§200τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, φύλαξον παρὰ σαυτῷ μεμνημένος ὅτου· τοσόνδε δὲ εἰπέ, πότερον ὁ Ἔρως ἐκείνου οὗ ἔστιν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτοῦ ἢ οὔ;
"This indeed, then," said Socrates, "keep safe within yourself, remembering of whom it is; and tell me this much: does Eros desire that of which he is the love, or not?" "Certainly," he said.
πάνυ γε, φάναι. πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, εἶτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, ἢ οὐκ ἔχων; οὐκ ἔχων, ὡς τὸ εἰκός γε, φάναι.
"Is it when he has that which he desires and loves, that he then desires and loves it, or when he does not have it?" "When he does not have it, in all probability," he said.
σκόπει δή, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος εἰ ἀνάγκη οὕτως, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν οὗ ἐνδεές ἐστιν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐνδεὲς ᾖ;
"Consider then," said Socrates, "instead of 'in all probability', whether it is necessary that it be so: that that which desires, desires that of which it is in want, or does not desire it, if it is not in want?
ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ θαυμαστῶς δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἀγάθων, ὡς ἀνάγκη εἶναι· σοὶ δὲ πῶς; κἀμοί, φάναι, δοκεῖ. καλῶς λέγεις.
For to me, Agathon, it seems wonderfully necessary to be so; but how does it seem to you?" "To me too," he said, "it seems so." "You speak well.
ἆρʼ οὖν βούλοιτʼ ἄν τις μέγας ὢν μέγας εἶναι, ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ὢν ἰσχυρός; ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων. οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεὴς ἂν εἴη τούτων ὅ γε ὤν. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ὢν βούλοιτο ἰσχυρὸς εἶναι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ταχὺς ὢν ταχύς, καὶ ὑγιὴς ὢν ὑγιής—ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις ταῦτα οἰηθείη καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς ὄντας τε τοιούτους καὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα τούτων ἅπερ ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἵνʼ οὖν μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν, τούτου ἕνεκα λέγω— τούτοις γάρ, ὦ Ἀγάθων, εἰ ἐννοεῖς, ἔχειν μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀνάγκη ἃ ἔχουσιν, ἐάντε βούλωνται ἐάντε μή, καὶ τούτου γε δήπου τίς ἂν ἐπιθυμήσειεν;
Would anyone then, being tall, wish to be tall, or being strong, wish to be strong?" "Impossible, from what has been agreed." "For surely he who is so would not be in want of these things." "You speak the truth." "For if indeed, being strong, one should wish to be strong," said Socrates, "and being swift, to be swift, and being healthy, to be healthy—for someone might perhaps think as to these things and all such things, that those who are such and possess these things also desire these very things which they possess, and so that we may not be deceived, I say this on account of this—for to these, O Agathon, if you consider, it is necessary to have each of these things which they have in the present, whether they wish it or not; and who, indeed, would desire this?
ἀλλʼ ὅταν τις λέγῃ ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑγιαίνων βούλομαι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ πλουτῶν βούλομαι καὶ πλουτεῖν, καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἃ ἔχω, εἴποιμεν ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι σύ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, πλοῦτον κεκτημένος καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν βούλει καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα κεκτῆσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ γε νῦν παρόντι, εἴτε βούλει εἴτε μή, ἔχεις· σκόπει οὖν, ὅταν τοῦτο λέγῃς, ὅτι ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν παρόντων, εἰ ἄλλο τι λέγεις ἢ τόδε, ὅτι βούλομαι τὰ νῦν παρόντα καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον παρεῖναι. ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῖ ἄν; Συμφάναι ἔφη τὸν Ἀγάθωνα.
But when someone says, 'I, being healthy, wish also to be healthy,' and 'being rich, wish also to be rich, and I desire these very things which I have,' we would say to him: 'You, my good man, possessing wealth and health and strength, wish also to possess these in the time to come, since in the present, at least, whether you wish it or not, you have them; consider then, when you say this: "I desire the things present," whether you mean anything other than this: "I wish the things now present to be present also in the time to come." Would he agree to anything else?' He said that Agathon agreed.
εἰπεῖν δὴ τὸν Σωκράτη, οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γʼ ἐστὶν ἐκείνου ἐρᾶν, ὃ οὔπω ἕτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σῳζόμενα καὶ παρόντα; πάνυ γε, φάναι.
Socrates then said: "Is not this, then, to love that which is not yet ready for him, nor does he have, namely, that these things should be preserved for him and present in the time to come?" "Certainly," he said.
καὶ οὗτος ἄρα καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ μὴ ἑτοίμου ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦ μὴ παρόντος, καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔχει καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ οὗ ἐνδεής ἐστι, τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα ἐστὶν ὧν ἡ ἐπιθυμία τε καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐστίν; πάνυ γʼ, εἰπεῖν.
"And he, then, and every other who desires, desires that which is not ready and which is not present, and that which he does not have, and that which he himself is not, and of which he is in want—are these the kinds of things of which desire and love are?" "Certainly," he said.
ἴθι δή, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀνομολογησώμεθα τὰ εἰρημένα.
"Come then," said Socrates, "let us agree again on what has been said.
ἄλλο τι ἔστιν ὁ Ἔρως πρῶτον μὲν τινῶν, ἔπειτα τούτων ὧν ἂν ἔνδεια παρῇ αὐτῷ;
Is Eros, first, the love of certain things, and second, of those things of which a want is present to him?"