§138ΣΩ. ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἆρά γε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν προσευξόμενος πορεύῃ;
SOCRATES: Alkibiades, are you on your way to pray to the god?
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates.
ΣΩ. φαίνῃ γέ τοι ἐσκυθρωπακέναι τε καὶ εἰς γῆν βλέπειν, ὥς τι συννοούμενος.
SOCRATES: You seem at any rate to have a gloomy look and to be looking down at the ground, as if you are contemplating something.
ΑΛ. καὶ τί ἄν τις συννοοῖτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ALCIBIADES: And what would anyone be contemplating, Socrates?
ΣΩ. τὴν μεγίστην, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, σύννοιαν, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.
SOCRATES: The greatest contemplation, Alkibiades, as it seems to me.
ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τοὺς θεούς, ἃ τυγχάνομεν εὐχόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἐνίοτε τούτων τὰ μὲν διδόναι, τὰ δʼ οὔ, καὶ ἔστιν οἷς μὲν αὐτῶν, ἔστι δʼ οἷς οὔ;
For tell me, by Zeus, do you not think that the gods, of the things we happen to pray for both privately and publicly, sometimes grant some and not others, and to some of us but not to others?
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly I do.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσεται αὑτὸν εὐχόμενος μεγάλα κακά, δοκῶν δʼ ἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τύχωσιν ἐν ταύτῃ ὄντες τῇ ἕξει, ἐν ᾗ διδόασιν αὐτοὶ ἅ τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνει;
SOCRATES: Does it not seem to you, then, to require much foresight, lest a man should unconsciously pray for great evils while thinking they are goods, and the gods should happen to be in that disposition in which they grant whatever one happens to pray for?
ὥσπερ τὸν Οἰδίπουν αὐτίκα φασὶν εὔξασθαι χαλκῷ διελέσθαι τὰ πατρῷα τοὺς ὑεῖς· ἐξὸν αὐτῷ τῶν παρόντων αὐτῷ κακῶν ἀποτροπήν τινα εὔξασθαι, ἕτερα πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν κατηρᾶτο·
Just as they say Oedipus immediately prayed that his sons should divide their paternal inheritance with the sword; when it was open to him to pray for some aversion of his present evils, he cursed them with other evils in addition to those already existing.
τοιγαροῦν ταῦτά τε ἐξετελέσθη, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ἃ τί δεῖ καθʼ ἕκαστα λέγειν;
Consequently, these things were fulfilled, and from these, many other terrible things, which why is there any need to relate in detail?
ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ σὺ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον εἴρηκας· ἐπεὶ τίς ἄν σοι δοκεῖ τολμῆσαι ὑγιαίνων τοιαῦτʼ εὔξασθαι;
ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, you have spoken of a madman; for who, do you think, in his right mind would dare to pray for such things?
ΣΩ. τὸ μαίνεσθαι ἆρά γε ὑπεναντίον σοι δοκεῖ τῷ φρονεῖν;
SOCRATES: Does being mad seem to you to be opposite to being wise?
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἄφρονες δὲ καὶ φρόνιμοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τινές σοι;
SOCRATES: And do some men seem to you to be foolish and others wise?
ΑΛ. εἶναι μέντοι.
ALCIBIADES: Indeed they do.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα τίνες ποτʼ εἰσὶν οὗτοι.
SOCRATES: Come then, let us examine who on earth these are.
ὅτι μὲν γάρ εἰσί τινες, ὡμολόγηται, ἄφρονές τε καὶ φρόνιμοι, καὶ μαινόμενοι ἕτεροι.
For that there are some who are foolish and some who are wise, and others who are mad, is agreed.
ΑΛ. ὡμολόγηται γάρ.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, it is agreed.
ΣΩ. ἔτι δὲ ὑγιαίνοντές εἰσί τινες;
SOCRATES: And are there some who are healthy?
ΑΛ. εἰσίν.
ALCIBIADES: There are.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσθενοῦντες ἕτεροι;
SOCRATES: And others who are sick?
§139ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί;
SOCRATES: Then they are not the same?
ΑΛ. οὐ γάρ.
ALCIBIADES: No.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἕτεροί τινές εἰσιν, οἳ μηδέτερα τούτων πεπόνθασιν;
SOCRATES: Are there also some others who have experienced neither of these?
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ALCIBIADES: Surely not.
ΣΩ. ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἢ νοσεῖν ἢ μὴ νοσεῖν.
SOCRATES: For it is necessary for a human being either to be sick or not to be sick.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ALCIBIADES: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: What then?
περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἆρά γε τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχεις σὺ γνώμην;
Do you hold the same opinion about wisdom and folly?
ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
ALCIBIADES: How do you mean?
ΣΩ. εἰ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἢ φρόνιμον ἢ ἄφρονα, ἢ ἔστι τι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα;
SOCRATES: Whether it seems to you possible to be either wise or foolish, or is there some third state in between, which makes a man neither wise nor foolish?
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ALCIBIADES: Surely not.
ΣΩ. ἀνάγκη ἄρʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων πεπονθέναι.
SOCRATES: Then it is necessary to have experienced one of these two.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ALCIBIADES: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ὁμολογήσας ὑπεναντίον εἶναι μανίαν φρονήσει;
SOCRATES: Do you remember, then, having agreed that madness is opposite to wisdom?
ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
ALCIBIADES: I do.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα εἶναι;
SOCRATES: And also that there is no third state in between, which makes a man neither wise nor foolish?
ΑΛ. ὡμολόγησα γάρ.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, I agreed.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπεναντία ἑνὶ πράγματι πῶς ἂν εἴη;
SOCRATES: And yet, how could there be two opposites to one single thing?
ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
ALCIBIADES: In no way.
ΣΩ. ἀφροσύνη ἄρα καὶ μανία κινδυνεύει ταὐτὸν εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Folly and madness, then, are likely to be the same thing.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ALCIBIADES: So it appears.
ΣΩ. πάντας οὖν ἂν φάντες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι ὀρθῶς ἂν φαίημεν· αὐτίκα τῶν σῶν ἡλικιωτῶν εἴ τινες τυγχάνουσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες, ὥσπερ εἰσί, καὶ τῶν ἔτι πρεσβυτέρων.
SOCRATES: Therefore, Alkibiades, if we said that all foolish people are mad, we would be speaking correctly; for instance, if some of your contemporaries happen to be foolish, as indeed they are, and some of the older ones too.
ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀλίγους μὲν εἶναι τοὺς φρονίμους, ἄφρονας δὲ δὴ τοὺς πολλούς, οὓς δὴ σὺ μαινομένους καλεῖς;
For tell me, by Zeus, do you not think that the wise in the city are few, and the foolish are many, whom you indeed call mad?
ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
ALCIBIADES: I do.
ΣΩ. οἴει ἂν οὖν χαίροντας ἡμᾶς εἶναι μετὰ τοσούτων μαινομένων πολιτευομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν παιομένους καὶ βαλλομένους, καὶ ἅπερ εἰώθασιν οἱ μαινόμενοι διαπράττεσθαι, πάλαι δὴ δίκην δεδωκέναι;
SOCRATES: Do you think, then, we would be happy living in a state with so many madmen, and would not have long ago paid the penalty by being beaten, pelted, and suffering what madmen are accustomed to do?
ἀλλὰ ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ταῦτʼ ἔχει.
But look, my good friend, lest this is not so.
ΑΛ. πῶς ἂν οὖν ποτʼ ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ALCIBIADES: How then could it be, Socrates?
κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ᾠήθην.
For it is likely not to be as I thought.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.
SOCRATES: I do not think so either.
ἀλλὰ τῇδέ πῃ ἀθρητέον.
But we must observe it in some such way.
ΑΛ. πῇ ποτε λέγεις;
ALCIBIADES: In what way do you mean?
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δή σοί γε ἐρῶ.
SOCRATES: I will tell you.
ὑπολαμβάνομέν γέ τινας εἶναι νοσοῦντας· ἢ οὔ;
We suppose that there are some people who are sick, or not?
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν νοσοῦντα ποδαγρᾶν ἢ πυρέττειν ἢ ὀφθαλμιᾶν, ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι καὶ μηδὲν τούτων πεπονθὼς ἑτέραν νόσον νοσεῖν; πολλαὶ γὰρ δήπου γέ εἰσι, καὶ οὐχ αὗται μόναι.
SOCRATES: Does it seem to you necessary, then, that a sick person must have gout, or a fever, or sore eyes, or do you think he could be sick with another illness without having suffered any of these? For there are surely many, and not these alone.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
ALCIBIADES: I think so.
ΣΩ. ὀφθαλμία σοι οὖν δοκεῖ πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Does every sore eyes, then, seem to you to be an illness?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ πᾶσα νόσος ὀφθαλμία;
SOCRATES: And is every illness sore eyes?
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα ἔμοιγε· ἀπορῶ μέντοι γε πῶς λέγω.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not, in my view; yet I am at a loss as to how I am speaking.