§202μάλιστά γε.
"Quite so," she said.
ἦ καὶ ἂν μὴ σοφόν, ἀμαθές;
"And is that which is not wise, ignorant?
ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἔστιν τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; τί τοῦτο; τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ἔφη, ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν—ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; —οὔτε ἀμαθία—τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία;
Or have you not noticed that there is something between wisdom and ignorance?" "What is this?" "Do you not know," she said, "that holding correct opinions without being able to give a reason is neither to understand—for how could an irrational matter be knowledge?—nor is it ignorance—for how could that which hits upon reality be ignorance?
—ἔστι δὲ δήπου τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. ἀληθῆ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις.
Correct opinion, indeed, is surely something of this sort, between understanding and ignorance." "You speak the truth," I said.
μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, μηδὲ ὃ μὴ ἀγαθόν, κακόν.
"Do not, then, force that which is not beautiful to be ugly, nor that which is not good, bad.
οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ καλόν, μηδέν τι μᾶλλον οἴου δεῖν αὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι, ἀλλά τι μεταξύ, ἔφη, τούτοιν. καὶ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὁμολογεῖταί γε παρὰ πάντων μέγας θεὸς εἶναι. τῶν μὴ εἰδότων, ἔφη, πάντων λέγεις, ἢ καὶ τῶν εἰδότων; συμπάντων μὲν οὖν.
And so also concerning Eros, since you yourself agree that he is neither good nor beautiful, do not think at all the more that he must be ugly and bad, but rather something," she said, "between these two." "And yet," I said, "he is agreed by all to be a great god." "Do you mean by 'all' those who do not know," she said, "or also those who do know?" "By absolutely everyone." And she laughed and said, "And how, Socrates, could he be agreed to be a great god by those who say that he is not even a god at all?" "Who are these?" I said.
καὶ ἣ γελάσασα καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογοῖτο μέγας θεὸς εἶναι παρὰ τούτων, οἵ φασιν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ θεὸν εἶναι; τίνες οὗτοι; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. εἷς μέν, ἔφη, σύ, μία δʼ ἐγώ. κἀγὼ εἶπον, πῶς τοῦτο, ἔφην, λέγεις; καὶ ἥ, ῥᾳδίως, ἔφη.
"One is you," she said, "and one is I." And I said, "How can you say this?" And she said, "Easily.
λέγε γάρ μοι, οὐ πάντας θεοὺς φῂς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ καλούς;
For tell me, do you not say that all gods are happy and beautiful?
ἢ τολμήσαις ἄν τινα μὴ φάναι καλόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα θεῶν εἶναι; μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφην.
Or would you dare to say that any of the gods is not beautiful and happy?" "By Zeus, not I," I said.
εὐδαίμονας δὲ δὴ λέγεις οὐ τοὺς τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κεκτημένους; πάνυ γε. ἀλλὰ μὴν Ἔρωτά γε ὡμολόγηκας διʼ ἔνδειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν τούτων ὧν ἐνδεής ἐστιν. ὡμολόγηκα γάρ. πῶς ἂν οὖν θεὸς εἴη ὅ γε τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἄμοιρος; οὐδαμῶς, ὥς γʼ ἔοικεν. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ σὺ ἔρωτα οὐ θεὸν νομίζεις;
"And do you not call happy indeed those who possess good and beautiful things?" "Certainly." "But surely you have agreed that Eros, because of his want of good and beautiful things, desires these very things of which he is in want." "Yes, I have agreed." "How then could he be a god, he who has no share of beautiful and good things?" "In no way, as it seems." "Do you see then," she said, "that you too do not consider Eros to be a god?" "What then," I said, "would Eros be?
τί οὖν ἄν, ἔφην, εἴη ὁ Ἔρως; θνητός; ἥκιστά γε. ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα, ἔφη, μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου. τί οὖν, ὦ Διοτίμα; δαίμων μέγας, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ. τίνα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον;
A mortal?" "Certainly not." "But what then?" "Just as in the previous cases," she said, "between mortal and immortal." "What is that, Diotima?" "A great daemon, Socrates; for indeed everything that is daemonic is between god and mortal." "What power does it have?" I said.
ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρʼ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς τῶν θυσιῶν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὂν ἀμφοτέρων συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι.
"Interpreting and transporting to gods the things from men, and to men the things from gods—from the former their prayers and sacrifices, and from the latter their commands and rewards for the sacrifices; and being in the middle of both, it fills up the gap, so that the whole itself is bound together with itself."