§330ΣΩ. ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία; —
πάντων μάλιστα δήπου,
ἔφη· καὶ μέγιστόν γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων. —ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστιν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο;
Socrates: "‘Are these also, then,’ I said, ‘parts of virtue—wisdom and courage?’ ‘Most certainly of all, indeed,’ he said; ‘and wisdom is the greatest of the parts.’ ‘And is each of them,’ I said, ‘different from the other?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And does each of them have its own particular power?
—
ναί. —ἦ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἰδίαν ἔχει; ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμὸς οἷον τὰ ὦτα, οὐδʼ ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα·
Just as with the parts of the face, the eye is not like the ears, nor is its power the same; nor is any of the other parts like another, either in power or in other respects.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ;
Is it then the same with the parts of virtue, that one is not like another, either in itself or in its power?
ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ τῷ παραδείγματί γε ἔοικε; —
ἀλλʼ οὕτως,
ἔφη,
ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Or is it clear that it is so, if indeed it resembles the example?’ ‘Indeed it is so, Socrates,’ he said.
—καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλο οἷον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδʼ οἷον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδʼ οἷον ἀνδρεία, οὐδʼ οἷον σωφροσύνη, οὐδʼ οἷον ὁσιότης. —οὐκ ἔφη. —φέρε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα ποῖόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἕκαστον.
And I said: ‘Then no other of the parts of virtue is like knowledge, nor like justice, nor like courage, nor like temperance, nor like holiness.’ He agreed. ‘Come then,’ I said, ‘let us consider together what sort of thing each of them is.
πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τί ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα;
First, something like this: is justice some thing, or is it nothing?
ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοί; —
κἀμοί,
ἔφη. —τί οὖν;
For to me it seems to be something; but what about to you?’ ‘To me too,’ he said. ‘What then?
εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἴπετον δή μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδικον; ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον·
If someone were to ask you and me: "Protagoras and Socrates, tell me, please, this thing which you just now named, justice, is this itself just or unjust?" I for my part would answer him that it is just.
σὺ δὲ τίνʼ ἂν ψῆφον θεῖο;
But what vote would you cast?
τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην; —
τὴν αὐτήν,
ἔφη. —ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ;
The same as mine, or another?’ ‘The same,’ he said. ‘“Justice, then, is of such a nature as to be just,” I for my part would say in answering the questioner.
—
ναί,
ἔφη. —εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι; φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. —ναί,
ἦ δʼ ὅς. —
οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμά τι εἶναι; φαῖμεν ἄν· ἢ οὔ; —καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη. —
πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμά φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὅσιον; ἀγανακτήσαιμʼ ἂν ἔγωγʼ, ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἴποιμʼ ἄν· εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε·
Would not you too?’ ‘Yes,’ he said. ‘If then after this he should ask us: "Do you not also say that there is a certain thing, holiness?" We would say so, as I think.’ ‘Yes,’ he said. ‘“Do you then also say that this is some thing?” We would say so, or not?” He agreed to this too. ‘“And do you say that this thing itself is by nature such as to be unholy, or such as to be holy?” I for my part would be indignant at the question,’ I said, ‘and would say: "Speak words of good omen, fellow!
σχολῇ μεντἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται. τί δὲ σύ;
For hardly could anything else be holy, if holiness itself is not to be holy." But what about you?
οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο; —
πάνυ μὲν οὖν,
ἔφη. εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἴποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς·
Would you not answer in this way?’ ‘Most certainly,’ he said. ‘If then after this he should say, questioning us: "How then were you speaking a little earlier?
πῶς οὖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἆρʼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα;
Did I not hear you correctly?
ἐδόξατέ μοι φάναι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον·
You seemed to me to say that the parts of virtue are related to one another in such a way that one of them is not like another;"’"