§143πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τό τε ἓν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὖ μορίοιν τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἀεί, ὅτιπερ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τούτω τὼ μορίω ἀεὶ ἴσχει· τό τε γὰρ ἓν τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἕν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη δύʼ ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἓν εἶναι.
Therefore, again, each of these parts also holds both "the one" and "being", and the part, even the smallest one, in turn becomes consisting of two parts; and according to the same argument always in this way, whatever part may come to be, it always holds these two parts; for the one always holds being, and being always holds the one; so that it is necessary that it, always becoming two, is never one.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Most certainly.
οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ ἓν ὂν εἴη;
Is it not so, then, that the one which is would thus be infinite in multitude?
ἔοικεν.
So it seems.
ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι.
Come now, look further in this way also.
πῇ;
In what way?
οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν τὸ ἕν, διὸ ἔστιν;
Do we say that the one participates in being, which is why it is?
ναί.
Yes.
καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἓν ὂν πολλὰ ἐφάνη.
And it is for these reasons indeed that the one which is appeared as many.
οὕτω.
Quite so.
τί δέ;
But what of this?
αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθʼ αὑτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὗ φαμεν μετέχειν, ἆρά γε ἓν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο;
The one itself, which we say participates in being, if we take it alone by itself in thought, without that in which we say it participates, will this very thing appear as only one, or also as many?
ἕν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
As one, I believe.
ἴδωμεν δή·
Let us see, then.
ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἕν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἓν οὐσίας μετέσχεν.
It is necessary that its being is one other thing, and it itself is another, if indeed the one is not being, but participated in being as one.
ἀνάγκη.
Necessary.
οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσία, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε τῷ ἓν τὸ ἓν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.
If, then, being is one other thing, and the one is another, the one is other than being not by being one, nor is being other than the one by being being, but by the other and the different they are other than each other.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Certainly.
ὥστε οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ ἑνὶ οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἕτερον.
So that the other is identical neither with the one nor with being.
πῶς γάρ;
How could it be?
τί οὖν;
What then?
ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἓν εἴτε τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθά τινε ὣ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω;
If we select from them, whether you like being and the other, or being and the one, or the one and the other, do we not in each selection select a certain two which are rightly called both?
πῶς;
How so?
ὧδε· ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν;
In this way: is it possible to say "being"?
ἔστιν.
It is.
καὶ αὖθις εἰπεῖν ἕν;
And again to say "one"?
καὶ τοῦτο.
That too.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἴρηται;
Has not each of them, then, been spoken of?
ναί.
Yes.
τί δʼ ὅταν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἕν, ἆρα οὐκ ἀμφοτέρω;
And when I say "being and one", is it not both?
πάνυ γε.
Certainly.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον ἢ ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω πανταχῶς ἐφʼ ἑκάστου ἄμφω λέγω;
And if "being and the other", or "the other and the one", is it not also in this way in every case that I speak of both?
ναί.
Yes.
ὣ δʼ ἂν ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἆρα οἷόν τε ἄμφω μὲν αὐτὼ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μή;
But for those two which are rightly addressed as both, is it possible for them to be both, but not two?
οὐχ οἷόν τε.
It is not possible.
ὣ δʼ ἂν δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἓν εἶναι;
And if they are two, is there any way for each of them not to be one?
οὐδεμία.
None.
τούτων ἄρα ἐπείπερ σύνδυο ἕκαστα συμβαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἓν ἂν εἴη ἕκαστον.
Since, therefore, these things turn out to be pairwise, each one must also be one.
φαίνεται.
It appears so.
εἰ δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι, συντεθέντος ἑνὸς ὁποιουοῦν ᾑτινιοῦν συζυγίᾳ οὐ τρία γίγνεται τὰ πάντα;
And if each of them is one, when any one is added to any pair, does not the whole become three?
ναί.
Yes.
τρία δὲ οὐ περιττὰ καὶ δύο ἄρτια;
And are not three odd, and two even?
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
How could they not be?
τί δέ;
What then?
δυοῖν ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δίς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δὶς ἓν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρὶς ἕν;
If there are two, is it not necessary that "twice" also exists, and if there are three, "thrice", if indeed to two belongs twice one and to three thrice one?
ἀνάγκη.
Necessary.
δυοῖν δὲ ὄντοιν καὶ δὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δὶς εἶναι;
And if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there be twice two?
καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖ τρία τρὶς εἶναι;
And if there are three and thrice, is it not necessary in turn that there be thrice three?
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
How could they not be?
τί δέ;
What then?
τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δὶς ὄντων καὶ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ τρὶς ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δὶς εἶναι καὶ δύο τρίς;
If there are three and twice, and if there are two and thrice, is it not necessary that there be twice three and thrice two?
πολλή γε.
Very much so.