§153οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
[] "I cannot say."
τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ ἕτερά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω ἐστὶν ἑνός· ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὂν ἓν ἂν ἦν, ἕτερα δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἑνός ἐστι καὶ πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι. ἔχοι γὰρ ἄν. πλῆθος δὲ ὂν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ ἑνός. πῶς δʼ οὔ; τί οὖν;
"I cannot say." "But this at least you can say, that the others, if indeed they are other and not another, are more than one; for if they were another, they would be one, but being other, they are more than one and must have plurality." "Indeed they would." "And being a plurality, they would partake of a greater number than the one." "How indeed could it not be?" "What then?
ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω; τὰ ἐλάττω. τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον· τοῦτο δʼ ἔστι τὸ ἕν.
Shall we say that of number, the greater becomes and has become earlier, or the lesser?" "The lesser." "Therefore, the least comes first; and this is the one.
ἦ γάρ; ναί. πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἓν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐχόντων· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστίν. ἔχει γάρ. πρῶτον δέ γε οἶμαι γεγονὸς πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὕστερον, τὰ δʼ ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος· καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη τἆλλα νεώτερα τοῦ ἑνός, τὸ δὲ ἓν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων. εἴη γὰρ ἄν.
Is it not so?" "Yes." "Therefore, the one has become first of all things having number; and all the others have number, if indeed they are other and not other." "Yes, they have." "But that which has become first, I think, became prior, and the others later; and things that became later are younger than that which became prior; and thus the others would be younger than the one, and the one older than the other things." "Indeed it would." "But what about this?
τί δὲ τόδε; ἆρʼ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὑτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἕν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον. ναί. οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους; τί μήν; καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτʼ εἶναι πάντα τἆλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἕν τε καὶ ὅλον. φήσομεν γάρ. τελευτὴ δέ γε οἶμαι ὕστατον γίγνεται, τούτῳ δʼ ἅμα τὸ ἓν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι· ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῇ ἂν γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι. φαίνεται. νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἕν ἐστι, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα. οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται.
Would the one have become contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?" "Impossible." "But indeed the one was shown to have parts, and if parts, both a beginning and an end and a middle." "Yes." "Is it not then that first of all, a beginning comes into being, both of the one itself and of each of the others, and after the beginning all the other parts up to the end?" "To be sure." "And indeed we shall say that all these others are parts of the whole and of the one, but that itself has become one and whole together with the end." "Yes, we shall." "But the end, I think, comes into being last, and along with this the one is by nature constituted to come into being; so that if indeed it is necessary that the one itself does not come into being contrary to nature, having come into being along with the end, it would by nature be constituted to come into being last of the other things." "It appears so." "Therefore, the one is younger than the others, and the others older than the one." "Thus again it appears to me." "What then?
τί δὲ δή; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν, ἐάνπερ μέρος ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἓν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἓν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτʼ ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὅτιπερ ἂν προσγίγνηται ὁτῳοῦν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὸν ὅλον ἓν γένηται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει. ἀληθῆ.
A beginning or any other part whatsoever, whether of the one or of any other thing whatsoever, if indeed it is a part and not parts, is it not necessary for it to be one, being a part?" "Necessary." "Is it not then that the one would come into being along with the first thing that comes into being, and along with the second, and is left behind by none of the other things that come into being, whatever is added to whatever, until passing through to the last it becomes a whole one, being left behind neither of the middle nor of the first nor of the last nor of any other in its coming into being?" "True."