Humanitext Reader

Plato · Alcibiades I §117-118

Double Ignorance and the Ignorance of Politicians

Passage 11 of 21 · Greek

Summary

Socrates and Alcibiades agree on the nature of "double ignorance"—that people do not waver when they are aware of their own ignorance, but only make errors when they falsely believe they know. Socrates points out that Alcibiades and most of the city's politicians suffer from this supreme state of ignorance, unable to pass down their wisdom to others.

§117ΑΛ. δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγε ἤδη περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, οἶμαι μέντοι τὰ αὐτά.
ALCIBIADES: I for my part am already afraid for myself, but I think indeed I would answer the same.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅτι οἶσθα;
SOCRATES: Is it not because you know?
τοῦτʼ αἴτιον;
Is this the cause?
ΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
ALCIBIADES: I think so.
ΣΩ. περὶ ὧν ἄρα ἄκων τἀναντία ἀποκρίνῃ, δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τούτων οὐκ οἶσθα.
SOCRATES: Concerning those things, then, about which you answer the opposite against your will, it is clear that you do not know about them.
ΑΛ. εἰκός γε.
ALCIBIADES: It is likely.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ μὴ ἀποκρινόμενος φῂς πλανᾶσθαι;
SOCRATES: Do you not then say that you waver in answering about just and unjust, beautiful and shameful, bad and good, beneficial and harmful?
εἶτα οὐ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανᾷ;
Is it not then clear that because of not knowing about them, you waver because of these things?
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.
ALCIBIADES: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει· ἐπειδάν τίς τι μὴ εἰδῇ, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τούτου πλανᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν;
SOCRATES: Is this then how it is: whenever someone does not know something, is it necessary for his soul to waver about this?
ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ALCIBIADES: For how could it not be?
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
οἶσθα ὅντινα τρόπον ἀναβήσῃ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν;
Do you know in what manner you will ascend to heaven?
ΑΛ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
ALCIBIADES: By Zeus, not I.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ πλανᾶταί σου ἡ δόξα περὶ ταῦτα;
SOCRATES: Does your opinion also waver about these things?
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ALCIBIADES: Not at all.
ΣΩ. τὸ δʼ αἴτιον οἶσθα ἢ ἐγὼ φράσω;
SOCRATES: Do you know the cause, or shall I tell you?
ΑΛ. φράσον.
ALCIBIADES: Tell me.
ΣΩ. ὅτι, ὦ φίλε, οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος.
SOCRATES: Because, my friend, you do not think you know it when you do not know it.
ΑΛ. πῶς αὖ τοῦτο λέγεις;
ALCIBIADES: How do you say this again?
ΣΩ. ὅρα καὶ σὺ κοινῇ.
SOCRATES: Consider it also yourself in common.
ἃ μὴ ἐπίστασαι, γιγνώσκεις δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι, πλανᾷ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
Concerning things which you do not know, but recognize that you do not know, do you waver about such things?
ὥσπερ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας οἶσθα δήπου ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα;
Just as about the preparation of sauce, you know, I suppose, that you do not know?
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ALCIBIADES: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν αὐτὸς περὶ ταῦτα δοξάζεις ὅπως χρὴ σκευάζειν καὶ πλανᾷ, ἢ τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ ἐπιτρέπεις;
SOCRATES: Do you then yourself hold an opinion about these things, how they must be prepared, and waver, or do you entrust it to the one who knows?
ΑΛ. οὕτως.
ALCIBIADES: Thus.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ ἐν νηῒ πλέοις, ἆρα δοξάζοις ἂν πότερον χρὴ τὸν οἴακα εἴσω ἄγειν ἢ ἔξω, καὶ ἅτε οὐκ εἰδὼς πλανῷο ἄν, ἢ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἂν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοις;
SOCRATES: What if you were sailing in a ship, would you hold an opinion whether one must bring the helm inside or outside, and as one not knowing waver, or would you entrust it to the pilot and keep quiet?
ΑΛ. τῷ κυβερνήτῃ.
ALCIBIADES: To the pilot.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα περὶ ἃ μὴ οἶσθα πλανᾷ, ἄνπερ εἰδῇς ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα;
SOCRATES: You do not, then, waver about things you do not know, provided you know that you do not know?
ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικα.
ALCIBIADES: It seems not.
ΣΩ. ἐννοεῖς οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα ἐν τῇ πράξει διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιάν ἐστι, τὴν τοῦ μὴ εἰδότα οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι;
SOCRATES: Do you then perceive that errors in action are also because of this ignorance, that of the one who does not know thinking he knows?
ΑΛ. πῶς αὖ λέγεις τοῦτο;
ALCIBIADES: How do you say this again?
ΣΩ. τότε που ἐπιχειροῦμεν πράττειν, ὅταν οἰώμεθα εἰδέναι ὅτι πράττομεν;
SOCRATES: Is it then that we attempt to act, when we think we know what we are doing?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ὅταν δέ γέ πού τινες μὴ οἴωνται εἰδέναι, ἄλλοις παραδιδόασι;
SOCRATES: But when some indeed do not think they know, do they hand it over to others?
ΑΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ALCIBIADES: For how could they not?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μὴ εἰδότων ἀναμάρτητοι ζῶσι διὰ τὸ ἄλλοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιτρέπειν;
SOCRATES: Do not such of those who do not know live without making errors, because of entrusting it to others concerning these things?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τίνες οὖν οἱ ἁμαρτάνοντες;
