§276ΣΩ. τί δʼ;
SOCRATES: And what?
ἄλλον ὁρῶμεν λόγον τούτου ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον, τῷ τρόπῳ τε γίγνεται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀμείνων καὶ δυνατώτερος τούτου φύεται;
Do we see another speech, a legitimate brother of this one, in what way it comes to be, and by how much better and more powerful than this one it grows?
ΦΑΙ. τίνα τοῦτον καὶ πῶς λέγεις γιγνόμενον;
PHAEDRUS: What is this speech, and how do you say it comes to be?
ΣΩ. ὃς μετʼ ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμῦναι ἑαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ.
SOCRATES: The one that is written with knowledge in the soul of the learner, capable of defending itself, and knowing how to speak and to keep silence toward those whom it ought.
ΦΑΙ. τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραμμένος εἴδωλον ἄν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως.
PHAEDRUS: You mean the living and animate speech of the one who knows, of which the written one might justly be called a kind of image.
ΣΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
SOCRATES: Absolutely.
τόδε δή μοι εἰπέ· ὁ νοῦν ἔχων γεωργός, ὧν σπερμάτων κήδοιτο καὶ ἔγκαρπα βούλοιτο γενέσθαι, πότερα σπουδῇ ἂν θέρους εἰς Ἀδώνιδος κήπους ἀρῶν χαίροι θεωρῶν καλοὺς ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὀκτὼ γιγνομένους, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἑορτῆς χάριν δρῴη ἄν, ὅτε καὶ ποιοῖ·
Now tell me this: would a farmer who has understanding, regarding the seeds he cared for and wished to become fruitful, seriously plant them in summer in the gardens of Adonis, and rejoice at seeing them become beautiful in eight days?
ἐφʼ οἷς δὲ ἐσπούδακεν, τῇ γεωργικῇ χρώμενος ἂν τέχνῃ, σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσῆκον, ἀγαπῴη ἂν ἐν ὀγδόῳ μηνὶ ὅσα ἔσπειρεν τέλος λαβόντα;
Or would he do these things, when he does them at all, for the sake of play and festival, but for those about which he is serious, using the art of agriculture and sowing in the proper soil, be content when what he sowed reached its end in the eighth month?
ΦΑΙ. οὕτω που, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν σπουδῇ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἑτέρως ἂν ᾗ λέγεις ποιοῖ.
PHAEDRUS: In that way, Socrates, he would do the ones seriously, and the others differently, as you say.
ΣΩ. τὸν δὲ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντα τοῦ γεωργοῦ φῶμεν ἧττον νοῦν ἔχειν εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ σπέρματα;
SOCRATES: And shall we say that the one who has knowledge of things just, beautiful, and good has less understanding regarding his own seeds than the farmer?
ΦΑΙ. ἥκιστά γε.
PHAEDRUS: By no means.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα σπουδῇ αὐτὰ ἐν ὕδατι γράψει μέλανι σπείρων διὰ καλάμου μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὑτοῖς λόγῳ βοηθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἱκανῶς τἀληθῆ διδάξαι.
SOCRATES: He will not, then, write them seriously in water, sowing them with ink through a reed pen, along with speeches that are unable to help themselves by speech, and unable to sufficiently teach the truth.
ΦΑΙ. οὔκουν δὴ τό γʼ εἰκός.
PHAEDRUS: At least that is not likely.
ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ·
SOCRATES: No indeed.
ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους, ὡς ἔοικε, παιδιᾶς χάριν σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράψει, ὅταν γράφῃ, ἑαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενος, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἐὰν ἵκηται, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταὐτὸν ἴχνος μετιόντι, ἡσθήσεταί τε αὐτοὺς θεωρῶν φυομένους ἁπαλούς·
But the gardens in letters, as it seems, he will sow and write for the sake of play, when he writes, treasuring up reminders for himself against the forgetfulness of old age, if he should reach it, and for anyone who follows the same path; and he will be pleased to see them growing tenderly.
ὅταν δὲ ἄλλοι παιδιαῖς ἄλλαις χρῶνται, συμποσίοις τε ἄρδοντες αὑτοὺς ἑτέροις τε ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, τότʼ ἐκεῖνος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀντὶ τούτων οἷς λέγω παίζων διάξει.
And when others employ themselves in other plays, watering themselves with banquets and other things akin to these, then he, as it seems, will spend his time playing instead of those things I mention.
ΦΑΙ. παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὧν λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα.
PHAEDRUS: You speak of a very beautiful play, Socrates, in contrast to a trivial one, for the one who is able to play in speeches, spinning stories about justice and the other things you mention.
§277ΣΩ. ἔστι γάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, οὕτω·
SOCRATES: For it is so, my dear Phaedrus.
