§133ΣΩ. ἐννενόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ὄψει ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κόρην καλοῦμεν, εἴδωλον ὄν τι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος;
SOCRATES: Then have you noticed that the face of the one who looks into the eye appears in the sight of the one opposite, as if in a mirror, which indeed we call the pupil, being a kind of image of the one who looks?
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ALCIBIADES: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὀφθαλμὸν θεώμενος, καὶ ἐμβλέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ καὶ ᾧ ὁρᾷ, οὕτως ἂν αὑτὸν ἴδοι.
SOCRATES: Therefore, an eye contemplating an eye, and looking into that which is best in it and by which it sees, would thus see itself.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ALCIBIADES: So it appears.
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γʼ εἰς ἄλλο τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βλέποι ἤ τι τῶν ὄντων, πλὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον, οὐκ ὄψεται ἑαυτόν.
SOCRATES: But if it should look at any other of the things belonging to a human being, or at any of existing things, except that to which this happens to be similar, it will not see itself.
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ALCIBIADES: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρʼ εἰ μέλλει ἰδεῖν αὑτόν, εἰς ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῷ βλεπτέον, καὶ τοῦ ὄμματος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ἡ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐγγιγνομένη· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτό που ὄψις;
SOCRATES: Therefore, if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that place of the eye in which the virtue of the eye happens to arise; and this, I suppose, is sight?
ΑΛ. οὕτως.
ALCIBIADES: Quite so.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ψυχὴ εἰ μέλλει γνώσεσθαι αὑτήν, εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλεπτέον, καὶ μάλιστʼ εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετή, σοφία, καὶ εἰς ἄλλο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον ὄν;
SOCRATES: Then, my dear Alcibiades, if a soul too is to know itself, must it look at a soul, and especially at that place of it in which the virtue of the soul, wisdom, arises, and at any other thing to which this happens to be similar?
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ALCIBIADES: So it seems to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Can we then say that there is anything of the soul more divine than this, which is concerned with knowing and thinking?
ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔχομεν.
ALCIBIADES: We cannot.
ΣΩ. τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καί τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίη μάλιστα.
SOCRATES: This part of it, then, resembles God, and someone looking into this and knowing all that is divine, both God and wisdom, would thus also know himself most of all.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ALCIBIADES: So it appears.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὅθʼ ὥσπερ κάτοπτρά ἐστι σαφέστερα τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἐνόπτρου καὶ καθαρώτερα καὶ λαμπρότερα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ βελτίστου καθαρώτερόν τε καὶ λαμπρότερον τυγχάνει ὄν;
SOCRATES: Then, just as mirrors are clearer than the mirror in the eye, and purer and brighter, does God also happen to be purer and brighter than the best part in our soul?
ΑΛ. ἔοικέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ALCIBIADES: It seems so, Socrates.
ΣΩ. εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἄρα βλέποντες ἐκείνῳ καλλίστῳ ἐνόπτρῳ χρῴμεθʼ ἂν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς ἀρετήν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα ὁρῷμεν καὶ γιγνώσκοιμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς.
SOCRATES: Therefore, by looking at God, we would use that most beautiful mirror and, among human things, look to the virtue of the soul, and in this way we would most of all see and know ourselves.
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ γιγνώσκειν αὑτὸν ὡμολογοῦμεν σωφροσύνην εἶναι;
SOCRATES: And did we agree that knowing oneself is temperance?
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ALCIBIADES: Absolutely so.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν μὴ γιγνώσκοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς μηδὲ σώφρονες ὄντες δυναίμεθʼ ἂν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακά τε καὶ ἀγαθά;
SOCRATES: Then, if we do not know ourselves and are not temperate, would we be able to know what is our own, both bad and good?
ΑΛ. καὶ πῶς ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ALCIBIADES: And how could that be, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἴσως σοι φαίνεται μὴ γιγνώσκοντα Ἀλκιβιάδην τὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου γιγνώσκειν ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐστίν.
SOCRATES: For indeed it likely seems impossible to you that someone who does not know Alcibiades should know the things of Alcibiades, that they belong to Alcibiades.
ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον μέντοι νὴ Δία.
ALCIBIADES: Impossible indeed, by Zeus.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα τὰ ἡμέτερα ὅτι ἡμέτερα, εἰ μηδʼ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;
SOCRATES: Neither, then, our own things, that they are ours, if we do not even know ourselves?
ΑΛ. πῶς γάρ;
ALCIBIADES: For how could we?
ΣΩ. εἰ δʼ ἄρα μηδὲ τὰ ἡμέτερα, οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων;
SOCRATES: And if not even our own things, neither the things belonging to our own things?
ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.
ALCIBIADES: It does not appear so.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα πάνυ τι ὀρθῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἄρτι εἶναί τινας οἳ ἑαυτοὺς μὲν οὐ γιγνώσκουσιν, τὰ δʼ αὑτῶν, ἄλλους δὲ τὰ τῶν ἑαυτῶν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, we were not altogether correct in agreeing just now that there are some who do not know themselves, but know their own things, and others who know the things belonging to their own things.
ἔοικε γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι κατιδεῖν ἑνός τε καὶ μιᾶς τέχνης, αὑτόν, τὰ αὑτοῦ, τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ.
For it seems that to perceive all these things—oneself, one's own things, and the things belonging to one's own things—belongs to one and the same person and to one and the same art.
ΑΛ. κινδυνεύει.
ALCIBIADES: Likely so.
ΣΩ. ὅστις δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων που ἂν ἀγνοοῖ κατὰ ταὐτά.
SOCRATES: And whoever is ignorant of his own things would also, I suppose, be ignorant of the things of others in the same way.
ΑΛ. τί μήν;
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἀγνοήσει.
SOCRATES: Therefore, if he is ignorant of the things of others, he will also be ignorant of the affairs of cities.
ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ALCIBIADES: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρʼ ἂν γένοιτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ πολιτικός.
SOCRATES: Such a man, then, would not become a statesman.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ οἰκονομικός γε.
SOCRATES: Nor indeed even a household manager.