Humanitext Reader

Plato · Symposium §184-185

Conclusion of Pausanias' Speech and Aristophanes' Hiccups

Passage 9 of 36 · Greek

Summary

Pausanias concludes his speech by arguing that only the love of boys aimed at virtue is beautiful and constant. When Aristophanes is unable to speak next due to a sudden fit of hiccups, the physician Eryximachus offers to swap their speaking turns and provides him with remedies.

§184τούτους δὴ βούλεται ὁ ἡμέτερος νόμος εὖ καὶ καλῶς βασανίζειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαρίσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ διαφεύγειν.
These are the very ones whom our law wishes to test well and beautifully, and to gratify some, but to flee from others.
διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τοῖς μὲν διώκειν παρακελεύεται, τοῖς δὲ φεύγειν, ἀγωνοθετῶν καὶ βασανίζων ποτέρων ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ ἐρῶν καὶ ποτέρων ὁ ἐρώμενος.
For this reason, therefore, it encourages some to pursue and others to flee, acting as a judge and testing to which of the two classes the lover belongs, and to which the beloved.
οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἁλίσκεσθαι ταχὺ αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται, ἵνα χρόνος ἐγγένηται, ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τὰ πολλὰ καλῶς βασανίζειν, ἔπειτα τὸ ὑπὸ χρημάτων καὶ ὑπὸ πολιτικῶν δυνάμεων ἁλῶναι αἰσχρόν, ἐάν τε κακῶς πάσχων πτήξῃ καὶ μὴ καρτερήσῃ, ἄν τʼ εὐεργετούμενος εἰς χρήματα ἢ εἰς διαπράξεις πολιτικὰς μὴ καταφρονήσῃ·
Thus, indeed, for this reason, first, to be caught quickly has been deemed shameful, so that time may intervene, which indeed is thought in most cases to test beautifully; next, to be caught by money and by political powers is shameful, whether one, suffering ill, cringes and does not endure, or being benefited with respect to money or political achievements, does not look down on them.
οὐδὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τούτων οὔτε βέβαιον οὔτε μόνιμον εἶναι, χωρὶς τοῦ μηδὲ πεφυκέναι ἀπʼ αὐτῶν γενναίαν φιλίαν.
For none of these things is thought to be either secure or constant, apart from the fact that no noble friendship can even by nature arise from them.
μία δὴ λείπεται τῷ ἡμετέρῳ νόμῳ ὁδός, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς χαριεῖσθαι ἐραστῇ παιδικά.
One path, indeed, is left for our law, if the beloved is to gratify the lover beautifully.
ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐρασταῖς ἦν δουλεύειν ἐθέλοντα ἡντινοῦν δουλείαν παιδικοῖς μὴ κολακείαν εἶναι μηδὲ ἐπονείδιστον, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἄλλη μία μόνη δουλεία ἑκούσιος λείπεται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος·
For we have a law that, just as in the case of lovers it was not flattery nor reproachful to be willing to serve any servitude whatsoever to their beloved, so indeed also another single voluntary servitude is left that is not reproachful; and this is the one concerning virtue.
αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀρετήν. νενόμισται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν, ἐάν τις ἐθέλῃ τινὰ θεραπεύειν ἡγούμενος διʼ ἐκεῖνον ἀμείνων ἔσεσθαι ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν τινὰ ἢ κατὰ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν μέρος ἀρετῆς, αὕτη αὖ ἡ ἐθελοδουλεία οὐκ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι οὐδὲ κολακεία.
For it has been established among us that if anyone wishes to serve someone, thinking that through him he will become better either in some wisdom or in any other part of virtue, this voluntary servitude in turn is neither shameful nor flattery.
δεῖ δὴ τὼ νόμω τούτω συμβαλεῖν εἰς ταὐτόν, τόν τε περὶ τὴν παιδεραστίαν καὶ τὸν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν, εἰ μέλλει συμβῆναι καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ ἐραστῇ παιδικὰ χαρίσασθαι.
It is necessary, then, to bring these two laws together into the same place, both the one concerning the love of boys and the one concerning philosophy and the other virtue, if it is to happen that the beloved’s gratifying the lover becomes beautiful.
ὅταν γὰρ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωσιν ἐραστής τε καὶ παιδικά, νόμον ἔχων ἑκάτερος, ὁ μὲν χαρισαμένοις παιδικοῖς ὑπηρετῶν ὁτιοῦν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν, ὁ δὲ τῷ ποιοῦντι αὐτὸν σοφόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν δικαίως αὖ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὑπουργῶν ὑπουργεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παίδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι, τότε δὴ τούτων συνιόντων εἰς ταὐτὸν τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ ἐνταῦθα συμπίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῇ χαρίσασθαι, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ.
For when the lover and the beloved come to the same place, each having his law, the one serving in any way whatsoever justly the beloved who has gratified him, and the other in turn helping in any way whatsoever justly the one who makes him wise and good, and the one being able to contribute to prudence and the other virtue, and the other needing to acquire education and other wisdom, then indeed, when these laws come together into the same place, only there and nowhere else does it coincide that it is beautiful for a beloved to gratify a lover.
ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι καὶ ἐξαπατωμένῳ αἰσχύνην φέρει καὶ μή.
Under this condition, even to be deceived is not at all shameful; but in all other cases, whether one is deceived or not, it brings shame.
§185εἰ γάρ τις ἐραστῇ ὡς πλουσίῳ πλούτου ἕνεκα χαρισάμενος ἐξαπατηθείη καὶ μὴ λάβοι χρήματα, ἀναφανέντος τοῦ ἐραστοῦ πένητος, οὐδὲν ἧττον αἰσχρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος τό γε αὑτοῦ ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἕνεκα χρημάτων ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὁτῳοῦν ὑπηρετοῖ, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ καλόν.
For if anyone, gratifying a lover as if he were rich for the sake of wealth, should be deceived and should not get money, when the lover turns out to be poor, it is no less shameful; for such a person is thought to have shown his own character, namely that for the sake of money he would serve anyone in any way, and this is not beautiful.
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λόγον κἂν εἴ τις ὡς ἀγαθῷ χαρισάμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἀμείνων ἐσόμενος διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἐραστοῦ ἐξαπατηθείη, ἀναφανέντος ἐκείνου κακοῦ καὶ οὐ κεκτημένου ἀρετήν, ὅμως καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸν δεδηλωκέναι, ὅτι ἀρετῆς γʼ ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ βελτίων γενέσθαι πᾶν ἂν παντὶ προθυμηθείη, τοῦτο δὲ αὖ πάντων κάλλιστον·
By the same reasoning, even if anyone, gratifying a lover as if he were good and expecting to become better himself through the friendship of the lover, should be deceived, when that man turns out to be bad and not possessing virtue, nevertheless the deception is beautiful; for this person in turn is thought to have shown his own character, namely that for the sake of virtue and of becoming better he would eagerly do anything for anyone, and this in turn is the most beautiful of all things.
οὕτω πᾶν πάντως γε καλὸν ἀρετῆς γʼ ἕνεκα χαρίζεσθαι.
Thus it is entirely and in every way beautiful to gratify for the sake of virtue.
οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τῆς οὐρανίας θεοῦ ἔρως καὶ οὐράνιος καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιος καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώταις, πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκάζων ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν τόν τε ἐρῶντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον· οἱ δʼ ἕτεροι πάντες τῆς ἑτέρας, τῆς πανδήμου.
This is the love of the Heavenly Goddess, which is both heavenly and of great value both to the city and to individuals, compelling both the lover himself and the beloved to take great care of themselves with respect to virtue; but all the other loves belong to the other goddess, the Common one.
ταῦτά σοι, ἔφη, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, περὶ Ἔρωτος συμβάλλομαι. Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου—διδάσκουσι γάρ με ἴσα λέγειν οὑτωσὶ οἱ σοφοί—ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος δεῖν μὲν Ἀριστοφάνη λέγειν, τυχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινα ἢ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἢ ὑπό τινος ἄλλου λύγγα ἐπιπεπτωκυῖαν καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλʼ εἰπεῖν αὐτόν—ἐν τῇ κάτω γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἰατρὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον κατακεῖσθαι— ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, δίκαιος εἶ ἢ παῦσαί με τῆς λυγγὸς ἢ λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ἕως ἂν ἐγὼ παύσωμαι. καὶ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ἀμφότερα ταῦτα·
"This," he said, "is my contribution on Love, offered on the spur of the moment, Phaedrus." And when Pausanias paused—for the wise teach me to make such equal sounds—Aristodemus said that it was necessary for Aristophanes to speak, but it happened that a hiccup had fallen upon him, either from fullness or from some other cause, and he was not able to speak, but he said—for the physician Eryximachus was reclining below him— "Eryximachus, you are obligated either to make my hiccup stop or to speak on my behalf until I stop." And Eryximachus said, "Well, I will do both of these things; for I will speak in your turn, and you, when you stop, shall speak in mine.
ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἐρῶ ἐν τῷ σῷ μέρει, σὺ δʼ ἐπειδὰν παύσῃ, ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ. ἐν ᾧ δʼ ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐὰν μέν σοι ἐθέλῃ ἀπνευστὶ ἔχοντι πολὺν χρόνον παύεσθαι ἡ λύγξ· εἰ δὲ μή, ὕδατι ἀνακογχυλίασον.
And while I am speaking, if the hiccup wishes to stop when you hold your breath for a long time, let it; but if not, gargle with water.
εἰ δʼ ἄρα πάνυ ἰσχυρά ἐστιν, ἀναλαβών τι τοιοῦτον οἵῳ κινήσαις ἂν τὴν ῥῖνα, πτάρε· καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιήσῃς ἅπαξ ἢ δίς, καὶ εἰ πάνυ ἰσχυρά ἐστι, παύσεται. οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις λέγων, φάναι τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη· ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτα ποιήσω.
And if indeed it is very strong, take something with which you might tickle your nose, and sneeze; and if you do this once or twice, even if it is very strong, it will stop." "You cannot start speaking too soon," said Aristophanes, "and I will do these things."

