Humanitext Reader

Plato · Parmenides §155

The One's Full Participation and Transition in Time

Passage 26 of 36 · Greek

Summary

Analyzes the process of the one and the others becoming older and younger than each other, concluding that the one participates in all aspects of time, being, and knowledge. It then initiates the third inquiry, asking about the temporal transition of the one's participation and non-participation in essence.

§155τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὄν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον.
Therefore, that which has become younger becomes older in relation to that which has become prior and is older; yet it is never older, but is always becoming older than it; for while the latter progresses toward the younger, the former progresses toward the older.
τὸ δʼ αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως.
And in turn, that which is older becomes younger than the younger in like manner.
ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου· γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἵω τε εἴτην.
For as they move in opposite directions, they become the opposite of each other: the younger becomes older than the older, and the older becomes younger than the younger; but they would not be able to have actually become so.
εἰ γὰρ γένοιντο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γίγνοιντο, ἀλλʼ εἶεν ἄν.
For if they should have become so, they would no longer be becoming, but would be so.
νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα· τὸ μὲν ἓν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὂν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ὕστερα γέγονε.
But as it is, they are becoming older and younger than each other: the one indeed becomes younger than the others, because it appeared to be older and to have become prior, and the others become older than the one, because they became posterior.
κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἴσχει, ἐπειδήπερ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα.
And according to the same argument, the others also hold this relation toward the one, since indeed they appeared older than it and to have become prior.
φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.
Indeed, so it appears.
οὐκοῦν ᾗ μὲν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων ἀεὶ διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτʼ ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὔτε τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός· ᾗ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἀεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ὕστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύτῃ δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων;
Therefore, in so far as one thing does not become older or younger than another, by reason of their always differing from each other by an equal number, neither would the one become older or younger than the other things, nor the other things than the one; but in so far as those that became prior must always differ from those that became posterior, and the posterior from the prior, by a different fraction, in this way is it indeed necessary that the other things and the one become both older and younger than each other?
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Entirely so.
κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτʼ ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὑτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων.
According to all these things, then, the one is and becomes both older and younger than itself and the others, and is and becomes neither older nor younger than itself or the others.
παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.
Absolutely so.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἓν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει;
And since the one participates in time and in becoming older and younger, is it not necessary that it also participate in 'sometime', in 'hereafter', and in 'now', if indeed it participates in time?
ἀνάγκη.
It is necessary.
ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἓν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται.
Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become.
τί μήν;
Of course.
καὶ εἴη ἄν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται.
And there would be something belonging to it and of it, and there was and is and will be.
πάνυ γε.
Quite so.
καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν.
And indeed there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it, if indeed we ourselves are now doing all these things concerning it.
ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
You say correctly.
καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἓν ἔστιν.
And indeed there is both a name and a definition for it, and it is named and spoken of; and whatever other such things belong to other things of this sort, also belong to the one.
παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως.
Absolutely, that is how it is.
ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν.
Let us still state the third point.
τὸ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἕν τε ὂν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἕν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δʼ οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτε οὐσίας;
If the one is such as we have described, is it not necessary that, since it is both one and many, and neither one nor many, and participates in time, in so far as it is one, it participates in essence at some time, and in so far as it is not, it does not participate in essence at another time?
ἀνάγκη.
It is necessary.
ἆρʼ οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἷόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν;
Is it then possible that, when it participates, it does not participate at that very time, or when it does not participate, it participates?
οὐχ οἷόν τε.
It is impossible.
ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι.
Therefore it participates at one time and does not participate at another; for only in this way could it both participate and not participate in the same thing.

Notes

  1. 155aἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν — The nominative dual participle ἰόντε is paired with the genitive dual pronoun αὐτοῖν. This can be interpreted as an irregular construction (nominative absolute or anacoluthon) where a genitive absolute construction is confused with the subject of the dual main verb γίγνεσθον, causing the participle to appear in the nominative.
  2. 155dτι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου — The dative of possession/relation ἐκείνῳ ('for it') and the genitive of possession/belonging ἐκείνου ('of it') are placed in parallel, both depending on the existential verb εἴη ἄν with the indefinite pronoun τι ('something') as the subject. This simultaneously expresses the existence of relations to the one and attributes/parts belonging to the one.
  3. 155eτὸ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν — The phrase τὸ ἓν at the beginning of the sentence functions as a prolepsis, anticipating the subject of the following conditional clause εἰ ἔστιν and the subject of the accusative infinitive αὐτό in the main clause, thereby emphasizing the object of discussion (the one).

Cite this passage

Plato, Parmenides §155. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg009.humanitext-grc2:155

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