§212ὑμᾶς οὖν ὁρῶν, σέ τε καὶ Λύσιν, ἐκπέπληγμαι καὶ εὐδαιμονίζω ὅτι οὕτω νέοι ὄντες οἷοι τʼ ἐστὸν τοῦτο τὸ κτῆμα ταχὺ καὶ ῥᾳδίως κτᾶσθαι, καὶ σύ τε τοῦτον οὕτω φίλον ἐκτήσω ταχύ τε καὶ σφόδρα, καὶ αὖ οὗτος σέ·
"Now when I see you two, both you and Lysis, I am amazed and I count you happy that, being so young, you are able to acquire this possession so quickly and easily, and that you have acquired him as such a friend so quickly and thoroughly, and he in turn you.
ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω πόρρω εἰμὶ τοῦ κτήματος, ὥστε οὐδʼ ὅντινα τρόπον γίγνεται φίλος ἕτερος ἑτέρου οἶδα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα δὴ αὐτά σε βούλομαι ἐρέσθαι ἅτε ἔμπειρον.
But I am so far from this possession that I do not even know in what way one becomes a friend to another, but I want to ask you these very things as one who is experienced.
καί μοι εἰπέ· ἐπειδάν τίς τινα φιλῇ, πότερος ποτέρου φίλος γίγνεται, ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος·
And tell me: whenever someone loves another, which of the two becomes the friend of which? Does the lover become the friend of the beloved, or the beloved of the lover?
ἢ οὐδὲν διαφέρει; —
οὐδέν,
ἔφη,
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ διαφέρειν. —πῶς λέγεις; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
Or is there no difference?" "It seems to me," he said, "to make no difference." "How do you mean?" I said.
ἀμφότεροι ἄρα ἀλλήλων φίλοι γίγνονται, ἐὰν μόνος ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον φιλῇ; —
ἔμοιγε,
ἔφη,
δοκεῖ.
"Are both then friends of each other if only one loves the other?" "It seems so to me," he said.
—τί δέ;
"What?
οὐκ ἔστιν φιλοῦντα μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου ὃν ἂν φιλῇ; —
ἔστιν. —τί δέ;
Is it not possible for one who loves not to be loved in return by the one he loves?" "It is." "What?
ἆρα ἔστιν καὶ μισεῖσθαι φιλοῦντα;
Is it also possible for one who loves even to be hated?
οἷόν που ἐνίοτε δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ πάσχειν πρὸς τὰ παιδικά·
Just as, I suppose, lovers sometimes seem to suffer at the hands of their darlings.
φιλοῦντες γὰρ ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα οἱ μὲν οἴονται οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἱ δὲ καὶ μισεῖσθαι.
For though they love them as much as possible, some think they are not loved in return, and some even that they are hated.
ἢ οὐκ ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο; —
σφόδρα γε,
ἔφη,
ἀληθές. —οὐκοῦν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ φιλεῖται; —
ναί.
Or does this not seem true to you?" "Very much so," he said, "it is true." "Therefore, in such a case," I said, "one loves and the other is loved?" "Yes." "Which of them then is the friend of which?
—πότερος οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρου φίλος ἐστίν; ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου, ἐάντε καὶ ἀντιφιλῆται ἐάντε καὶ μισῆται, ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος;
Is the lover the friend of the beloved, whether he is loved in return or even hated, or is the beloved the friend of the lover?
ἢ οὐδέτερος αὖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οὐδετέρου φίλος ἐστίν, ἂν μὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀλλήλους φιλῶσιν; —
ἔοικε γοῦν οὕτως ἔχειν. —ἀλλοίως ἄρα νῦν ἡμῖν δοκεῖ ἢ πρότερον ἔδοξεν.
Or again, in such a case, is neither the friend of neither, unless both love each other?" "It seems, at least, to be so." "Then we think differently now than we did before.
τότε μὲν γάρ, εἰ ὁ ἕτερος φιλοῖ, φίλω εἶναι ἄμφω· νῦν δέ, ἂν μὴ ἀμφότεροι φιλῶσιν, οὐδέτερος φίλος. —
κινδυνεύει,
ἔφη.
For then, if one loved, we thought both were friends; but now, unless both love, neither is a friend." "It seems likely," he said.
—οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν φίλον τῷ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ οὐκ ἀντιφιλοῦν. —
οὐκ ἔοικεν. —οὐδʼ ἄρα φίλιπποί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ ἵπποι μὴ ἀντιφιλῶσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες, οὐδʼ αὖ φιλόκυνές γε καὶ φίλοινοι καὶ φιλογυμνασταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι, ἂν μὴ ἡ σοφία αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλῇ.
"Then nothing is a friend to the lover unless it loves in return." "It does not seem so." "Then people are not horse-lovers if the horses do not love them in return, nor quail-lovers, nor again dog-lovers, wine-lovers, gymnastics-lovers, and wisdom-lovers (philosophers), unless wisdom loves them in return.
ἢ φιλοῦσι μὲν ταῦτα ἕκαστοι, οὐ μέντοι φίλα ὄντα, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεθʼ ὁ ποιητής, ὃς ἔφη—
"
ὄλβιος, ᾧ παῖδές τε φίλοι καὶ μώνυχες ἵπποι
καὶ κύνες ἀγρευταὶ καὶ ξένος ἀλλοδαπός; "
—
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ,
ἦ δʼ ὅς.
Or do they love each of these things without their being friends, and is the poet lying who said: 'Happy is he who has dear children, and single-hooved horses, and hunting dogs, and a stranger from abroad'?" "It does not seem so to me," he said.