Notes

  1. 184aποτέρων ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ ἐρῶν καὶ ποτέρων ὁ ἐρώμενος — The genitive ποτέρων is a genitive of belonging/possession used with εἰμί to mean "belongs to which of the two classes." It refers back to the two types of lovers and beloveds discussed in the preceding section.
  2. 184bἐάν τε κακῶς πάσχων πτήξῃ καὶ μὴ καρτερήσῃ, ἄν τʼ εὐεργετούμενος εἰς χρήματα ἢ εἰς διαπράξεις πολιτικὰς μὴ καταφρονήσῃ — The negative μὴ καταφρονήσῃ in the second clause corresponds to μὴ καρτερήσῃ in the first. The prepositional phrase εἰς χρήματα... modifies the participle εὐεργετούμενος ("benefited with respect to money...") while also functioning as the object of the verb καταφρονέω ("not to look down on them").
  3. 184dνόμον ἔχων ἑκάτερος — While the logical subject is plural (ἐραστής τε καὶ παιδικά), the singular ἑκάτερος is placed in apposition, and the participle ἔχων agrees with it in the singular. After this, the sentence structure splits into the individual clauses (ὁ μὲν... ὁ δὲ...), creating an anacoluthon where the strict nominative agreement with the main verb is broken.
  4. 184eκαὶ ἐξαπατωμένῳ αἰσχύνην φέρει καὶ μή — The final phrase καὶ μή stands in contrast with the preceding participle clause ἐξαπατωμένῳ ("for the one who is deceived") and functions as an elliptical conditional clause meaning "even if one is not deceived (καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἐξαπατηθῇ)." Thus, the overall sense is concessive: "it brings shame, whether one is deceived or not."
  5. 185dδίκαιος εἶ ἢ παῦσαί με τῆς λυγγὸς ἢ λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ — This is the personal construction of δίκαιός εἰμι + infinitive. Although it is synonymous with the impersonal δίκαιόν ἐστι + accusative and infinitive ("it is just/fitting for you to..."), the subject is attracted to the second-person singular verb εἶ, agreeing with it in the nominative δίκαιος.

Cite this passage

Plato, Symposium §184-185. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg011.humanitext-grc2:184-185

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