks well or not, will you know better or will a charioteer?
ΙΩΝ. Ἡνίοχος.
ION: A charioteer.
ΣΩ. Ῥαψῳδὸς γάρ που εἶ ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡνίοχος.
SOC: For you are a rhapsode, I suppose, but not a charioteer.
ΙΩΝ. ναί.
ION: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἡ δὲ ῥαψῳδικὴ τέχνη ἑτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς ἡνιοχικῆς;
SOC: And is the rhapsodic art different from the charioteering art?
ΙΩΝ. ναί.
ION: Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα ἑτέρα, περὶ ἑτέρων καὶ ἐπιστήμη πραγμάτων ἐστίν.
SOC: If then it is different, it is also a knowledge of different things.
ΙΩΝ. ναί.
ION: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ ὅταν Ὅμηρος λέγῃ ὡς τετρωμένῳ τῷ Μαχάονι Ἑκαμήδη ἡ Νέστορος παλλακὴ κυκεῶνα πίνειν δίδωσι;
SOC: What then when Homer says that Hecamede, Nestor’s concubine, gives the wounded Machaon a potion to drink?
καὶ λέγει πως οὕτως— " οἴνῳ πραμνείῳ, φησίν, ἐπὶ δʼ αἴγειον κνῆ τυρὸν κνήστι χαλκείῃ· παρὰ δὲ κρόμυον ποτῷ ὄψον· " ταῦτα εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή, πότερον ἰατρικῆς ἐστι διαγνῶναι καλῶς ἢ ῥαψῳδικῆς;
And he speaks somewhat like this— "Over Pramnian wine," he says, "she grated goat's cheese with a bronze grater; and by the drink, an onion as a relish;" whether Homer speaks correctly or not in this, is it for the art of medicine to judge well, or for the rhapsodic art?
ΙΩΝ. Ἰατρικῆς.
ION: Medicine.
ΣΩ. τί δέ, ὅταν λέγῃ Ὅμηρος— " ἡ δὲ μολυβδαίνῃ ἰκέλη ἐς βυσσὸν ἵκανεν, ἥ τε κατʼ ἀγραύλοιο βοὸς κέρας ἐμμεμαυῖα ἔρχεται ὠμηστῇσι μετʼ ἰχθύσι πῆμα φέρουσα· " ταῦτα πότερον φῶμεν ἁλιευτικῆς εἶναι τέχνης μᾶλλον κρῖναι ἢ ῥαψῳδικῆς, ἅττα λέγει καὶ εἴτε καλῶς εἴτε μή;
SOC: And what when Homer says— "She went to the bottom like a lead weight, which, eager to go down through the horn of a wild ox, comes bringing death to the carnivorous fish;" whether Homer speaks well or not in this, shall we say it belongs to the art of fishing to judge rather than to the rhapsodic art?
ΙΩΝ. δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἁλιευτικῆς.
ION: It is clear, Socrates, that it belongs to the art of fishing.
ΣΩ. σκέψαι δή, σοῦ ἐρομένου, εἰ ἔροιό με· ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν Ὁμήρῳ εὑρίσκεις ἃ προσήκει ἑκάστῃ διακρίνειν, ἴθι μοι ἔξευρε καὶ τὰ τοῦ μάντεώς τε καὶ μαντικῆς, ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ προσήκει αὐτῷ οἵῳ τʼ εἶναι διαγιγνώσκειν, εἴτε εὖ εἴτε κακῶς πεποίηται — σκέψαι ὡς ῥᾳδίως τε καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐγώ σοι ἀποκρινοῦμαι.
SOC: Consider then, if you were to ask me, and I were to ask you: "Since then, Socrates, you find in Homer what belongs to each of these arts to judge, come and find for me also those things of the seer and of the art of divination, what kind of things they are which it belongs to him to be able to judge, whether they are made well or poorly"— see how easily and truly I will answer you.
πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ λέγει, οἷον καὶ ἃ ὁ τῶν Μελαμποδιδῶν λέγει μάντις πρὸς τοὺς μνηστῆρας, Θεοκλύμενος—
For he speaks in many places, also in the Odyssey, for instance, what the seer of the descendants of Melampus, Theoclymenus, says to the suitors—

Notes

  1. 537aἐὰν μνησθῶ τὰ ἔπη, ἐγώ σοι φράσω — The conditional clause uses `ean` with the subjunctive `mnēsthō` (aorist passive with middle meaning "remember"), followed by the future indicative `phrasō` in the apodosis. This construction represents a future vivid or prospective condition ("if I recall the verses, I will tell you").
  2. 537cοἵᾳ τε εἶναι γιγνώσκειν — The adjective `hoia` in `hoia te einai` (the infinitive of `hoios t' eimi`, "to be able to") is in the dative feminine singular, agreeing with `hekastē` ("to each"). It governs the infinitive `gignōskein` ("to know"), meaning "such as to be able to know."
  3. 538eἃ προσήκει ἑκάστῃ διακρίνειν — The relative pronoun `ha` (neuter plural accusative) functions as the object of the infinitive `diakrinein` ("to distinguish"), which depends on the impersonal verb `prosēkei` ("it belongs to/is fitting for"). The dative `hekastē` refers back to "each art." The structure means "the things which it belongs to each art to judge."

Cite this passage

Plato, Ion §537-538. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg027.humanitext-grc2:537-538

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