§260ΦΑΙ. οὑτωσὶ περὶ τούτου ἀκήκοα, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσεσθαι τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια μανθάνειν ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντʼ ἂν πλήθει οἵπερ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλὰ ἀλλʼ ὅσα δόξει· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων εἶναι τὸ πείθειν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας.
PHAEDRUS: I have heard about this in the following way, my dear Socrates: that there is no necessity for one who is going to be a rhetorician to learn what is really just, but rather what would seem so to the multitude who will judge, nor what is really good or beautiful, but whatever will seem so; for persuading comes from these, but not from the truth.
ΣΩ.
οὔτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος
εἶναι δεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὃ ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον.
SOCRATES: "An utterance not to be cast aside," indeed, it must be, Phaedrus, whatever the wise may say, but we must examine whether they are saying something of weight; and indeed, what has now been said must not be dismissed.
ΦΑΙ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
PHAEDRUS: You speak rightly.
ΣΩ. ὧδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν αὐτό.
SOCRATES: Let us consider it in this way.
ΦΑΙ. πῶς;
PHAEDRUS: How?
ΣΩ. εἴ σε πείθοιμι ἐγὼ πολεμίους ἀμύνειν κτησάμενον ἵππον, ἄμφω δὲ ἵππον ἀγνοοῖμεν, τοσόνδε μέντοι τυγχάνοιμι εἰδὼς περὶ σοῦ, ὅτι Φαῖδρος ἵππον ἡγεῖται τὸ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῴων μέγιστα ἔχον ὦτα—
ΦΑΙ. γελοῖόν γʼ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴη.
SOCRATES: If I should persuade you to acquire a horse to defend against enemies, and both of us were ignorant of what a horse is, but I happened to know this much about you: that Phaedrus considers a horse to be that of the domestic animals which has the largest ears— PHAEDRUS: That would be ridiculous, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὔπω γε·
SOCRATES: Not yet, indeed.
ἀλλʼ ὅτε δὴ σπουδῇ σε πείθοιμι, συντιθεὶς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου, ἵππον ἐπονομάζων καὶ λέγων ὡς παντὸς ἄξιον τὸ θρέμμα οἴκοι τε κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς, ἀποπολεμεῖν τε χρήσιμον καὶ πρός γʼ ἐνεγκεῖν δυνατὸν σκεύη καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὠφέλιμον.
But what if I should seriously try to persuade you, composing a speech of praise about the donkey, calling it a horse and saying that the beast is thoroughly worth acquiring both at home and on campaign, being useful to fight from and capable of carrying baggage and beneficial for many other things?
ΦΑΙ. παγγέλοιόν γʼ ἂν ἤδη εἴη.
PHAEDRUS: That would indeed be completely ridiculous by now.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ κρεῖττον γελοῖον καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὸν;
SOCRATES: Is it not, then, better to be ridiculous and friendly than clever and hostile?
ΦΑΙ. φαίνεται.
PHAEDRUS: So it appears.
ΣΩ. ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀγνοῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, λαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθῃ, μὴ περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς ὡς ἵππου τὸν ἔπαινον ποιούμενος, ἀλλὰ περὶ κακοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ, δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκὼς πείσῃ κακὰ πράττειν ἀντʼ ἀγαθῶν, ποῖόν τινʼ ἂν οἴει μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;
SOCRATES: When, therefore, the rhetorician who is ignorant of good and evil, taking a city in the same condition, persuades it, not making his praise about "the shadow of a donkey" as if it were a horse, but about evil as if it were good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude, persuades them to do evil instead of good, what kind of harvest do you think rhetoric will reap after this from what she sowed?
ΦΑΙ. οὐ πάνυ γε ἐπιεικῆ.
PHAEDRUS: Not a very decent one.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην;
SOCRATES: Have we, then, my good friend, reviled the art of speeches more rudely than is proper?
ἡ δʼ ἴσως ἂν εἴποι· τί ποτʼ, ὦ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε;
But she might perhaps say: "Why indeed, you wondrous men, do you talk nonsense?
ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδένʼ ἀγνοοῦντα τἀληθὲς ἀναγκάζω μανθάνειν λέγειν, ἀλλʼ, εἴ τι ἐμὴ συμβουλή, κτησάμενον ἐκεῖνο οὕτως ἐμὲ λαμβάνειν· τόδε δʼ οὖν μέγα λέγω, ὡς ἄνευ ἐμοῦ τῷ τὰ ὄντα εἰδότι οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἔσται πείθειν τέχνῃ. ΦΑΙ. οὐκοῦν δίκαια ἐρεῖ, λέγουσα ταῦτα;
For I do not compel anyone who is ignorant of the truth to learn to speak, but, if my advice is worth anything, to acquire that first and then to take me; this, however, I say as a great thing, that without me, even for the one who knows the things that are, there will be no more persuading by art." PHAEDRUS: Will she not speak justly, in saying these things?
ΣΩ. φημί, ἐὰν οἵ γʼ ἐπιόντες αὐτῇ λόγοι μαρτυρῶσιν εἶναι τέχνῃ.
SOCRATES: I say so, indeed, if only the arguments that attack her testify that she is an art.
