§294ΣΩ. ὅρα τοίνυν· τὸ πρέπον ἆρα τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὃ παραγενόμενον ποιεῖ ἕκαστα φαίνεσθαι καλὰ τούτων οἷς ἂν παρῇ, ἢ ὃ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἢ οὐδέτερα τούτων;
SOCRATES: Consider then; is this what we call the appropriate, that which by being present makes each of those things to which it is present appear beautiful, or that which makes them be so, or neither of these?
ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὃ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι καλά· ὥσπερ γε ἐπειδὰν ἱμάτιά τις λάβῃ ἢ ὑποδήματα ἁρμόττοντα, κἂν ᾖ γελοῖος, καλλίων φαίνεται.
HIPPIAS: To me at least, it seems to be that which makes them appear beautiful; just as when someone puts on clothes or shoes that fit, even if he is ridiculous, he appears more beautiful.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλλίω ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἔστι τὸ πρέπον, ἀπάτη τις ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ πρέπον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
SOCRATES: Therefore, if the appropriate indeed makes things appear more beautiful than they are, the appropriate would be a certain deception concerning the beautiful, and would not be this which we are seeking, Hippias?
ἡμεῖς μὲν γάρ που ἐκεῖνο ἐζητοῦμεν, ᾧ πάντα τὰ καλὰ πράγματα καλά ἐστιν— ὥσπερ ᾧ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐστὶ μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι· τούτῳ γὰρ πάντα μεγάλα ἐστί, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ φαίνηται, ὑπερέχῃ δέ, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλοις εἶναι—οὕτω δή, φαμέν, καὶ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καλὰ πάντα ἐστίν, ἄντʼ οὖν φαίνηται ἄντε μή, τί ἂν εἴη;
For we, surely, were seeking that by which all beautiful things are beautiful—just as that by which all great things are great is the exceeding; for by this all things are great, and even if they do not appear so, but exceed, they are necessarily great—so indeed, we say, also the beautiful, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear so or not, what would it be?
τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη· καλλίω γὰρ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, οἷα δʼ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐᾷ φαίνεσθαι.
For the appropriate could not be it; for it makes things appear more beautiful than they are, according to your argument, and does not allow them to appear as they are.
τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν εἶναι καλά, ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον, ἐάντε φαίνηται ἐάντε μή, πειρατέον λέγειν τί ἐστι· τοῦτο γὰρ ζητοῦμεν, εἴπερ τὸ καλὸν ζητοῦμεν.
But that which makes them be beautiful, which I just now mentioned, whether they appear so or not, we must try to say what it is; for this is what we are seeking, if indeed we are seeking the beautiful.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρέπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ καλὰ παρόν.
HIPPIAS: But the appropriate, Socrates, by being present, makes things both be and appear beautiful.
ΣΩ. ἀδύνατον ἄρα τῷ ὄντι καλὰ ὄντα μὴ φαίνεσθαι καλὰ εἶναι, παρόντος γε τοῦ ποιοῦντος φαίνεσθαι;
SOCRATES: Is it impossible, then, for things that are really beautiful not to appear beautiful, at least when that which makes them appear so is present?
ΙΠ. ἀδύνατον.
HIPPIAS: Impossible.
ΣΩ. ὁμολογήσομεν οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Ἱππία, πάντα τὰ τῷ ὄντι καλὰ καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ δοξάζεσθαι καλὰ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ πᾶσιν, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἀγνοεῖσθαι καὶ πάντων μάλιστα ἔριν καὶ μάχην περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ ταῖς πόλεσιν;
SOCRATES: Shall we then agree to this, Hippias, that all things really beautiful, both laws and customs, are thought to be beautiful and appear so always to everyone, or, quite the contrary, that they are not known, and that of all things there is the greatest strife and conflict about them, both individually to each person and publicly to cities?
ΙΠ. οὕτω μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀγνοεῖσθαι.
HIPPIAS: Rather the latter, Socrates; they are not known.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γέ που τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς προσῆν· προσῆν δʼ ἄν, εἴπερ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν ἦν καὶ μὴ μόνον καλὰ ἐποίει εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι.
SOCRATES: It would not be so, if indeed appearing were present to them; and it would be present, if indeed the appropriate were the beautiful and made things not only be but also appear beautiful.
ὥστε τὸ πρέπον, εἰ μὲν τὸ καλὰ ποιοῦν ἐστιν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ποιοῦν φαίνεσθαι· εἰ δʼ αὖ τὸ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦν ἐστιν τὸ πρέπον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ καλόν, ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν.
So that the appropriate, if it is that which makes things be beautiful, would be the beautiful, which we are seeking, but not that which makes them appear so; but if on the other hand the appropriate is that which makes them appear so, it would not be the beautiful, which we are seeking.
εἶναι γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε ποιεῖ, φαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ εἶναι οὐ μόνον καλὰ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν.
For that other makes them be so, but the same thing could never be able to make things both appear and be, not only beautiful, but not even anything else whatever.
ἑλώμεθα δὴ πότερα δοκεῖ τὸ πρέπον εἶναι τὸ φαίνεσθαι καλὰ ποιοῦν, ἢ τὸ εἶναι.
Let us choose then, whether the appropriate seems to be that which makes things appear beautiful, or that which makes them be so.
ΙΠ. τὸ φαίνεσθαι, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
HIPPIAS: That which makes them appear so, it seems to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. βαβαῖ, οἴχεται ἄρʼ ἡμᾶς διαπεφευγός, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ καλὸν γνῶναι ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν, ἐπειδή γε τὸ πρέπον ἄλλο τι ἐφάνη ὂν ἢ καλόν.
SOCRATES: Alas! It has then escaped and gone from us, Hippias, to know what on earth the beautiful is, since the appropriate has appeared to be something other than the beautiful.