Humanitext Reader

Plato · Alcibiades I §134-135

Virtue as the Source of Happiness and the Resolution

Passage 21 of 21 · Greek

Summary

Socrates argues that happiness is achieved not through external prosperity but through the virtue of the soul, and that anyone who wishes to guide the city must first possess justice and temperance. Deeply convinced, Alcibiades resolves to follow Socrates, and the dialogue ends with a humorous exchange about their reversal of roles, illustrated by the metaphor of the stork.

§134ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε εἴσεται ὅτι πράττει.
SOCRATES: Nor indeed will he know what he is doing.
ΑΛ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ALCIBIADES: Indeed not.
ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται;
SOCRATES: And will not the one who does not know commit errors?
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ALCIBIADES: Absolutely.
ΣΩ. ἐξαμαρτάνων δὲ οὐ κακῶς πράξει ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ;
SOCRATES: And in committing errors, will he not fare badly both privately and publicly?
ΑΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
ΣΩ. κακῶς δὲ πράττων οὐκ ἄθλιος;
SOCRATES: And the one who fares badly, is he not wretched?
ΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.
ALCIBIADES: Very much so.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ οἷς οὗτος πράττει;
SOCRATES: And what of those for whom he acts?
ΑΛ. καὶ οὗτοι.
ALCIBIADES: They too.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε, ἐὰν μή τις σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Therefore, it is not possible to be happy unless one is temperate and good.
ΑΛ. οὐχ οἷόν τε.
ALCIBIADES: It is not possible.
ΣΩ. οἱ ἄρα κακοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄθλιοι.
SOCRATES: Therefore, the bad among human beings are wretched.
ΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.
ALCIBIADES: Very much so.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδʼ ὁ πλουτήσας ἀθλιότητος ἀπαλλάττεται, ἀλλʼ ὁ σωφρονήσας.
SOCRATES: Therefore, it is not even the one who has become rich who is delivered from wretchedness, but the one who has become temperate.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ALCIBIADES: So it appears.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τειχῶν οὐδὲ τριήρων οὐδὲ νεωρίων δέονται αἱ πόλεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐδαιμονήσειν, οὐδὲ πλήθους οὐδὲ μεγέθους ἄνευ ἀρετῆς.
SOCRATES: Therefore, cities do not need walls or triremes or dockyards, my dear Alcibiades, if they are to be happy, nor do they need numbers or size without virtue.
ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. εἰ δὴ μέλλεις τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράξειν ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς, ἀρετῆς σοι μεταδοτέον τοῖς πολίταις.
SOCRATES: If then you are to manage the affairs of the city rightly and finely, you must impart virtue to the citizens.
ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ALCIBIADES: Indeed, how could it be otherwise?
ΣΩ. δύναιτο δʼ ἄν τις μεταδιδόναι ὃ μὴ ἔχοι;
SOCRATES: And could anyone impart what he does not have?
ΑΛ. καὶ πῶς;
ALCIBIADES: And how?
ΣΩ. αὐτῷ ἄρα σοὶ πρῶτον κτητέον ἀρετήν, καὶ ἄλλῳ ὃς μέλλει μὴ ἰδίᾳ μόνον αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἄρξειν καὶ ἐπιμελήσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πόλεως καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως.
SOCRATES: Therefore, you yourself must first acquire virtue, as must anyone else who is to rule over and care for not only himself and his own things in private, but also for the city and the things of the city.
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ALCIBIADES: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐξουσίαν σοι οὐδʼ ἀρχὴν παρασκευαστέον σαυτῷ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ, οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην.
SOCRATES: Therefore, you must not prepare for yourself or for the city the power and authority to do whatever you want, but rather justice and temperance.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ALCIBIADES: So it appears.
ΣΩ. δικαίως μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες καὶ σωφρόνως σύ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε.
SOCRATES: For acting justly and temperately, both you and the city will act in a way beloved of God.
ΑΛ. εἰκός γε.
ALCIBIADES: It is likely.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ὁρῶντες πράξετε.
SOCRATES: And, just as we were saying before, you will act by looking toward what is divine and bright.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ALCIBIADES: So it appears.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐνταῦθά γε βλέποντες ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα ἀγαθὰ κατόψεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε.
SOCRATES: Indeed, by looking there, you will behold and know both yourselves and your own goods.
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ πράξετε;
SOCRATES: Then will you not act rightly and well?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε πράττοντας ὑμᾶς ἐθέλω ἐγγυήσασθαι ἦ μὴν εὐδαιμονήσειν.
SOCRATES: Indeed, for you acting in this way, I am willing to guarantee that you will surely be happy.
ΑΛ. ἀσφαλὴς γὰρ εἶ ἐγγυητής.
ALCIBIADES: For you are a trustworthy guarantor.
ΣΩ. ἀδίκως δέ γε πράττοντες, εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα, ὅμοια τούτοις πράξετε ἀγνοοῦντες ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.
SOCRATES: But if you act unjustly, looking toward what is godless and dark, you will, in all likelihood, do things similar to these, being ignorant of yourselves.
ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.
ALCIBIADES: So it seems.
§135ΣΩ. ὧι γὰρ ἄν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐξουσία μὲν ᾖ ποιεῖν ὃ βούλεται, νοῦν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ, τί τὸ εἰκὸς συμβαίνειν, ἰδιώτῃ ἢ καὶ πόλει;
SOCRATES: For, my dear Alcibiades, if someone has the power to do what he wants, but does not have intellect, what is likely to happen, whether to a private individual or to a city?
οἷον νοσοῦντι ἐξουσίας οὔσης δρᾶν ὃ βούλεται, νοῦν ἰατρικὸν μὴ ἔχοντι, τυραννοῦντι δὲ ὡς μηδὲν ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμβησόμενον;
For example, if a sick person has the power to do what he wants, not having medical intellect, but acting tyrannically so that no one may rebuke him, what will be the result?
ἆρʼ οὐχ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, διαφθαρῆναι τὸ σῶμα;
Is it not, in all likelihood, the ruin of his body?
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ALCIBIADES: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἐν νηί, εἴ τῳ ἐξουσία εἴη ποιεῖν ὃ δοκεῖ, νοῦ τε καὶ ἀρετῆς κυβερνητικῆς ἐστερημένῳ, καθορᾷς ἃ ἂν συμβαίη αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς συνναύταις;
SOCRATES: And what about on a ship, if someone had the power to do what seemed best to him, while deprived of intellect and piloting virtue—do you perceive what would happen to both him and his fellow sailors?
ΑΛ. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ἀπόλοιντο πάντες ἄν.
ALCIBIADES: I do; they would all perish.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως ἐν πόλει τε καὶ πάσαις ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἐξουσίαις ἀπολειπομέναις ἀρετῆς ἕπεται τὸ κακῶς πράττειν;
SOCRATES: Then, in the same way, in a city and in all offices and authorities that are destitute of virtue, does faring badly follow?
ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ALCIBIADES: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τυραννίδα χρή, ὦ ἄριστε Ἀλκιβιάδη, παρασκευάζεσθαι οὔθʼ αὑτῷ οὔτε τῇ πόλει, εἰ μέλλετε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἀρετήν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, my excellent Alcibiades, you must not prepare tyranny either for yourself or for the city, if you are to be happy, but virtue.
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ALCIBIADES: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. πρὶν δέ γε ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἄρχεσθαι ἄμεινον ὑπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἢ τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνδρί, οὐ μόνον παιδί.
SOCRATES: And before one has virtue, to be ruled by one's better is better than to rule, for a man as well as for a child.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ALCIBIADES: So it appears.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τό γʼ ἄμεινον καὶ κάλλιον;
SOCRATES: Then is what is better not also finer?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ κάλλιον πρεπωδέστερον;
SOCRATES: And is what is finer not more fitting?
ΑΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
ΣΩ. πρέπει ἄρα τῷ κακῷ δουλεύειν·
SOCRATES: Therefore, it is fitting for the bad man to be a slave; for that is better.
ἄμεινον γάρ.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΑΛ. ναί.
SOCRATES: Therefore, vice is fit for a slave.
ΣΩ. δουλοπρεπὲς ἄρʼ ἡ κακία.
ALCIBIADES: So it appears.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
SOCRATES: And virtue is fit for a free man.
ΣΩ. ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς δὲ ἡ ἀρετή.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΑΛ. ναί.
SOCRATES: Then must we not flee, my friend, from slavishness?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φεύγειν χρή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὴν δουλοπρέπειαν;
ALCIBIADES: Most certainly, Socrates.
ΑΛ. μάλιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
SOCRATES: And do you perceive now how you are?
ΣΩ. αἰσθάνῃ δὲ νῦν πῶς ἔχεις; ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς ἢ οὔ;
Fit for a free man, or not?
ΑΛ. δοκῶ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα αἰσθάνεσθαι.
ALCIBIADES: I think I perceive it only too well.
ΣΩ. οἶσθʼ οὖν πῶς ἀποφεύξῃ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ σὲ νῦν; ἵνα μὴ ὀνομάζωμεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ καλῷ ἀνδρί, ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
SOCRATES: Do you know, then, how you will escape this state that is now about you—so that we may not name it in connection with a handsome man? ALCIBIADES: I do.
ΣΩ. πῶς;
SOCRATES: How?
ΑΛ. ἐὰν βούλῃ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ALCIBIADES: If you are willing, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη.
SOCRATES: You do not speak well, Alcibiades.
ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ πῶς χρὴ λέγειν;
ALCIBIADES: But how should I speak?
ΣΩ. ὅτι ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.
SOCRATES: That 'if God wills'.
ΑΛ. λέγω δή.
ALCIBIADES: I say so indeed.
καὶ πρὸς τούτοις μέντοι τόδε λέγω, ὅτι κινδυνεύσομεν μεταβαλεῖν τὸ σχῆμα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὲν σὸν ἐγώ, σὺ δὲ τοὐμόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ παιδαγωγήσω σε ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, σὺ δʼ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ παιδαγωγήσῃ.
And in addition to this, I also say that we are likely to exchange roles, Socrates, I taking yours, and you mine; for from this day on, there is no way I will not guide you, and you will be guided by me.
ΣΩ. ὦ γενναῖε, πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως οὐδὲν διοίσει, εἰ παρὰ σοὶ ἐννεοττεύσας ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον ὑπὸ τούτου πάλιν θεραπεύσεται.
SOCRATES: My noble friend, my love then will be no different from a stork, if, having nested a winged love in you, it is to be cared for in turn by this very offspring.
ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄρξομαί γε ἐντεῦθεν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμέλεσθαι.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, that is how it is, and from this moment I shall begin to care for justice.
ΣΩ. βουλοίμην ἄν σε καὶ διατελέσαι· ὀρρωδῶ δέ, οὔ τι τῇ σῇ φύσει ἀπιστῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ῥώμην, μὴ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ κρατήσῃ.
SOCRATES: I could wish indeed that you would continue in this; but I am full of dread—not because I distrust your nature, but because, seeing the power of the city, I fear it may master both me and you.

