§128οὔκ, ἀλλά, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνῆκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται. μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὅτι Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται ᾠκειῶσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι.
"No, on the contrary," said Zeno, "you have understood well the whole purpose of the writing." "I understand, Parmenides," said Socrates, "that this Zeno wishes to be closely associated with you not only in your general friendship, but also in his writing.
ταὐτὸν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειρᾶται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἕτερόν τι λέγων.
For he has written in a way the same thing as you, but by changing it he tries to deceive us as if he were saying something else.
σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἓν φῂς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχῃ καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὅδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται.
For you in your poems say that the All is one, and you provide proofs of this both beautifully and well; while he, on the other hand, says that there is no many, and he himself provides very many and very great proofs.
τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἓν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἑκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταὐτά, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρῆσθαι. ναί, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Therefore, that one of you says it is one, and the other that it is not many, and that each speaks in such a way that you seem to have said nothing the same, though you are saying almost the same things, makes what you have said appear to have been spoken far above us others." "Yes, Socrates," said Zeno.
σὺ δʼ οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ᾔσθησαι.
"But at any rate you have not perceived the truth of the writing in every respect.
καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι σκύλακες εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφῆναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὥς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον·
And yet, like Laconian hounds, you pursue and track well what has been said; but first of all this escapes you, that the writing is not altogether so solemn as to have been written with the design you say, hiding itself from men as if it were accomplishing some great thing.
ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμῳδεῖν ὡς εἰ ἕν ἐστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὑτῷ.
Instead, you have spoken of one of its incidental features, whereas the truth is that these writings are a kind of defense for Parmenides' argument against those who attempt to mock it, claiming that if it is one, many ridiculous consequences and self-contradictions happen to the argument.
ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταὐτὰ καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίοι.
So this writing speaks against those who assert the many, and pays them back in their own coin with interest, wishing to show that their hypothesis, if there are many, would suffer even more ridiculous consequences than the hypothesis of its being one, if someone should follow it out sufficiently.
διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καί τις αὐτὸ ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἴτʼ ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μή.
It was written because of such a love of controversy when I was young, and someone stole it after it was written, so that it was not even possible for me to deliberate whether it should be brought to light or not.
ταύτῃ οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονικίας οἴει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας· ἐπεί, ὅπερ γʼ εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπῄκασας. §129ἀλλʼ ἀποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν.
In this respect, then, you are mistaken, Socrates, in thinking that it was written not from the love of controversy of a young man, but from the ambition of an older one; though, as I said, you did not guess badly." "Well, I accept that," said Socrates, "and I believe it is as you say.
τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ εἶδός τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον· τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν;
But tell me this: do you not believe that there is a certain form of likeness, 129a¦ in and of itself, and another opposite to it, which is unlikeness; and that, these two being in existence, both you and I and the other things which we call 'many' participate in them?
καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι ταύτῃ τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα;
And that those which participate in likeness become like in that way and to the extent that they participate, while those that participate in unlikeness become unlike, and those that participate in both become both?
εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν;
And even if all things participate in both, opposite as they are, and by sharing in both are both like and unlike to themselves, what is there to wonder at?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν οἶμαι ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ, οὐδέ γε εἰ ἓν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὖ μετέχειν.
For if someone showed that likeness itself becomes unlike, or unlikeness like, that, I think, would be a marvel; but if he shows that those things which participate in both suffer both states, it does not seem to me, Zeno, to be at all strange, nor indeed if someone shows that all things are one by participating in the one, and these same things are many by participating in turn in multitude.
ἀλλʼ εἰ ὃ ἔστιν ἕν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει καὶ αὖ τὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἕν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι.
But if he should demonstrate that that which is one, this very thing, is many, and in turn that the many are one, at this I should indeed be astonished.
καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὡσαύτως· εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τἀναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν·
And likewise concerning all other things: if he should show that the genera and forms themselves in themselves suffer these opposite states, it would be worthy of wonder; but if someone should demonstrate that I am one and many, what is there to wonder at?
εἰ δʼ ἐμὲ ἕν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων, ὅταν μὲν βούληται πολλὰ ἀποφῆναι, ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μού ἐστιν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπʼ ἀριστερά, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ὄπισθεν, καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως—πλήθους γὰρ οἶμαι μετέχω—ὅταν δὲ ἕν, ἐρεῖ ὡς ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἷς ἐγώ εἰμι ἄνθρωπος μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα.
When he wishes to show that I am many, saying that my right side is different from my left side, and my front from my back, and likewise my upper and lower parts—for I believe I participate in multitude—and when he wishes to show that I am one, he will say that of the seven of us here, I am one man, participating also in the one; so he shows both to be true.
ἐὰν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρῇ πολλὰ καὶ ἓν ταὐτὸν ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὶ φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ καὶ ἓν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ πολλὰ ