Humanitext Reader

Plato · Alcibiades II §150-151

Justice of the Soul, Postponing Prayer, and the Wreath

Passage 8 of 8 · Greek

Summary

Socrates and Alcibiades agree that the gods value justice of the soul over lavish sacrifices, leading Alcibiades to postpone his prayer until he receives guidance. Alcibiades presents Socrates with a wreath of gratitude, which Socrates accepts as a favorable omen in his effort to win over Alcibiades' other suitors.

§150ΣΩ. πολλῷ γε μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἢ πρὸς τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταύτας πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας, ἃς οὐδὲν κωλύει πολλὰ μὲν εἰς θεούς, πολλὰ δʼ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἡμαρτηκότας καὶ ἰδιώτην καὶ πόλιν ἔχειν ἀνʼ ἕκαστον ἔτος τελεῖν·
SOCRATES: Much more so, I think, than to these costly processions and sacrifices, which nothing prevents both an individual and a city, though having committed many sins against gods and men, from being able to perform every year.
οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐ δωροδόκοι ὄντες, καταφρονοῦσιν ἁπάντων τούτων, ὥς φησιν ὁ θεὸς καὶ θεῶν προφήτης.
But the gods, since they do not receive bribes, despise all these things, as the god and the prophet of the gods says.
κινδυνεύει γοῦν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρʼ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ φρόνησις διαφερόντως τετιμῆσθαι·
At any rate, it seems that both among gods and among men who have understanding, justice and wisdom are pre-eminently honored.
φρόνιμοι δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι οὐκ ἄλλοι τινές εἰσιν τῶν εἰδότων ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους.
And the wise and just are none other than those who know what they ought to do and say both to gods and to men.
βουλοίμην δʼ ἂν καὶ σοῦ πυθέσθαι ὅτι ποτʼ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα.
And I should like to ask you too what on earth you have in mind regarding these things.
ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄλλῃ πῃ δοκεῖ ἢ ᾗπερ σοί τε καὶ τῷ θεῷ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν εἰκὸς εἴη ἀντίψηφον ἐμὲ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι.
ALKIBIADES: Well, to me, Socrates, it seems no other way than as it seems to you and to the god; for indeed it would not be reasonable for me to vote against the god.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ἐν πολλῇ ἀπορίᾳ φάσκων εἶναι, ὅπως μὴ λάθῃς σεαυτὸν εὐχόμενος κακά, δοκῶν δὲ ἀγαθά;
SOCRATES: Do you remember then saying that you were in great perplexity, lest you should unawares pray for evils while thinking they are goods?
ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
ALKIBIADES: I do.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλές σοί ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐξομένῳ, ἵνα μηδʼ ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, βλασφημοῦντός σου ἀκούων οὐθὲν ἀποδέξηται τῆς θυσίας ταύτης, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ἕτερόν τι προσαπολαύσῃς.
SOCRATES: You see then that it is not safe for you to go to pray to the god, lest, if it should so happen, hearing you pray for harmful things, he should accept nothing of this sacrifice, and perchance you might besides reap some other evil.
ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ βέλτιστον εἶναι ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων εὐχῇ διὰ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν—τοῦτο γὰρ κάλλιστον τῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ γε ὀνομάτων—οὐκ ἂν οἶμαί σε ἐθέλειν χρῆσθαι.
Therefore it seems to me best to keep quiet; for as to the Lacedaemonians' prayer, because of their grandiosity—for this is the fairest of the names that belong to folly, at least—I do not think you would want to use it.
ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἐστι περιμένειν ἕως ἄν τις μάθῃ ὡς δεῖ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους διακεῖσθαι.
It is necessary therefore to wait until someone learns how one ought to be disposed towards gods and towards men.
ΑΛ. πότε οὖν παρέσται ὁ χρόνος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τίς ὁ παιδεύσων;
ALKIBIADES: When then will this time come, Socrates, and who is he who will instruct me?
ἥδιστα γὰρ ἄν μοι δοκῶ ἰδεῖν τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τίς ἐστιν.
For I think I should most gladly see who this man is.
ΣΩ. οὗτος ᾧ μέλει περὶ σοῦ.
SOCRATES: This is he who cares for you.
ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι, ὥσπερ τῷ Διομήδει φησὶν τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν Ὅμηρος ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀχλύν, " ὄφρʼ εὖ γιγνώσκοι ἠμὲν θεὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα, " οὕτω καὶ σοὶ δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρῶτον τὴν ἀχλὺν ἀφελόντα, ἣ νῦν παροῦσα τυγχάνει, τὸ τηνικαῦτʼ ἤδη προσφέρειν διʼ ὧν μέλλεις γνώσεσθαι ἠμὲν κακὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν.
But it seems to me, just as Homer says Athena took away the mist from the eyes of Diomedes, "that he might well discern both god and man," so you too must first have the mist taken away from your soul, which happens now to be present, and only then to apply the means by which you are to know both evil and good.
νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖς δυνηθῆναι.
For now indeed you do not seem to me to be able to do so.
ΑΛ. ἀφαιρείτω, εἴτε βούλεται τὴν ἀχλὺν εἴτε ἄλλο τι· ὡς ἐγὼ παρεσκεύασμαι μηθὲν ἂν φυγεῖν τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνου προσταττομένων, ὅστις ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἅνθρωπος, εἴ γε μέλλοιμι βελτίων γενέσθαι.
ALKIBIADES: Let him take away the mist, whether he wishes to do so or anything else; for I am prepared to flee from none of the things commanded by him, whoever this man is, if only I am to become better.
§151ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνος θαυμαστὴν ὅσην περὶ σὲ προθυμίαν ἔχει.
SOCRATES: Indeed, he too has a wonderful eagerness for you.
ΑΛ. εἰς τότε τοίνυν καὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀναβάλλεσθαι κράτιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ.
ALKIBIADES: Till then, therefore, it seems to me best to postpone the sacrifice as well.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ σοι δοκεῖ· ἀσφαλέστερον γάρ ἐστιν ἢ παρακινδυνεύειν τοσοῦτον κίνδυνον.
SOCRATES: And indeed you think rightly; for it is safer than to run so great a risk.
ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ALKIBIADES: But how so, Socrates?
καὶ μὴν τουτονὶ τὸν στέφανον, ἐπειδή μοι δοκεῖς καλῶς συμβεβουλευκέναι, σοὶ περιθήσω· τοῖς θεοῖς δὲ καὶ στεφάνους καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ νομιζόμενα τότε δώσομεν, ὅταν ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐλθοῦσαν ἴδω.
Indeed, this wreath, since you seem to have advised me well, I will place around you; and to the gods we will give both wreaths and all other customary things then, when I see that day has arrived.
ἥξει δʼ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ τούτων θελόντων.
And it will come before long, if they are willing.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δέχομαι καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ἄν τι τῶν παρὰ σοῦ δοθέντων ἡδέως ἴδοιμι δεξάμενον ἐμαυτόν.
SOCRATES: Well, I accept this too, and I would gladly see myself receiving any other of the things given by you.
ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ὁ Κρέων Εὐριπίδῃ πεποίηται τὸν Τειρεσίαν ἰδὼν ἔχοντα τὰ στέφη καὶ ἀκούσας ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαρχὰς αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι διὰ τὴν τέχνην, " οἰωνὸν ἐθέμην, φησί, καλλίνικα σὰ στέφη· ἐν γὰρ κλύδωνι κείμεθʼ, ὥσπερ οἶσθα σύ· " οὕτω δὲ κἀγὼ παρὰ σοῦ τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οἰωνὸν τίθεμαι.
And just as Creon in Euripides, when he saw Teiresias wearing the wreaths and heard that he had received them as first-fruits from the enemy on account of his art, says: "I take as an omen your victorious wreaths; for we are in a tempest, as you know"; so do I also take this honor from you as an omen.
δοκῶ δέ μοι οὐκ ἐν ἐλάττονι κλύδωνι τοῦ Κρέοντος εἶναι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν καλλίνικος γενέσθαι τῶν σῶν ἐραστῶν.
For I seem to myself to be in no less a tempest than Creon, and I should like to become victorious over your lovers.

