§262ΦΑΙ. ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγον.
PHAEDRUS: In those that differ little.
ΣΩ. ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα.
SOCRATES: But indeed, by shifting little by little, you will more escape notice in arriving at the opposite than by shifting in a big way.
ΦΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
PHAEDRUS: How could it not be so?
ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσειν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι, τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι.
SOCRATES: Therefore, the one who is going to deceive another, but not be deceived himself, must accurately distinguish the similarity and dissimilarity of things that are.
ΦΑΙ. ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.
PHAEDRUS: It is indeed necessary.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν οἷός τε ἔσται, ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοῶν ἑκάστου, τὴν τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ὁμοιότητα σμικράν τε καὶ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις διαγιγνώσκειν;
SOCRATES: Will he then be able, if he is ignorant of the truth of each thing, to discern the similarity of the unknown thing, whether small or great, in other things?
ΦΑΙ. ἀδύνατον.
PHAEDRUS: Impossible.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζουσι καὶ ἀπατωμένοις δῆλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τοῦτο διʼ ὁμοιοτήτων τινῶν εἰσερρύη.
SOCRATES: Therefore, for those who hold opinions contrary to the things that are and are deceived, it is clear that this affection has crept in through certain similarities.
ΦΑΙ. γίγνεται γοῦν οὕτως.
PHAEDRUS: At any rate, it happens in this way.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως τεχνικὸς ἔσται μεταβιβάζειν κατὰ σμικρὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμοιοτήτων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστοτε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἀπάγων, ἢ αὐτὸς τοῦτο διαφεύγειν, ὁ μὴ ἐγνωρικὼς ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων;
SOCRATES: Is there then any way that one will be skilled in shifting by small degrees through similarities, leading away from what is on each occasion to the opposite, or in escaping this himself, if he has not recognized what each of the things that are is?
ΦΑΙ. οὐ μή ποτε.
PHAEDRUS: Never indeed.
ΣΩ. λόγων ἄρα τέχνην, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς, γελοίαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται.
SOCRATES: Therefore, my companion, the one who does not know the truth, but has hunted after opinions, will offer an art of speeches that is, as it seems, a ridiculous and artless one.
ΦΑΙ. κινδυνεύει.
PHAEDRUS: It is likely.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν ἐν τῷ Λυσίου λόγῳ ὃν φέρεις, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν ἰδεῖν τι ὧν φαμεν ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Do you wish, then, in the speech of Lysias which you are carrying, and in those which we spoke, to see something of what we say is artless and artful?
ΦΑΙ. πάντων γέ που μάλιστα, ὡς νῦν γε ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα.
PHAEDRUS: Most of all, surely, since as it is we are speaking in a rather bare way, not having sufficient examples.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρρηθήτην τὼ λόγω ἔχοντέ τι παράδειγμα, ὡς ἂν ὁ εἰδὼς τὸ ἀληθὲς προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας.
SOCRATES: And indeed by some chance, as it seems, the two speeches were spoken containing an example of how one who knows the truth, playing in words, might mislead his hearers.
καὶ ἔγωγε, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αἰτιῶμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεούς· ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ᾠδοὶ ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἂν ἡμῖν εἶεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας· οὐ γάρ που ἔγωγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.
And I, Phaedrus, blame the local gods; and perhaps also the prophets of the Muses, the singers above our heads, might have inspired us with this gift; for surely I myself have no share in any art of speaking.
ΦΑΙ. ἔστω ὡς λέγεις· μόνον δήλωσον ὃ φῄς.
PHAEDRUS: Let it be as you say; only make clear what you mean.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή μοι ἀνάγνωθι τὴν τοῦ Λυσίου λόγου ἀρχήν.
SOCRATES: Come then, read to me the beginning of Lysias' speech.
ΦΑΙ.
περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας.
PHAEDRUS: "Concerning my affairs you understand, and you have heard how I think it is advantageous for us if these things come about.
ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὢν σοῦ τυγχάνω.
And I claim that I should not fail to get what I ask for this reason, that I happen not to be a lover of yours.
ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει
—
ΣΩ. παῦσαι.
For to those, on the one hand, there is regret then —" SOCRATES: Stop.
τί δὴ οὖν οὗτος ἁμαρτάνει καὶ ἄτεχνον ποιεῖ λεκτέον·
Now we must state in what indeed this man errs and acts without art; is it not so?
ἦ γάρ; §263ΦΑΙ. ναί.
PHAEDRUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ παντὶ δῆλον τό γε τοιόνδε, ὡς περὶ μὲν ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχομεν, περὶ δʼ ἔνια στασιωτικῶς;
SOCRATES: Is it not, then, clear to everyone at least this much, that concerning some of such things we are in agreement, but concerning others we are in conflict?
