§160οὔτʼ ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτʼ ἀνόμοιά ἐστιν οὔτʼ ἀμφότερα τἆλλα.
Therefore, the others are neither like nor unlike, nor both.
ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἑνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἴδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοιν· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη.
For if they were like or unlike, they would participate in one of the two forms, and if they were both, in two contrary forms; but this has been shown to be impossible.
ἀληθῆ.
True.
οὐδʼ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδʼ ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἑστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα· οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων·
Nor, then, are they the same or other, nor in motion or at rest, nor coming to be or perishing, nor greater or less or equal; nor have they experienced anything else of such kinds.
εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπονθέναι ὑπομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μεθέξει, ὧν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνός γε πάντῃ πάντως στερομένοις.
For if the others submit to experiencing any such thing, they will participate in one, two, three, odd, and even, in which it has been shown impossible for them to participate, since they are entirely and in every way deprived of the one.
ἀληθέστατα.
Most true.
οὕτω δὴ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.
Thus, indeed, if the one is, the one is all things and is not even one, both in relation to itself and in relation to the others likewise.
παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.
Entirely so.
εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν ἆρʼ οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ τοῦτο;
Very well; but if the one is not, must we not next consider what must follow?
σκεπτέον γάρ.
We must indeed.
τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν;
What, then, would this hypothesis be, "if the one is not"?
ἆρά τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν;
Does it differ at all from this, "if that which is not one is not"?
διαφέρει μέντοι.
It certainly differs.
διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν;
Does it merely differ, or is saying "if that which is not one is not" the complete contrary of saying "if the one is not"?
πᾶν τοὐναντίον.
The complete contrary.
τί δʼ εἴ τις λέγοι εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἆρα ἐφʼ ἑκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν;
And what if someone should say "if greatness is not" or "if smallness is not" or any other of such things, would he not in each case make it clear that that which is not, of which he speaks, is something different?
πάνυ γε.
Certainly.
οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει;
Does he not, then, in the present case also make it clear that that which is not, of which he speaks, is other than the rest when he says "if the one is not," and do we not know what he means?
ἴσμεν.
We know.
πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἕν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεὶς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον γιγνώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων.
First, then, he speaks of something known, and secondly, of something other than the rest, when he says "one," whether he adds to it being or non-being; for that which is said not to be is known no less as to what it is, and that it is different from the rest.
ἢ οὔ;
Or is it not so?
ἀνάγκη.
It must be.
ὧδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί χρὴ εἶναι.
We must, then, speak from the beginning as follows: if the one is not, what must it be?
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γιγνώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. ἀληθῆ.
First, then, this must belong to it, as it seems: that there is knowledge of it, or otherwise not even what is spoken of would be known when someone says "if the one is not." True.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἕτερα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι;
And also that the others are other than it, or else it would not be said to be other than the others?
πάνυ γε.
Certainly.
καὶ ἑτεροιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.
And so otherness also belongs to it, in addition to knowledge.
οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτεροιότητα λέγει, ὅταν τὸ ἓν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου.
For he does not speak of the otherness of the others when he says that the one is other than the others, but of its own.
φαίνεται.
So it appears.
καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐλέγετο οὐδʼ ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδʼ ἐκείνῳ ἄν τι ἦν οὐδʼ ἐκείνου, οὐδʼ ἄν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων.
And indeed, that which is not one participates in "that," and in "something," and in "this," and in "to this," and in "of these," and in all such things; for the one would not be spoken of, nor would things other than the one, nor would there be anything for it or of it, nor would anything be spoken of, if it did not participate in "something" or in these other things.
ὀρθῶς.
Right.