§192ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὧδε λέγω, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τάχος ἠρώτων τί ποτʼ ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρέχειν τυγχάνει ὂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν καὶ ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, καὶ σχεδόν τι αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα, οὗ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον λέγειν, ἢ ἐν ταῖς τῶν χειρῶν πράξεσιν ἢ σκελῶν ἢ στόματός τε καὶ φωνῆς ἢ διανοίας·
Socrates: I mean it this way, just as if I were to ask what "quickness" is, which happens to exist for us both in running and in playing the lyre, and in speaking and in learning, and in many other things, and which we possess as something worth speaking of, whether in the actions of the hands, or of the legs, or of the mouth and voice, or of the mind; or do you not also say so?
ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ σὺ λέγεις; ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.
Laches: Certainly.
ΣΩ. εἰ τοίνυν τίς με ἔροιτο· ὦ Σώκρατες, τί λέγεις τοῦτο ὃ ἐν πᾶσιν ὀνομάζεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι; εἴποιμʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ διαπραττομένην δύναμιν ταχυτῆτα ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ περὶ φωνὴν καὶ περὶ δρόμον καὶ περὶ τἆλλα πάντα.
Socrates: If then someone should ask me: "Socrates, what do you say this thing is which you call 'quickness' in all these cases?" I should say to him that the power which accomplishes many things in a short time is what I call "quickness," both in respect of voice and of running, and of all other things.
ΛΑ. ὀρθῶς γε σὺ λέγων.
Laches: And you would be speaking quite rightly.
ΣΩ. πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν ἀνδρείαν οὕτως εἰπεῖν τίς οὖσα δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐν λύπῃ καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀνδρεία κέκληται.
Socrates: Try then yourself also, Laches, to speak of courage in this way: what power is it which is the same in pleasure and in pain and in all the things in which we were just now saying it was, and is therefore called "courage"?
ΛΑ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καρτερία τις εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν.
Laches: It seems to me, then, to be a certain endurance of the soul, if indeed one must speak of that which by nature pervades them all.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινούμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.
Socrates: But indeed we must, if we are to answer the question for ourselves.
τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε φαίνεται· οὔτι πᾶσά γε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, καρτερία ἀνδρεία σοι φαίνεται.
Now this is how it appears to me: not every endurance, I think, appears to you to be courage.
τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐνθένδε· σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγῇ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.
And I infer it from this: for I know pretty well, Laches, that you consider courage to be one of the very noble things.
ΛΑ. εὖ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι τῶν καλλίστων.
Laches: Know well indeed that it is one of the noblest.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερία καλὴ κἀγαθή;
Socrates: Therefore, is the endurance which is accompanied by wisdom noble and good?
ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.
Laches: Certainly.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἡ μετʼ ἀφροσύνης;
Socrates: And what about that accompanied by folly?
οὐ τοὐναντίον ταύτῃ βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος;
Is it not, on the contrary, harmful and mischievous to it?
ΛΑ. ναί.
Laches: Yes.
ΣΩ. καλὸν οὖν τι φήσεις σὺ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὂν κακοῦργόν τε καὶ βλαβερόν;
Socrates: Will you then say that such a thing, being mischievous and harmful, is noble?
ΛΑ. οὔκουν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Laches: Certainly not, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τήν γε τοιαύτην καρτερίαν ἀνδρείαν ὁμολογήσεις εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ καλή ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία καλόν ἐστιν.
Socrates: Then you will not admit that such endurance is courage, since it is not noble, whereas courage is noble.
ΛΑ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Laches: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. ἡ φρόνιμος ἄρα καρτερία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.
Socrates: Then, according to your argument, wise endurance would be courage.
ΛΑ. ἔοικεν.
Laches: It seems so.
ΣΩ. ἴδωμεν δή, ἡ εἰς τί φρόνιμος;
Socrates: Let us see then, wise in respect of what?
ἢ ἡ εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμικρά;
Or is it wise in respect of all things, both great and small?
οἷον εἴ τις καρτερεῖ ἀναλίσκων ἀργύριον φρονίμως, εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀναλώσας πλέον ἐκτήσεται, τοῦτον ἀνδρεῖον καλοῖς ἄν;
For example, if someone endures spending money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire more, would you call this man courageous?
ΛΑ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Laches: By Zeus, not I.
§193ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οἷον εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὤν, περιπλευμονίᾳ τοῦ ὑέος ἐχομένου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς καὶ δεομένου πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν δοῦναι, μὴ κάμπτοιτο ἀλλὰ καρτεροῖ;
Socrates: But what if someone who is a physician, when his son or someone else is held by pneumonia and begs for something to drink or eat, does not give in but endures?
ΛΑ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν οὐδʼ αὕτη.
