§332ΣΩ. οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη,
οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι. —ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα.
Socrates: "Not altogether so," he said, "nor yet, however, as you seem to think I do." "But indeed," I said, "since you seem to me to be uneasy with this, let us leave this aside, and examine this other thing from what you said.
ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; —ἔφη.
Do you call something folly?" He said he did.
—τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία; —
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ,
ἔφη.
"To this thing, is not wisdom the opposite in every way?" "It seems so to me," he said.
—πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἅνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἢ τοὐναντίον; —
σωφρονεῖν,
ἔφη.
"And when people act correctly and beneficially, do they seem to you to be temperate in so acting, or the opposite?" "To be temperate," he said.
—οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνῃ σωφρονοῦσιν; —
ἀνάγκη. —οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες; —
συνδοκεῖ μοι,
ἔφη.
"Is it not, then, by temperance that they are temperate?" "Necessarily." "And do those who act incorrectly act foolishly, and not be temperate in so acting?" "I agree," he said.
—τοὐναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως; —ἔφη.
"Is acting foolishly, then, the opposite of acting temperately?" He said it was.
—οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνῃ πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνῃ; —ὡμολόγει.
"And are things done foolishly done by folly, and things done temperately by temperance?" He agreed.
—οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς; —ἐδόκει.
"And if anything is done by strength, is it done strongly, and if by weakness, weakly?" It seemed so.
—καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτῆτος, βραδέως; —ἔφη.
"And if anything with speed, quickly, and if with slowness, slowly?" He said it was.
—καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου; —συνέφη.
"And if indeed anything is done in the same way, is it done by the same agent, and if in the opposite way, by the opposite?" He agreed.
—φέρε δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλόν; —συνεχώρει.
"Come then," I said, "is there something beautiful?" He conceded.
—τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν; —
οὐκ ἔστιν. —τί δέ;
"To this, is there any opposite except the ugly?" "There is not." "What of this?
ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν; —
ἔστιν. —τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν; —
οὐκ ἔστιν. —τί δέ;
Is there something good?" "There is." "To this, is there any opposite except the bad?" "There is not." "What of this?
ἔστιν τι ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῇ; —ἔφη.
Is there a high pitch in the voice?" He said there was.
—τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ; —οὐκ ἔφη.
"To this, is there no other opposite except the low pitch?" He said there was not.
—οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ἓν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά; —συνωμολόγει.
"Is it not the case, then," I said, "that for each of the opposites there is only one opposite, and not many?" He agreed.
ἴθι δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν.
"Come now," I said, "let us recall what we have agreed upon.
ὡμολογήκαμεν ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή; —
ὡμολογήκαμεν. —τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι; —ἔφη.
Have we agreed that there is only one opposite for one thing, and not more?" "We have agreed." "And that what is done in the opposite way is done by opposites?" He said so.
—ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ; —ἔφη.
"And we agreed that what is done foolishly is done in the opposite way to what is done temperately?" He said so.
—τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; —συνεχώρει.
"And that what is done temperately is done by temperance, and what is foolishly by folly?" He conceded.
—οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράττοιτʼ ἄν; —
ναί. —πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; —ναί. —ἐναντίως; —πάνυ γε. —οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων; —
ναί. —ἐναντίον ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνης; —
φαίνεται. —μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφίᾳ ἐναντίον εἶναι; —συνωμολόγει. —
"So, if indeed it is done in the opposite way, would it be done by the opposite?" "Yes." "And one is done by temperance, and the other by folly?" "Yes." "In the opposite way?" "Certainly." "Therefore by things that are opposites?" "Yes." "Is folly, then, the opposite of temperance?" "It appears so." "Do you remember, then, that in what went before we agreed that folly is the opposite of wisdom?" He agreed.
§333ΣΩ. ἓν δὲ ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι; —
φημί
. —πότερον οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων;
Socrates: "And that there is only one opposite for one thing?" "I say so." "Which of these assertions, then, Protagoras, shall we reject?
τὸ ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγετο ἕτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία, μόριον δὲ ἑκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια;
That there is only one opposite for one thing, or that other one in which it was said that wisdom is distinct from temperance, and that each is a part of virtue, and that besides being distinct, they and their powers are also unlike, just like the parts of the face?
πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν;
Which one then shall we reject?
οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ συνᾴδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις.
For both of these assertions are not spoken in a very harmonious way; for they do not sing in tune nor fit together with each other.
πῶς γὰρ ἂν συνᾴδοιεν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μὲν ἓν μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείοσιν δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνῃ ἑνὶ ὄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὖ φαίνεται·
For how could they sing in tune, if indeed it is necessary for one thing to have only one opposite, and not more, yet for folly, which is one, wisdom is shown to be opposite, and temperance in turn is also shown to be so?
ἦ γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως πως; —ὡμολόγησεν καὶ μάλʼ ἀκόντως.
Is it so, Protagoras," I said, "or is it some other way?" He agreed, and very reluctantly.
—οὐκοῦν ἓν ἂν εἴη ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία;
"Would temperance and wisdom, then, be one?
τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὖ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν ὄν.
And previously, on the other hand, justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same thing.
ἴθι δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα.
Come then, Protagoras," I said, "let us not grow weary, but let us also examine the rest.
ἆρά τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ; —
αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἔγωγʼ,
ἔφη,
ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοί γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων. —πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι, ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ; —
εἰ βούλει,
ἔφη,
πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν πολλῶν. —ἀλλʼ οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνῃ, εἴτʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα εἴτε μή· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας—τὸν γὰρ λόγον ᾐτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι—ἔπειτα μέντοι συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
Does anyone seem to you, when acting unjustly, to be temperate in that they act unjustly?" "I for my part would be ashamed, Socrates," he said, "to agree to this, though many people indeed say so." "Shall I then direct the argument to them," I said, "or to you?" "If you like," he said, "discuss this argument first with that of the many." "But it makes no difference to me, if only you will answer, whether you think so or not; for it is the argument itself that I am primarily examining, though it may happen that both I who ask and you who answer are being examined too." At first Protagoras began to put on airs for us—for he complained that the argument was difficult—but then he agreed to answer.
—ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι.
"Come then," I said, "answer me from the beginning.
δοκοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες; —
ἔστω,
ἔφη.
Do some people seem to you to be temperate when acting unjustly?" "Let it be so," he said.
—τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν; —ἔφη.
"And by being temperate, do you mean thinking well?" He said so.
—τὸ δʼ εὖ φρονεῖν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν; —
ἔστω,
ἔφη.
"And by thinking well, planning well, in that they act unjustly?" "Let it be so," he said.
—πότερον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς; —
εἰ εὖ. —λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἄττα εἶναι; —
λέγω. —ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἅ ἐστιν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; —
καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ,
ἔφη,
κἂν μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὠφέλιμα ᾖ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθά. —καί μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἑώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος ἠρέμα ἠρόμην.
"Is it," I said, "if they fare well in acting unjustly, or if they fare badly?" "If they fare well." "Do you say then that some things are good?" "I do." "Are these things good," I said, "which are beneficial to humans?" "Indeed, by Zeus," he said, "even if they are not beneficial to humans, I at least call them good." And Protagoras seemed to me to be already getting rough and struggling and drawing himself up in battle array to answer; so when I saw him in this state, I asked my questions more gently, taking precautions.