ΦΑΙ. δοκῶ μὲν ὃ λέγεις μανθάνειν, ἔτι δʼ εἰπὲ σαφέστερον.
PHAEDRUS: I think indeed I understand what you mean, but state it still more clearly.
ΣΩ. ὅταν τις ὄνομα εἴπῃ σιδήρου ἢ ἀργύρου, ἆρʼ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες διενοήθημεν;
SOCRATES: When someone utters the name of "iron" or "silver," do we not all think of the same thing?
ΦΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
PHAEDRUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν δικαίου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ;
SOCRATES: But what when someone utters "just" or "good"?
οὐκ ἄλλος ἄλλῃ φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;
Is not one carried in one direction and another in another, and do we not dispute with one another and with our own selves?
ΦΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PHAEDRUS: Entirely so.
ΣΩ. ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὔ.
SOCRATES: In some of these things, therefore, we agree, but in others we do not.
ΦΑΙ. οὕτω.
PHAEDRUS: Just so.
ΣΩ. ποτέρωθι οὖν εὐαπατητότεροί ἐσμεν, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐν ποτέροις μεῖζον δύναται;
SOCRATES: In which of the two, then, are we more easily deceived, and in which does rhetoric have greater power?
ΦΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλανώμεθα.
PHAEDRUS: Clearly in those in which we wander.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητορικὴν μετιέναι πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ ταῦτα ὁδῷ διῃρῆσθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἑκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους, ἐν ᾧ τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν ᾧ μή.
SOCRATES: Therefore, the one who is going to pursue the art of rhetoric must first have systematically divided these things, and have grasped some characteristic of each of the two kinds—both that in which the multitude must wander and that in which they do not.
ΦΑΙ. καλὸν γοῦν ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶδος εἴη κατανενοηκὼς ὁ τοῦτο λαβών.
PHAEDRUS: A beautiful class, at any rate, Socrates, would he have understood, the one who has grasped this.
ΣΩ. ἔπειτά γε οἶμαι πρὸς ἑκάστῳ γιγνόμενον μὴ λανθάνειν ἀλλʼ ὀξέως αἰσθάνεσθαι περὶ οὗ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐρεῖν ποτέρου ὂν τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους.
SOCRATES: Then, I think, as he comes to each case, he must not fail to notice but must sharply perceive to which of the two genera the thing about which he is going to speak happens to belong.
ΦΑΙ. τί μήν;
PHAEDRUS: Why indeed not?
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
τὸν ἔρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μή;
Shall we say that love is one of the disputed things or of the undisputed?
ΦΑΙ. τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων δήπου· ἢ οἴει ἄν σοι ἐγχωρῆσαι εἰπεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ εἶπες περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς βλάβη τέ ἐστι τῷ ἐρωμένῳ καὶ ἐρῶντι, καὶ αὖθις ὡς μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει;
PHAEDRUS: Of the disputed ones, surely; or do you think it would have been permitted to you to say what you said just now about it, that it is a harm both to the beloved and to the lover, and again that it happens to be the greatest of goods?
ΣΩ. ἄριστα λέγεις· ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ καὶ τόδε—ἐγὼ γάρ τοι διὰ τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν οὐ πάνυ μέμνημαι—εἰ ὡρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου.
SOCRATES: Most excellently said; but tell me also this—for indeed, owing to my inspired state, I do not quite remember—whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech.
ΦΑΙ. νὴ Δία ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα.
PHAEDRUS: Yes, by Zeus, extraordinarily so!
ΣΩ. φεῦ, ὅσῳ λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας τὰς Ἀχελῴου καὶ Πᾶνα τὸν Ἑρμοῦ Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Alas! By how much more artful do you say the Nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are in speeches than Lysias, son of Cephalus.
ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Λυσίας ἀρχόμενος τοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ ἠνάγκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν ἔρωτα ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ αὐτὸς ἐβουλήθη, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἤδη συνταξάμενος πάντα τὸν ὕστερον λόγον διεπεράνατο;
Or am I talking nonsense, and did Lysias also, at the beginning of his love-speech, compel us to conceive of love as some single thing among those that are, which he himself wished, and then, having arranged everything in relation to this, complete all the subsequent speech?
βούλει πάλιν ἀναγνῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ;
Do you wish us to read his beginning again?
ΦΑΙ. εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ· ὃ μέντοι ζητεῖς οὐκ ἔστʼ αὐτόθι.
PHAEDRUS: If it seems good to you; however, what you are seeking is not there.
ΣΩ. λέγε, ἵνα ἀκούσω αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου.
SOCRATES: Read, so that I may hear him himself.