Laches: Not in any way at all is this courage either.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐν πολέμῳ καρτεροῦντα ἄνδρα καὶ ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι, φρονίμως λογιζόμενον, εἰδότα μὲν ὅτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ καὶ φαυλοτέρους μαχεῖται ἢ μεθʼ ὧν αὐτός ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ χωρία ἔχει κρείττω, τοῦτον τὸν μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα ἀνδρειότερον ἂν φαίης ἢ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐθέλοντα ὑπομένειν τε καὶ καρτερεῖν;
Socrates: But what about a man enduring in war and willing to fight, calculating wisely, knowing that others will come to his aid, and that he will be fighting against fewer and weaker enemies than those on his own side, and furthermore that he holds better positions—would you say that this man, enduring with such wisdom and preparation, is more courageous than the one in the opposing camp who is willing to stand his ground and endure?
ΛΑ. τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Laches: The one in the opposing camp, it seems to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀφρονεστέρα γε ἡ τούτου ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἑτέρου καρτερία.
Socrates: But surely the endurance of this latter is more foolish than that of the former.
ΛΑ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Laches: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. καὶ τὸν μετʼ ἐπιστήμης ἄρα ἱππικῆς καρτεροῦντα ἐν ἱππομαχίᾳ ἧττον φήσεις ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης.
Socrates: And will you then say that the one who endures in a cavalry battle with knowledge of horsemanship is less courageous than the one without knowledge?
ΛΑ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Laches: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. καὶ τὸν μετὰ σφενδονητικῆς ἢ τοξικῆς ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς τέχνης καρτεροῦντα.
Socrates: And also the one who endures with the art of slinging, or archery, or some other skill?
ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.
Laches: Certainly.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν εἰς φρέαρ καταβαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες καρτερεῖν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, μὴ ὄντες δεινοί, ἢ ἔν τινι ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνδρειοτέρους φήσεις τῶν ταῦτα δεινῶν.
Socrates: And those who are willing to go down into a well and dive, and to endure in this work, although they are not experts, or in any other such matter—will you say they are more courageous than those who are experts in these things?
ΛΑ. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο φαίη, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Laches: What else indeed could anyone say, Socrates?
ΣΩ. οὐδέν, εἴπερ οἴοιτό γε οὕτως.
Socrates: Nothing, if indeed one were to think so.
ΛΑ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαί γε.
Laches: But indeed I do think so.
ΣΩ. καὶ μήν που ἀφρονεστέρως γε, ὦ Λάχης, οἱ τοιοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσίν τε καὶ καρτεροῦσιν ἢ οἱ μετὰ τέχνης αὐτὸ πράττοντες.
Socrates: And yet surely, Laches, such people run risks and endure more foolishly than those who do it with skill.
ΛΑ. φαίνονται.
Laches: So they appear.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αἰσχρὰ ἡ ἄφρων τόλμα τε καὶ καρτέρησις ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν οὖσα καὶ βλαβερά;
Socrates: Therefore, did not foolish daring and endurance appear to us earlier to be shameful and harmful?
ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.
Laches: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἡ δέ γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλόν τι εἶναι.
Socrates: And yet courage was agreed to be something noble.
ΛΑ. ὡμολογεῖτο γάρ.
Laches: Yes, it was so agreed.
ΣΩ. νῦν δʼ αὖ πάλιν φαμὲν ἐκεῖνο τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὴν ἄφρονα καρτέρησιν, ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.
Socrates: But now on the contrary we are saying again that that shameful thing, foolish endurance, is courage.
ΛΑ. ἐοίκαμεν.
Laches: We seem to be.
ΣΩ. καλῶς οὖν σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν;
Socrates: Do we then seem to you to be speaking well?
ΛΑ. μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὔ.
Laches: By Zeus, Socrates, not to me.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα που κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον δωριστὶ ἡρμόσμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης· τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οὐ συμφωνεῖ ἡμῖν τοῖς λόγοις.
Socrates: Then, I suppose, according to your argument, we are not tuned in the Dorian mode, Laches, you and I; for our deeds do not harmonize with our words.
ἔργῳ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, φαίη ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνδρείας μετέχειν, λόγῳ δʼ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οὐκ ἄν, εἰ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀκούσειε διαλεγομένων.
For in deed, as it seems, someone might say we share in courage, but in word, as I think, they would not, if they were to hear us conversing now.
ΛΑ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Laches: You speak the absolute truth.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
Socrates: What then?
δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι οὕτως ἡμᾶς διακεῖσθαι;
Does it seem noble to us to be in this condition?
ΛΑ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.
Laches: Not in any way at all.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν ᾧ λέγομεν πειθώμεθα τό γε τοσοῦτον;
Socrates: Are you willing then that we should obey what we are saying, at least to this extent?
ΛΑ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;
Laches: What kind of thing is this, and what is it we should obey?