Humanitext Reader

Plato · Parmenides §142

Conclusion of First Hypothesis and the One That Is

Passage 13 of 36 · Greek

Summary

After concluding the first hypothesis by showing that the one neither is nor can be known, the second hypothesis begins with 'if the one exists'. It is argued that if the one exists, its being must be distinct from itself, meaning that the 'one which is' is a whole containing the parts 'one' and 'being'.

§142οὐδʼ ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἓν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὂν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον·
Therefore, it does not even exist in such a way as to be one; for then it would already be existing and participating in being.
ἀλλʼ ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν.
But as it seems, the one is neither one nor does it exist, if we must believe this argument.
κινδυνεύει.
It is likely.
ὃ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἄν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ;
But for that which does not exist, can there be anything for it or of it?
καὶ πῶς;
How could there be?
οὐδʼ ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα.
Therefore, it has no name, nor is there any account of it, nor any knowledge, nor perception, nor opinion.
οὐ φαίνεται.
It does not appear so.
οὐδʼ ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται.
Therefore, it is neither named, nor spoken of, nor opined, nor known, nor does any of the things that exist perceive it.
οὐκ ἔοικεν.
It does not seem so.
ἦ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἓν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν;
Is it possible, then, for these things to be so concerning the one?
οὔκουν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Certainly it does not seem so to me.
βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῇ;
Do you wish, then, that we should return to the hypothesis again from the beginning, to see if anything different will appear to us as we return?
πάνυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι.
Yes, indeed, I wish it.
οὐκοῦν ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμέν, τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῖά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα·
Then, if the one exists, we say, we must thoroughly agree on what its consequences happen to be; is it not so?
οὐχ οὕτω;
Yes.
ναί. ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
Look then from the beginning.
ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν;
If the one exists, is it possible for it to be, but not to participate in being?
οὐχ οἷόν τε.
It is not possible.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταὐτὸν οὖσα τῷ ἑνί· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδʼ ἂν ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ἕν, ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν, ἀλλʼ ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἕν τε εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἕν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλʼ εἰ ἓν ἔστιν·
Therefore, the being of the one would also be, not being the same as the one; for otherwise that being would not be the being of that one, nor would that one participate in that being, but it would be the same to say "one is" and "one is one." But now, this is not the hypothesis, "if one is one, what must follow," but "if one is." Is it not so?
οὐχ οὕτω; πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Certainly.
οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἕν;
Therefore, "is" signifies something other than "one"?
ἀνάγκη.
Necessarily.
ἆρα οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἕν, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδάν τις συλλήβδην εἴπῃ ὅτι ἓν ἔστιν;
Is it, then, anything other than that the one participates in being, which is meant when someone says collectively "the one is"?
πάνυ γε.
Very much so.
πάλιν δὴ λέγωμεν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, τί συμβήσεται.
Let us say again, if the one is, what will follow.
σκόπει οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὂν τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν, οἷον μέρη ἔχειν;
Consider then if it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify that the one, being such, is of a nature to have parts?
πῶς; ὧδε·
How so?
εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἕν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου οὗ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἓν ὂν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι;
In this way: if "is" is spoken of the one which is, and "one" of the being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to that same thing which we hypothesized, namely "the one which is", is it not necessary that the whole itself should be "the one which is", and that of this, "the one" and "being" become parts?
ἀνάγκη.
Necessary.
πότερον οὖν ἑκάτερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσεροῦμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τό γε μόριον προσρητέον;
Shall we, then, call each of these parts merely a part, or is the part to be called a part of the whole?
τοῦ ὅλου.
Of the whole.
καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστί, ὃ ἂν ἓν ᾖ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει.
Therefore, that which is one is a whole, and has parts.
πάνυ γε.
Certainly.
τί οὖν;
What then?
τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἆρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου;
Of each of these parts of the one which is, namely "the one" and "being", is either the one left behind by the part "being", or being by the part "the one"?
οὐκ ἂν εἴη.
It could not be.

Notes

  1. 142aεἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὂν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον — A potential optative (εἴη ἄν) in the main clause. It explains why the previous assertion holds: if 'to be one' were the case, the one would already be existing. ὂν and μετέχον are nominative participles functioning as predicate adjectives.
  2. 142aτούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἄν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; — The dative demonstrative phrase τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι is placed at the beginning of the sentence for emphasis as a dative of interest. It is followed by the dative of possession αὐτῷ ('be something for it') and the genitive of possession αὐτοῦ ('be something of it'), double-negating the possibility of attributing any property or possession to a non-existent thing.
  3. 142bοὐ ταὐτὸν οὖσα τῷ ἑνί — The participle οὖσα modifies the subject ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνός (the being of the one), acting as an adverbial participle of attendant circumstance, or with a concessive/conditional nuance ('as being not the same as the one').
  4. 142cοὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδʼ ἂν ἐκεῖνο... μετεῖχεν — Within the clause introduced by γάρ, the past indicative with ἄν (ἂν ἦν, ἂν μετεῖχεν) forms a contrary-to-fact apodosis. The implication is that if they were the same (the contrary hypothesis), 'that being would not be the being of that one, nor would that one participate in that being'.
  5. 142dεἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός — The genitives τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος (the one which is) and τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός (the being which is one) function as genitives of reference or object with the passive verb λέγεται ('is spoken of / predicated of').

Cite this passage

Plato, Parmenides §142. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg009.humanitext-grc2:142

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