§140οὐδὲ μὴν ὅμοιόν τινι ἔσται οὐδʼ ἀνόμοιον οὔτε αὑτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ. τί δή; ὅτι τὸ ταὐτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον. ναί. τοῦ δέ γε ἑνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταὐτόν. ἐφάνη γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἕν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ναί. οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς εἶναι τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδὲ ὅμοιον ἄρα δυνατὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἕν· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἕν. πλείω γάρ. τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον. ὀρθῶς. τὸ δέ γε ἕν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιόν ἐστιν οὔτε αὑτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὔθʼ ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν. οὐ φαίνεται.
"Nor indeed will it be similar or dissimilar to either itself or another." "Why so?" "Because that which has experienced the same is, I suppose, similar." "Yes." "But the same was shown to have a nature distinct from the one." "Yes, it was." "But indeed, if the one has experienced anything distinct from being one, it would have experienced being more than one, and this is impossible." "Yes." "Therefore, it is in no way possible for the one to have experienced the same either with another or with itself." "It does not appear so." "Therefore, neither is it possible for it to be similar either to another or to itself." "It does not seem so." "Nor indeed has the one experienced being other; for in this way too it would have experienced being more than one." "Yes, more." "But that which has experienced being other than either itself or another would be dissimilar to either itself or another, if indeed that which has experienced the same is similar." "Correct." "But the one, as it seems, having in no way experienced being other, is in no way dissimilar to either itself or another." "Certainly not." "Therefore, the one would be neither similar nor dissimilar to either another or itself." "It does not appear so.
καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ. πῇ; ἴσον μὲν ὂν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν ἴσον ᾖ. ναί. μεῖζον δέ που ἢ ἔλαττον ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἂν σύμμετρον ᾖ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω. ναί. οἷς δʼ ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν τῶν αὐτῶν; ἀδύνατον. ἴσον μὲν ἄρα οὔτʼ ἂν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄν. οὔκουν φαίνεταί γε. ἀλλὰ μὴν πλειόνων γε μέτρων ὂν ἢ ἐλαττόνων, ὅσωνπερ μέτρων, τοσούτων καὶ μερῶν ἂν εἴη· καὶ οὕτω αὖ οὐκέτι ἓν ἔσται ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα. ὀρθῶς. εἰ δέ γε ἑνὸς μέτρου εἴη, ἴσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη, ἴσον τῳ αὐτὸ εἶναι. ἐφάνη γάρ. οὔτε ἄρα ἑνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ποτε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔσται ἴσον οὔτε ἄλλῳ· οὔτε αὖ μεῖζον οὐδὲ ἔλαττον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν οὕτω. τί δέ;
And indeed, being such, it will be neither equal nor unequal to either itself or another." "How so?" "If it is equal, it will have the same measures as that to which it is equal." "Yes." "But being, I suppose, greater or less, for those with which it is commensurate, it will have more measures than the less, and fewer than the greater." "Yes." "And for those with which it is not commensurate, it will have greater measures in some cases and smaller in others." "How could it not be so?" "Is it not, then, impossible for that which does not participate in the same to have either the same measures or any other same things whatsoever?" "Impossible." "Therefore, it would be equal neither to itself nor to another, if it does not have the same measures." "At least it does not appear so." "But indeed, if it has more or fewer measures, it would have as many parts as there are measures; and thus again it will no longer be one, but as many as the measures." "Correct." "But if it were of one measure, it would become equal to the measure; but this was shown to be impossible, namely, for it to be equal to anything." "Yes, it was." "Therefore, participating neither in one measure, nor in many, nor in few, nor participating at all in the same, it will never, as it seems, be equal to either itself or another; nor again will it be greater or less than either itself or another." "Certainly so in every way." "What then?
πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἓν δοκεῖ τῳ δυνατὸν εἶναι; τί δὴ γὰρ οὔ; ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὑτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι τῷ ἑνί, οὔτε ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἰσότητος. ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Does it seem possible for the one to be older or younger, or to have the same age as anything?" "Why not, indeed?" "Because, I suppose, if it has the same age as either itself or another, it will participate in equality of time and in similarity, in which we said the one has no share, namely neither similarity nor equality." "Yes, indeed we said so." "And indeed, we also said that it does not participate in dissimilarity and inequality." "Certainly."