πολὺ δʼ οἶμαι καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετʼ ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἳ ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι φυόμενοι τοῦτʼ ἀεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί, καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν μάλιστα.
But I think a much more beautiful seriousness arises concerning these things when someone, employing the dialectical art, taking a fitting soul, plants and sows speeches with knowledge, which are capable of helping themselves and the one who planted them, and are not fruitless but have seed, from which other speeches growing up in other characters are capable of making this ever immortal, and making the one who possesses it happy to the greatest extent possible for a human being.
ΦΑΙ. πολὺ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἔτι κάλλιον λέγεις.
PHAEDRUS: For this that you speak of is still much more beautiful.
ΣΩ. νῦν δὴ ἐκεῖνα ἤδη, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δυνάμεθα κρίνειν, τούτων ὡμολογημένων.
SOCRATES: Now indeed, Phaedrus, we are finally able to judge those other things, since these have been agreed upon.
ΦΑΙ. τὰ ποῖα;
PHAEDRUS: Which things?
ΣΩ. ὧν δὴ πέρι βουληθέντες ἰδεῖν ἀφικόμεθα εἰς τόδε, ὅπως τὸ Λυσίου τε ὄνειδος ἐξετάσαιμεν τῆς τῶν λόγων γραφῆς πέρι, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους οἳ τέχνῃ καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης γράφοιντο.
SOCRATES: The very things, indeed, wishing to see which we came to this point, so that we might examine the reproach against Lysias concerning the writing of speeches, and the speeches themselves, which ones are written with art and which without art.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔντεχνον καὶ μὴ δοκεῖ μοι δεδηλῶσθαι μετρίως.
Now, what is with art and what is not seems to me to have been shown moderately well.
ΦΑΙ. ἔδοξέ γε δή· πάλιν δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με πῶς.
PHAEDRUS: So it seemed, indeed; but remind me again how.
ΣΩ. πρὶν ἄν τις τό τε ἀληθὲς ἑκάστων εἰδῇ πέρι ὧν λέγει ἢ γράφει, κατʼ αὐτό τε πᾶν ὁρίζεσθαι δυνατὸς γένηται, ὁρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατʼ εἴδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστηθῇ, περί τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διιδὼν κατὰ ταὐτά, τὸ προσαρμόττον ἑκάστῃ φύσει εἶδος ἀνευρίσκων, οὕτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῇ τὸν λόγον, ποικίλῃ μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῇ καὶ παναρμονίους διδοὺς λόγους, ἁπλοῦς δὲ ἁπλῇ, οὐ πρότερον δυνατὸν τέχνῃ ἔσεσθαι καθʼ ὅσον πέφυκε μεταχειρισθῆναι τὸ λόγων γένος, οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι, ὡς ὁ ἔμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος.
SOCRATES: Until someone knows the truth about each of the things he speaks or writes, and becomes capable of defining everything in itself, and having defined it, knows how to divide it again by classes down to the indivisible; and having discerned the nature of the soul in the same way, discovering the class that fits each nature, in this way arranges and orders his speech, giving complex speeches to a complex soul and simple ones to a simple soul, it is not possible for the genus of speeches to be handled with art to the extent of its nature, either for the purpose of teaching or for that of persuading, as all our previous argument has indicated to us.
ΦΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε οὕτω πως ἐφάνη.
PHAEDRUS: Absolutely, at least this appeared in some such way.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, καὶ ὅπῃ γιγνόμενον ἐν δίκῃ λέγοιτʼ ἂν ὄνειδος ἢ μή, ἆρα οὐ δεδήλωκεν τὰ λεχθέντα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν—
ΦΑΙ. τὰ ποῖα;
SOCRATES: And what, again, about its being beautiful or shameful to speak and write speeches, and in what way it would justly be called a reproach or not, has not what was said a little while ago made it clear— PHAEDRUS: Which things?
ΣΩ. ὡς εἴτε Λυσίας ἤ τις ἄλλος πώποτε ἔγραψεν ἢ γράψει ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ νόμους τιθείς, σύγγραμμα πολιτικὸν γράφων καὶ μεγάλην τινὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βεβαιότητα ἡγούμενος καὶ σαφήνειαν, οὕτω μὲν ὄνειδος τῷ γράφοντι, εἴτε τίς φησιν εἴτε μή·
SOCRATES: That if Lysias or anyone else has ever written or will write, privately or publicly in establishing laws, writing a political document and believing that there is some great solidity and clarity in it, such writing is a reproach to the writer, whether anyone says so or not.
τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν ὕπαρ τε καὶ ὄναρ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων πέρι καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ.
For to be ignorant, awake or asleep, of what is just and unjust, bad and good, does not in truth escape being blameworthy, not even if the entire crowd should praise it.
ΦΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
PHAEDRUS: No, indeed.