Notes

  1. 134aοἷς — A dative relative pronoun acting as a dative of interest, denoting those affected by the person's actions or under his rule ("for those whom he acts").
  2. 134cμεταδοτέον — A neuter singular verbal adjective in an impersonal construction of obligation. The agent is in the dative `σοι` ("you must"), the shared object is in the genitive `ἀρετῆς` ("virtue"), and the recipients are in the dative `τοῖς πολίταις` ("to the citizens").
  3. 135dπαιδαγωγήσω σε... σὺ δʼ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ παιδαγωγήσῃ — The manuscript tradition features a redundancy in meaning with the active `παιδαγωγήσω` ("I shall guide you") and the passive `παιδαγωγήσῃ` ("you will be guided by me"). Although some editors emend the first verb to `παιδαγωγήσεις με` ("you will guide me") to fit the theme of role reversal, this translation follows the transmitted text as written, which reflects the humorous confusion of roles.
  4. 135eπελαργοῦ — A metaphorical reference to the ancient belief (known as *antipelargosis*) that young storks (`πελαργός`) care for and feed their aged parents. It humorously illustrates the reversal of roles where Socrates' nurtured love is now sustained by Alcibiades.

Cite this passage

Plato, Alcibiades I §134-135. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg013.humanitext-grc2:134-135

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