§148ἧι ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, κατʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν πεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις· τὸ δέ που ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον·
Therefore, in so far as the one is other than the others and the others other than the one, by having experienced this very 'other', the experience that the one has in relation to the others would be not other but the same; and that which has experienced the same is surely like; is it not?
οὐχί; ναί.
Yes.
ἧι δὴ τὸ ἓν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν.
Indeed, in so far as the one has experienced being other than the others, in this very respect it would be completely like all of them; for everything is other than everything.
ἔοικεν.
It seems so.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον.
But indeed, the like is opposite to the unlike.
ναί.
Yes.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταὐτῷ.
Therefore, 'the other' is also opposite to 'the same'.
καὶ τοῦτο.
This also.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γʼ ἐφάνη, ὡς ἄρα τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις ταὐτόν.
But indeed, this too was shown, namely, that the one is the same as the others.
ἐφάνη γάρ.
It was shown indeed.
τοὐναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων.
But the experience of being the same as the others is opposite to that of being other than the others.
πάνυ γε.
Very much so.
ἧι γε μὴν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον ἐφάνη.
But indeed, in so far as it is other, it was shown to be like.
ναί.
Yes.
ἧι ἄρα ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τοὐναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει.
Therefore, in so far as it is the same, it will be unlike, according to the opposite experience to that which makes like.
ὡμοίου δέ που τὸ ἕτερον;
And 'the other' surely made it like?
ναί.
Yes.
ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τὸ ταὐτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ ἑτέρῳ.
Therefore, 'the same' will make it unlike, or it will not be opposite to 'the other'.
ἔοικεν.
It seems so.
ὅμοιον ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ᾗ μὲν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον, ᾗ δὲ ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον.
Therefore, the one will be both like and unlike the others: in so far as it is other, like, and in so far as it is the same, unlike.
ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον.
Indeed, as it seems, it has also an argument of this kind.
καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει.
For it has also this one.
τίνα;
What is it?
ἧι ταὐτὸν πέπονθε, μὴ ἀλλοῖον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἀλλοῖον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὅμοιον εἶναι·
In so far as it has experienced 'the same', it has experienced nothing different; and having experienced nothing different, it is not unlike; and being not unlike, it is like.
ᾗ δʼ ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἀλλοῖον, ἀλλοῖον δὲ ὂν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι.
But in so far as it has experienced 'other', it is different; and being different, it is unlike.
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
What you say is true.
ταὐτόν τε ἄρα ὂν τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατʼ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον, ὅμοιόν τε ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις.
Therefore, since the one is both the same as the others and other, in both respects and in each respect, it would be both like and unlike the others.
πάνυ γε.
Very much so.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπείπερ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατʼ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται;
Therefore, will it not also be the same in relation to itself? Since it was shown to be both other than itself and the same as itself, in both respects and in each respect, will it not appear to be both like and unlike?
ἀνάγκη.
Necessary.
τί δὲ δή;
What then?
περὶ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι τὸ ἓν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἅπτεσθαι πέρι πῶς ἔχει, σκόπει.
Consider how the matter stands regarding the one's touching itself and the others, and its not touching them.
σκοπῶ.
I am considering.
αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλῳ τὸ ἓν ἐφάνη ὄν.
For the one, I suppose, was shown to be in itself as a whole.
ὀρθῶς.
Correctly.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἕν;
And is not the one also in the others?
ναί.
Yes.
ἧι μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἅπτοιτο ἄν· ᾗ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἅπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ ἅπτοιτο ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν.
In so far, then, as it is in the others, it would touch the others; but in so far as it is itself in itself, it would be prevented from touching the others, and being in itself, it would touch itself.
φαίνεται.
It appears so.
οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἅπτοιτο ἂν τὸ ἓν αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
In this way, then, the one would touch both itself and the others.
ἅπτοιτο.
It would touch.
τί δὲ τῇδε;
But what about this way?
ἆρʼ οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἅψεσθαί τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κεῖσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὗ μέλλει ἅπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἕδραν κατέχον ἣ ἂν μετʼ ἐκείνην ᾖ ᾗ ἂν κέηται, ἅπτεται;
Must not everything that is going to touch something lie next to that which it is going to touch, occupying that position which is immediately after the one where the other lies?
ἀνάγκη.
Necessary.
καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἅψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κεῖσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἐν ᾗ αὐτό ἐστιν.
And therefore the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie immediately next to itself, occupying the place adjacent to that in which it is.
δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.
It must indeed.