§293ΣΩ.
ἦ καὶ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ,
φήσει,
ὁ ξένος ὁ Ἠλεῖος ἔφη καλὸν εἶναι ὑστέρῳ τῶν προγόνων ταφῆναι, καὶ τῷ πάππῳ αὐτοῦ Αἰακῷ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι ἐκ θεῶν γεγόνασι, καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς θεοῖς; ΙΠ. τί τοῦτο;
SOCRATES: 'Was it so also for Achilles,' he will say, 'did the stranger from Elis say it is beautiful to be buried after one's ancestors, and for his grandfather Aeacus, and for the others who are born from gods, and for the gods themselves?' HIPPIAS: What is this?
βάλλʼ ἐς μακαρίαν.
Go to perdition!
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐδʼ εὔφημα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτά γε τὰ ἐρωτήματα.
These questions of the man are not even pious, Socrates.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: But what of it?
τὸ ἐρομένου ἑτέρου φάναι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν οὐ πάνυ δύσφημον;
When another asks, to say that this is so, is that not altogether impious?
ΙΠ. ἴσως.
HIPPIAS: Perhaps.
ΣΩ.
ἴσως τοίνυν σὺ εἶ οὗτος,
φήσει,
ὃς παντὶ φῂς καὶ ἀεὶ καλὸν εἶναι ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐκγόνων ταφῆναι, τοὺς δὲ γονέας θάψαι· ἢ οὐχ εἷς τῶν ἁπάντων καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ἦν καὶ οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντες; ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔγωγε ἔλεγον.
SOCRATES: 'Perhaps then you are this person,' he will say, 'who say that for everyone and always it is beautiful to be buried by one's offspring and to bury one's parents; or was Heracles not one of 'everyone', and all those we just now mentioned?' HIPPIAS: But I for my part was not saying this for the gods.
ΣΩ.
οὐδὲ τοῖς ἥρωσιν, ὡς ἔοικας. ΙΠ. οὐχ ὅσοι γε θεῶν παῖδες ἦσαν.
SOCRATES: 'Nor for the heroes, as it seems.' HIPPIAS: Not at least for those who were children of gods.
ΣΩ.
ἀλλʼ ὅσοι μή; ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
SOCRATES: 'But for those who were not?' HIPPIAS: Certainly.
ΣΩ.
οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν σὸν αὖ λόγον, ὡς φαίνεται, τῶν ἡρώων τῷ μὲν Ταντάλῳ καὶ τῷ Δαρδάνῳ καὶ τῷ Ζήθῳ δεινόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστι, Πέλοπι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς οὕτω γεγονόσι καλόν. ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
SOCRATES: 'Therefore, according to your argument again, as it appears, of the heroes, for Tantalus and Dardanus and Zethus it is terrible and impious and shameful, but for Pelops and the others born in that way, beautiful.' HIPPIAS: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ.
σοὶ τοίνυν δοκεῖ,
φήσει,
ὃ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα, τὸ θάψαντι τοὺς προγόνους ταφῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκγόνων ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐνίοις αἰσχρὸν εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀδύνατον πᾶσι τοῦτο γενέσθαι καὶ εἶναι καλόν, ὥστε τοῦτό γε ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ἥ τε παρθένος καὶ ἡ χύτρα, ταὐτὸν πέπονθε, καὶ ἔτι γελοιοτέρως τοῖς μέν ἐστι καλόν, τοῖς δʼ οὐ καλόν.
SOCRATES: 'To you, then, it seems,' he will say, 'what you denied just now: that to be buried by one's offspring after having buried one's ancestors is sometimes and for some people shameful; and still more, as it seems, it is impossible for this to happen to all and to be beautiful, so that this, just like those previous things, the maiden and the pot, has suffered the same fate, and still more ridiculously, for some it is beautiful, and for others not beautiful.
καὶ οὐδέπω καὶ τήμερον,
φήσει,
οἷός τʼ εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι. ταῦτά μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα ὀνειδιεῖ δικαίως, ἐὰν αὐτῷ οὕτως ἀποκρίνωμαι.
And not even to this day,' he will say, 'are you able, Socrates, to answer the question of what the beautiful itself is.' These and such things he will justly reproach me with, if I answer him in this way.
τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὦ Ἱππία, σχεδόν τί μοι οὕτω διαλέγεται· ἐνίοτε δὲ ὥσπερ ἐλεήσας μου τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἀπαιδευσίαν αὐτός μοι προβάλλει ἐρωτῶν εἰ τοιόνδε μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ καλόν, ἢ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὅτου ἂν τύχῃ πυνθανόμενος καὶ περὶ οὗ ἂν λόγος ᾖ.
For the most part, Hippias, he talks to me pretty much like this; but sometimes, as if pitying my ignorance and lack of education, he himself proposes a question, asking me if the beautiful seems to be something like this, or inquiring about whatever else happens to come up and is under discussion.
ΙΠ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
HIPPIAS: How do you mean this, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι φράσω.
SOCRATES: I will tell you.
ὦ δαιμόνιε,
φησί,
Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ οὕτω παῦσαι— λίαν γὰρ εὐήθη τε καὶ εὐεξέλεγκτά ἐστιν—ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε σκόπει εἴ σοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, οὗ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐπελαβόμεθα ἐν τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἡνίκʼ ἔφαμεν τὸν χρυσὸν οἷς μὲν πρέπει καλὸν εἶναι, οἷς δὲ μή, οὔ, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οἷς ἂν τοῦτο προσῇ·
'My dear friend Socrates,' he says, 'stop giving such answers in this way—for they are too simple-minded and easy to refute—but consider whether something like this seems to you to be the beautiful, which we also touched upon just now in our answer, when we said that gold is beautiful for those things for which it is appropriate, but not for those for which it is not, and so with all other things to which this belongs.
αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρέποντος σκόπει εἰ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ καλόν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν εἴωθα συμφάναι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἑκάστοτε—οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ὅτι λέγω—σοὶ δʼ οὖν δοκεῖ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν εἶναι;
Consider whether this very thing, the appropriate, and the nature of the appropriate itself, happens to be the beautiful.' Now I am accustomed to agree to such things each time—for I don't know what to say—but does the appropriate seem to you to be the beautiful?
ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
HIPPIAS: Absolutely, surely, Socrates.
ΣΩ. σκοπώμεθα, μή πῃ ἄρʼ ἐξαπατώμεθα.
SOCRATES: Let us consider it, lest we are somehow deceived.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ σκοπεῖν.
HIPPIAS: But we must consider it.