SOCRATES: Who then are those who make errors?
οὐ γάρ που οἵ γε εἰδότες.
For surely not those who know.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
§118ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δʼ οὔθʼ οἱ εἰδότες οὔθʼ οἱ τῶν μὴ εἰδότων εἰδότες ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν, ἦ ἄλλοι λείπονται ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες, οἰόμενοι δʼ εἰδέναι;
SOCRATES: Since, then, neither those who know, nor those of the ones who do not know who know that they do not know make errors, are any others left than those who do not know, but think they know?
ΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὗτοι.
ALCIBIADES: No, but these.
ΣΩ. αὕτη ἄρα ἡ ἄγνοια τῶν κακῶν αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία;
SOCRATES: Is this ignorance then the cause of bad things, and the blameworthy lack of learning?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅταν ᾖ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα, τότε κακουργοτάτη καὶ αἰσχίστη;
SOCRATES: Then whenever it is about the greatest things, is it then most mischievous and most shameful?
ΑΛ. πολύ γε.
ALCIBIADES: By far.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ἔχεις μείζω εἰπεῖν δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων;
Can you speak of things greater than just, beautiful, good, and beneficial things?
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν περὶ ταῦτα σὺ φῂς πλανᾶσθαι;
SOCRATES: Is it not about these things that you say you waver?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ πλανᾷ, ἆρʼ οὐ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἀγνοεῖς τὰ μέγιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐκ εἰδὼς οἴει αὐτὰ εἰδέναι;
SOCRATES: And if you waver, is it not clear from what went before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but also, not knowing them, you think you know them?
ΑΛ. κινδυνεύω.
ALCIBIADES: I am in danger of being so.
ΣΩ. βαβαῖ ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, οἷον πάθος πέπονθας·
SOCRATES: Alas then, Alcibiades, what a state you have suffered!
ὃ ἐγὼ ὀνομάζειν μὲν ὀκνῶ, ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμέν, ῥητέον.
Which I indeed hesitate to name, but nevertheless, since we are alone, it must be said.
ἀμαθίᾳ γὰρ συνοικεῖς, ὦ βέλτιστε, τῇ ἐσχάτῃ, ὡς ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ καὶ σὺ σαυτοῦ· διὸ καὶ ᾁττεις ἄρα πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πρὶν παιδευθῆναι.
For you live together with the extreme lack of learning, my best friend, as your own argument accuses you and you yourself accuse yourself; wherefore also you rush into political matters before being educated.
πέπονθας δὲ τοῦτο οὐ σὺ μόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πραττόντων τὰ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως, πλὴν ὀλίγων γε καὶ ἴσως τοῦ σοῦ ἐπιτρόπου Περικλέους.
And you have suffered this not alone, but also the many of those who manage the affairs of this city, except for a few, and perhaps your guardian Pericles.
ΑΛ. λέγεταί γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου σοφὸς γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς καὶ σοφοῖς συγγεγονέναι, καὶ Πυθοκλείδῃ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ· καὶ νῦν ἔτι τηλικοῦτος ὢν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα.
ALCIBIADES: It is indeed said, Socrates, that he did not become wise of his own accord, but associated with many wise men, both Pythocleides and Anaxagoras; and even now, being of such an age, he associates with Damon for this very purpose.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ἤδη τινʼ εἶδες σοφὸν ὁτιοῦν ἀδυνατοῦντα ποιῆσαι ἄλλον σοφὸν ἅπερ αὐτός;
Have you ever yet seen any wise man unable to make another wise in the very things in which he himself is?
ὥσπερ ὅς σε ἐδίδαξεν γράμματα, αὐτός τʼ ἦν σοφὸς καὶ σὲ ἐποίησε τῶν τε ἄλλων ὅντινʼ ἐβούλετο· ἦ γάρ;
Just as the one who taught you letters was himself wise and made you wise, and of the others whomever he wished; was it not so?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ὁ παρʼ ἐκείνου μαθὼν ἄλλον οἷός τε ἔσῃ;
SOCRATES: And will not you also, having learned from him, be able to make another so?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδοτρίβης ὡσαύτως;
SOCRATES: And the harpist and the trainer likewise?
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ALCIBIADES: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. καλὸν γὰρ δήπου τεκμήριον τοῦτο τῶν ἐπισταμένων ὁτιοῦν ὅτι ἐπίστανται, ἐπειδὰν καὶ ἄλλον οἷοί τʼ ὦσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ἐπιστάμενον.
SOCRATES: For this is a fine proof of those who know anything, that they know it, whenever they are also able to produce another who knows.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ALCIBIADES: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ἔχεις εἰπεῖν Περικλῆς τίνα ἐποίησεν σοφόν, ἀπὸ τῶν ὑέων ἀρξάμενος;
Can you say whom Pericles made wise, beginning from his sons?
ΑΛ. τί δʼ εἰ τὼ Περικλέους ὑεῖ ἠλιθίω ἐγενέσθην, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ALCIBIADES: But what if the two sons of Pericles became simpletons, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ Κλεινίαν τὸν σὸν ἀδελφόν.
SOCRATES: But Cleinias, your brother?
ΑΛ. τί δʼ ἂν αὖ Κλεινίαν λέγοις, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον;
ALCIBIADES: But why would you mention Cleinias again, a madman?
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν Κλεινίας μὲν μαίνεται, τὼ δὲ Περικλέους ὑεῖ ἠλιθίω ἐγενέσθην, σοὶ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀναθῶμεν, διʼ ὅτι σε οὕτως ἔχοντα περιορᾷ;
SOCRATES: Since, then, Cleinias is mad, and the two sons of Pericles became simpletons, what cause shall we assign to you, why he overlooks you being in such a state?
ΑΛ. ἐγὼ οἶμαι αἴτιος οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.
ALCIBIADES: I think I myself am the cause, by not paying attention.