—ἀλλʼ ἀληθῆ δοκεῖ λέγειν σοι; —
ναί. — §213τὸ φιλούμενον ἄρα τῷ φιλοῦντι φίλον ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Μενέξενε, ἐάντε φιλῇ ἐάντε καὶ μισῇ·
"But does he seem to you to speak the truth?" "Yes." "Therefore, what is loved is a friend to the lover, as it seems, Menexenus, whether it loves or even hates.
οἷον καὶ τὰ νεωστὶ γεγονότα παιδία, τὰ μὲν οὐδέπω φιλοῦντα, τὰ δὲ καὶ μισοῦντα, ὅταν κολάζηται ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅμως καὶ μισοῦντα ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πάντων μάλιστά ἐστι τοῖς γονεῦσι φίλτατα. —
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ,
ἔφη,
οὕτως ἔχειν. —οὐκ ἄρα ὁ φιλῶν φίλος ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλʼ ὁ φιλούμενος. —
ἔοικεν. —καὶ ὁ μισούμενος ἐχθρὸς ἄρα, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ μισῶν. —
φαίνεται. —πολλοὶ ἄρα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν φιλοῦνται, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν φίλων μισοῦνται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς φίλοι εἰσίν, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἐχθροί, εἰ τὸ φιλούμενον φίλον ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ φιλοῦν.
Just as newly born children, who do not yet love, or even hate, when they are punished by their mother or by their father; nevertheless, even while hating, they are at that time of all things dearest to their parents." "It seems to me," he said, "to be so." "Then not the lover is a friend according to this argument, but the beloved." "It seems so." "And what is hated is an enemy, but not what hates." "So it appears." "Then many are loved by their enemies and hated by their friends, and are friends to their enemies and enemies to their friends, if the beloved is a friend and not the lover.
καίτοι πολλὴ ἀλογία, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, μᾶλλον δὲ οἶμαι καὶ ἀδύνατον, τῷ τε φίλῳ ἐχθρὸν καὶ τῷ ἐχθρῷ φίλον εἶναι. —
ἀληθῆ,
ἔφη,
ἔοικας λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
And yet it is a great absurdity, my dear companion, or rather, I think, impossible, to be an enemy to one's friend and a friend to one's enemy." "You seem to speak the truth, Socrates," he said.
—οὐκοῦν εἰ τοῦτʼ ἀδύνατον, τὸ φιλοῦν ἂν εἴη φίλον τοῦ φιλουμένου. —
φαίνεται. —τὸ μισοῦν ἄρα πάλιν ἐχθρὸν τοῦ μισουμένου. —
ἀνάγκη. —οὐκοῦν ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν συμβήσεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὁμολογεῖν, ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πρότερον, πολλάκις φίλον εἶναι μὴ φίλου, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐχθροῦ, ὅταν ἢ μὴ φιλοῦν τις φιλῇ ἢ καὶ μισοῦν φιλῇ· πολλάκις δʼ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι μὴ ἐχθροῦ ἢ καὶ φίλου, ὅταν ἢ μὴ μισοῦν τις μισῇ ἢ καὶ φιλοῦν μισῇ. —
κινδυνεύει,
ἔφη.
"Therefore, if this is impossible, the lover must be the friend of the beloved." "So it appears." "And what hates, in turn, must be the enemy of what is hated." "Necessarily." "Therefore, we shall find ourselves forced to admit the very same things as in the previous cases: that a person is often a friend of one who is not a friend, and often even of an enemy, when he loves someone who does not love him, or even who hates him; and often an enemy of one who is not an enemy, or even who is a friend, when he hates someone who does not hate him, or even who loves him." "It seems likely," he said.
—τί οὖν δὴ χρησώμεθα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες φίλοι ἔσονται μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι; ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλους τινὰς ἔτι φήσομεν εἶναι φίλους ἀλλήλοις γιγνομένους;
"What then shall we do," I said, "if neither those who love are to be friends, nor those who are loved, nor those who both love and are loved?
—
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία,
ἔφη,
ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶ ἔγωγε. —ἆρα μή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Μενέξενε, τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐζητοῦμεν; —
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ἔφη, ὁ Λύσις, καὶ ἅμα εἰπὼν ἠρυθρίασεν·
Shall we say that there are still some others besides these who become friends to each other?" "No, by Zeus, Socrates," he said, "I am not at all resourceful myself." "Can it be, Menexenus," I said, "that we have been seeking altogether in the wrong way?" "I do not think so, Socrates," Lysis said, and as he spoke he blushed.
ἐδόκει γάρ μοι ἄκοντʼ αὐτὸν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ λεχθὲν διὰ τὸ σφόδρα προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις, δῆλος δʼ ἦν καὶ ὅτε ἠκροᾶτο οὕτως ἔχων.
For it seemed to me that the words escaped him against his will because he was paying such close attention to what was being said, and he was clearly in this state of mind even when he was listening.
ἐγὼ οὖν βουλόμενος τόν τε Μενέξενον ἀναπαῦσαι καὶ ἐκείνου ἡσθεὶς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, οὕτω μεταβαλὼν πρὸς τὸν λύσιν ἐποιούμην τοὺς λόγους, καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Λύσι, ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν ὅτι εἰ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκοποῦμεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὕτως ἐπλανώμεθα.
So I, wishing to give Menexenus a rest and being pleased with Lysis's love of wisdom, turned my talk to him and said: "Lysis, you seem to me to speak the truth, for if we had been seeking in the right way, we would never have wandered so."