§161εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἑνὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν.
For the one, to be is indeed impossible, if indeed it is not; but nothing prevents it from participating in many things, but rather it is necessary, if indeed that one and no other is what is not.
εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἓν μήτʼ ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι.
If, however, neither the one nor "that" is not to be, but the discourse is about something else, we must not utter a word; but if that one and no other is hypothesized not to be, it must participate both in "that" and in many other things.
καὶ πάνυ γε.
Very true.
καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα ἑτεροῖα καὶ εἴη ἄν.
And therefore unlikeness to the others belongs to it; for the others, being other than the one, would also be of another kind.
ναί.
Yes.
τὰ δʼ ἑτεροῖα οὐκ ἀλλοῖα;
And are things of another kind not of a different character?
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
How could they not be?
τὰ δʼ ἀλλοῖα οὐκ ἀνόμοια;
And are things of a different character not unlike?
ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν.
Unlike indeed.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίῳ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη.
Therefore, if they are unlike the one, it is clear that things which are unlike would be unlike to something that is unlike.
δῆλον.
Clear.
εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστιν.
There would then be unlikeness also belonging to the one, in relation to which the others are unlike to it.
ἔοικεν.
It seems so.
εἰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι;
But if unlikeness to the others belongs to it, is it not necessary that likeness to itself belongs to it?
πῶς;
How?
εἰ ἑνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστι τῷ ἑνί, οὐκ ἄν που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἴη οἵου τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδʼ ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἴη περὶ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἑνός.
If there were unlikeness of the one to the one, the discourse would surely not be about something such as the one, nor would the hypothesis be about the one, but about something other than the one.
πάνυ γε.
Absolutely so.
οὐ δεῖ δέ γε.
But it must not be so.
οὐ δῆτα.
Indeed not.
δεῖ ἄρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἑνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι.
Therefore, likeness to itself must belong to the one.
δεῖ.
It must.
καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ αὖ ἴσον γʼ ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἴσον, εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα.
And moreover, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, it would already be and would be like them in respect to equality.
ταῦτα δʼ ἀμφότερα ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν.
But both of these are impossible, if indeed the one is not.
ἀδύνατα.
Impossible.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι;
And since it is not equal to the others, is it not necessary that the others also are not equal to it?
ἀνάγκη.
Necessary.
τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα;
And are things that are not equal not unequal?
ναί.
Yes.
τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα;
And are unequal things not unequal to what is unequal?
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
How could they not be?
καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἕν, πρὸς ἣν τἆλλα αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἄνισα;
And does the one then participate in inequality, in relation to which the others are unequal to it?
μετέχει.
It participates.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γε ἐστὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης.
But greatness and smallness belong to inequality.
ἔστι γάρ.
Yes, they do.
ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἑνί;
Do greatness and smallness then belong to such a one?
κινδυνεύει.
Likely.
μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν.
Moreover, greatness and smallness are always separated from one another.
πάνυ γε.
Certainly.
μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν ἀεί ἐστιν.
Therefore, there is always something between them.
ἔστιν.
There is.
ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα;
Can you say that there is anything else between them than equality?
οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.
No, only this.
ὅτῳ ἄρα ἔστι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ ἰσότης αὐτῷ μεταξὺ τούτοιν οὖσα.
Therefore, to whatever greatness and smallness belong, equality also belongs to it, being between them.
φαίνεται.
It appears so.
τῷ δὴ ἑνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετείη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος.
To the non-being one, then, as it seems, equality, greatness, and smallness would belong.
ἔοικεν.
It seems so.
καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῃ.
And indeed, it must also participate in being in some way.
πῶς δή;
How so?
ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἓν μὴ εἶναι·
It must be in the state we say it is; for if it is not so, we would not speak the truth in saying that the one is not.
εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν.
But if we speak the truth, it is clear that we are speaking of things that are.
ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;
Or is it not so?
οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Indeed it is.