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινων προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων, ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλʼ ἄτεχνος τριβή· τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Λάκων, ἔτυμος τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἧφθαι οὔτʼ ἔστιν οὔτε μή ποτε ὕστερον γένηται. §261ΦΑΙ. τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δεῦρο αὐτοὺς παράγων ἐξέταζε τί καὶ πῶς λέγουσιν.
For I seem to hear certain arguments approaching and protesting that she lies and is not an art, but an artless routine; "of speaking," says the Spartan, "there is no genuine art without having grasped the truth, nor is there ever one hereafter." PHAEDRUS: There is need of these arguments, Socrates; but bring them here and examine what and how they speak.
ΣΩ. πάριτε δή, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαιδά τε Φαῖδρον πείθετε ὡς ἐὰν μὴ ἱκανῶς φιλοσοφήσῃ, οὐδὲ ἱκανός ποτε λέγειν ἔσται περὶ οὐδενός.
SOCRATES: Come forward, then, noble creatures, and persuade Phaedrus, the father of beautiful children, that unless he philosophizes sufficiently, he will never be capable of speaking about anything.
ἀποκρινέσθω δὴ ὁ Φαῖδρος.
Let Phaedrus answer.
ΦΑΙ. ἐρωτᾶτε.
PHAEDRUS: Ask.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις, ἡ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντιμότερον τό γε ὀρθὸν περὶ σπουδαῖα ἢ περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμενον;
SOCRATES: Would not rhetoric, then, as a whole, be a certain art of leading the soul through words, not only in courts of law and whatever other public assemblies, but also in private ones, the same concerning small things and great, and no more honorable when rightly applied to serious matters than to trivial ones?
ἢ πῶς σὺ ταῦτʼ ἀκήκοας;
Or how have you heard these things?
ΦΑΙ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μέν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεταί τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνῃ, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας· ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα.
PHAEDRUS: No, by Zeus, not entirely in this way, but it is said and written by art mostly concerning lawsuits, and it is also spoken concerning public harangues; but I have not heard of it further.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἦ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσέως τέχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας, ἃς ἐν Ἰλίῳ σχολάζοντες συνεγραψάτην, τῶν δὲ Παλαμήδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας;
SOCRATES: But have you heard only of the arts of speeches by Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed when they had leisure at Troy, and have you become unheard of those of Palamedes?
ΦΑΙ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ ἔγωγε τῶν Νέστορος, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἤ τινα Θρασύμαχόν τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσέα.
PHAEDRUS: Yes, by Zeus, I have of Nestor's, unless you are fashioning some Gorgias as a Nestor, or some Thrasymachus and Theodore as an Odysseus.
ΣΩ. ἴσως.
SOCRATES: Perhaps.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτους ἐῶμεν· σὺ δʼ εἰπέ, ἐν δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν;
But let us leave these men; you tell me, what do the opponents do in courts of law?
οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσιν μέντοι;
Do they not indeed contradict each other?
ἢ τί φήσομεν;
Or what shall we say?
ΦΑΙ. τοῦτʼ αὐτό.
PHAEDRUS: Exactly that.
ΣΩ. περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τε καὶ ἀδίκου;
SOCRATES: About what is just and unjust?
ΦΑΙ. ναί.
PHAEDRUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνῃ τοῦτο δρῶν ποιήσει φανῆναι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν δὲ βούληται, ἄδικον;
SOCRATES: Will not, then, the one who does this by art make the same thing appear to the same people at one time just, and, when he wishes, unjust?
ΦΑΙ. τί μήν;
PHAEDRUS: Why not?
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ δὴ τῇ πόλει δοκεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθά, τοτὲ δʼ αὖ τἀναντία;
SOCRATES: And in public speaking, will he not make the same things seem to the city at one time good, and at another time, in turn, the opposite?
ΦΑΙ. οὕτως.
PHAEDRUS: Just so.
ΣΩ. τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνῃ, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα;
SOCRATES: Do we not know, then, that the Eleatic Palamedes spoke by art, so that the same things appeared to his hearers to be both similar and dissimilar, both one and many, both at rest and in motion?
ΦΑΙ. μάλα γε.
PHAEDRUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστήριά τέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίαν, ἀλλʼ, ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἴπερ ἔστιν, αὕτη ἂν εἴη, ᾗ τις οἷός τʼ ἔσται πᾶν παντὶ ὁμοιοῦν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν, καὶ ἄλλου ὁμοιοῦντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς ἄγειν.
SOCRATES: The art of contradiction, therefore, is not only about courts of law and public speaking, but, as it seems, about all things spoken there would be this one single art, if indeed it exists, by which one will be able to assimilate everything to everything of the things possible and to those for whom it is possible, and to bring into the light when another assimilates and conceals.
ΦΑΙ. πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεις;
PHAEDRUS: In what way indeed do you mean this?
ΣΩ. τῇδε δοκῶ ζητοῦσιν φανεῖσθαι.
SOCRATES: I think it will appear to those who seek in this way.
ἀπάτη πότερον ἐν πολὺ διαφέρουσι γίγνεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὀλίγον;
Does deception occur more in things that differ much, or in things that differ little?