§147οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἕτερʼ ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑτέρου.
Nor indeed would they be other than one another in themselves, since they do not participate in the other.
πῶς γάρ;
For how could they be?
εἰ δὲ μήτε αὑτοῖς ἕτερά ἐστι μήτε τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἤδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων;
But if they are other neither by themselves nor by the other, would they not now completely escape being other than one another?
ἐκφεύγοι.
They would escape.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἑνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἓν ἦν, ἀλλά πῃ ἂν ἓν ἦν.
But indeed, the things that are not one do not participate in the one either; for they would not be not one, but would in some way be one.
ἀληθῆ.
True.
οὐδʼ ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἕν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἓν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμόν γε ἔχοντα.
Therefore the things that are not one would not be a number either; for being possessed of number, they would not be completely not one in this way.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Indeed not.
τί δέ;
What then?
τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἆρα μόριά ἐστιν;
Are the things that are not one parts of the one?
ἢ κἂν οὕτω μετεῖχε τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ μὴ ἕν;
Or would the things that are not one participate in the one even in this way?
μετεῖχεν.
They would participate.
εἰ ἄρα πάντῃ τὸ μὲν ἕν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἕν, οὔτʼ ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἓν τὸ ἓν εἴη οὔτε ὅλον ὡς μορίων· οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια, οὔτε ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ τῷ ἑνί.
If, then, the one is entirely one, and the things that are not one are not one, the one would neither be a part of the things that are not one, nor a whole in relation to them as parts; nor, again, would the things that are not one be parts of the one, nor wholes in relation to the one as a part.
οὐ γάρ.
Indeed.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε ὅλα μήτε ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ταὐτὰ ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις.
But indeed, we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes nor other than one another would be the same as one another.
ἔφαμεν γάρ.
We did.
φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἓν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἓν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς;
Shall we say, then, that the one, being in this relation to the things that are not one, is the same as them?
φῶμεν.
Let us say so.
τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ.
The one, therefore, as it seems, is both other than the others and other than itself, and the same as them and the same as itself.
κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου.
It is likely to appear so, at least from the argument.
ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;
Is it, then, also both like and unlike itself and the others?
ἴσως.
Perhaps.
ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τἆλλά που ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη.
Since, at any rate, it was shown to be other than the others, the others also, I suppose, would be other than it.
τί μήν;
Of course.
οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττον;
Is it not, then, other than the others in the same way as the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?
τί γὰρ ἄν;
For why should it be?
εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὁμοίως.
If, then, neither more nor less, equally.
ναί.
Yes.
οὐκοῦν ᾗ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τἆλλα τῷ ἑνί.
Then, in so far as it has experienced being other than the others and the others likewise other than it, in this respect the one would have experienced the same as the others, and the others the same as the one.
πῶς λέγεις;
How do you mean?
ὧδε· ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς;
Like this: do you not call each of the names in relation to something?
ἔγωγε.
I do.
τί οὖν;
What then?
τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκις ἢ ἅπαξ;
Could you say the same name more than once, or only once?
ἔγωγε.
I could.
πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις οὗπέρ ἐστι τοὔνομα, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο;
Whether, then, if you say it once, do you address that of which it is the name, but if many times, not that?
ἢ ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα φθέγξῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταὐτὸν καὶ λέγειν ἀεί;
Or, whether you utter the same name once or many times, is there a great necessity that you always speak of the same thing?
τί μήν;
Of course.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπί τινι;
Is not 'the other' also a name in relation to something?
πάνυ γε.
Very much so.
ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗπερ ἦν ὄνομα.
Whenever, then, you utter it, whether once or many times, you name it in relation to nothing else, nor do you name anything other than that of which it was the name.
ἀνάγκη.
Necessary.
ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, δὶς τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπʼ ἄλλῃ, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν ἧσπερ ἦν τοὔνομα.
When, therefore, we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others, though we say 'other' twice, we are not speaking of any other nature, but always of that very nature of which it was the name.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Most certainly.