Notes

  1. 150aπολλῷ γε μᾶλλον οἶμαι — Supplying the omitted verb from the preceding sentence (ἀποβλέπουσιν), meaning "I think the gods look to the soul much more so than..."
  2. 150aἃς οὐδὲν κωλύει πολλὰ μὲν εἰς θεούς, πολλὰ δʼ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἡμαρτηκότας καὶ ἰδιώτην καὶ πόλιν ἔχειν ἀνʼ ἕκαστον ἔτος τελεῖν — Accusative-with-infinitive construction following οὐδὲν κωλύει, where the accusative subject "καὶ ἰδιώτην καὶ πόλιν" (modified by the participle "ἡμαρτηκότας") governs the twin infinitives "ἔχειν" and "τελεῖν" (with the relative pronoun "ἃς" as object).
  3. 150cἵνα μηδʼ ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, βλασφημοῦντός σου ἀκούων οὐθὲν ἀποδέξηται τῆς θυσίας ταύτης, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ἕτερόν τι προσαπολαύσῃς — Within the purpose clause "ἵνα ... μή", there is a shift of subject from the third-person singular "ἀποδέξηται" (the god) to the second-person singular "προσαπολαύσῃς" (Alcibiades). The genitive absolute "βλασφημοῦντός σου" functions as the object of perception for the participle "ἀκούων".
  4. 150eτὸ τηνικαῦτʼ ἤδη προσφέρειν — The infinitive "προσφέρειν" depends on "δεῖν". Its logical subject is expressed by the accusative participle "ἀφελόντα", which does not agree grammatically with the preceding dative "σοί", a common syntactic shift where the dative personal pronoun is treated as an accusative subject for the subsequent infinitive.

Cite this passage

Plato, Alcibiades II §150-151. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg014.humanitext-grc2:150-151

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