§509ΣΩ. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις οὕτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὑτωσί, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω καλῶς λέγειν·
SOCRATES: These things, which appeared to us there above in the previous arguments as I say, are held down and bound—and, if it is permitted to say something rather rustic, by iron and adamantine arguments, so at least it would seem in this way; and unless you or someone more vigorous than you breaks them, it is not possible for anyone speaking otherwise than as I now speak to speak well.
ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστιν ἀεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός τʼ ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι.
Since for my part my argument is always the same, that I do not know how these things are, but indeed of those whom I have met, just as now, no one is able to speak otherwise without being ridiculous.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν·
I, then, on my part, set down these things to be so.
εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου μεῖζον μεγίστου ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη;
But if this is so, and committing injustice is the greatest of evils for the one who commits it, and an even greater evil than this greatest one, if possible, is for the one committing injustice not to pay the penalty, what kind of help is a person unable to provide to himself so that he would in truth be ridiculous?
ἆρα οὐ ταύτην, ἥτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην;
Is it not that which will turn away our greatest harm?
ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὑτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως· ὡς ἑκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφʼ ἕκαστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνη τοῦ μή.
Rather, it is of great necessity that this is the basest inability to help—not to be able to help either oneself or one's own friends and relatives—and second is that which regards the second evil, and third that which regards the third, and the others in this way; as the magnitude of each evil is by nature, so too is the beauty of being able to help against each, and the baseness of not being able to.
ἆρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;
Is it otherwise, or is it thus, Callicles?
ΚΑΛ. οὐκ ἄλλως.
CALLICLES: Not otherwise.
ΣΩ. δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μεῖζον μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
SOCRATES: Since there are these two, committing injustice and suffering it, we say that committing injustice is the greater evil, and suffering it the lesser.
τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὑτῷ, ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελίας ταύτας ἔχειν, τήν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
What then should a person prepare for himself so that he can help himself, so as to have both of these benefits—the one from not committing injustice and the one from not suffering it?
πότερα δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω·
Power or will?
πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσηται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται;
I mean it in this way: is it that if he does not wish to suffer injustice, he will not suffer it, or if he prepares a power of not suffering injustice, he will not suffer it?
ΚΑΛ. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.
CALLICLES: It is clear indeed, at least this, that it is if he prepares a power.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν;
SOCRATES: What about committing injustice?
πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτʼ ἐστίν—οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει—ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὡς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει;
Is it enough if he does not wish to commit injustice—for he will not commit it—or indeed, for this as well, is it necessary to prepare a certain power and art, so that unless he learns and practices them, he will commit injustice?
τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ πῶλος ἢ οὔ, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν;
Why do you not answer me this very thing, Callicles: do we, Polus and I, seem to you to have been rightly forced to agree in the previous arguments, or not, when we agreed that no one wishes to commit injustice, but all who commit injustice do so involuntarily?