Notes

  1. 117aοὐκοῦν ὅτι οἶσθα; τοῦτʼ αἴτιον; — The ὅτι clause in οὐκοῦν ὅτι οἶσθα; functions as a conjunction introducing the cause for Alcibiades' preceding statement that he would answer the same (οἶμαι μέντοι τὰ αὐτά). Socrates supplies the reason: 'Is it not because you know?' and immediately follows with 'Is this the cause?' (τοῦτʼ αἴτιον;).
  2. 117dτὴν τοῦ μὴ εἰδότα οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι — The negative participle in the accusative μὴ εἰδότα, placed before the articular infinitive in the genitive τοῦ οἴεσθαι, functions as the subject of the infinitive οἴεσθαι, creating an accusative-and-infinitive construction. The entire phrase represents 'the thinking of one who does not know that he knows,' which stands in apposition to and details the nature of 'this ignorance' (ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιάν).
  3. 118aτῶν μὴ εἰδότων εἰδότες — The genitive noun phrase τῶν μὴ εἰδότων (the ones who do not know) functions as a partitive genitive qualifying the substantivized participle οἱ εἰδότες (the ones who know). Thus, the entire expression refers to 'those among the ignorant who are aware [that they do not know]'.

Cite this passage

Plato, Alcibiades I §117-118. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg013.humanitext-grc2:117-118

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.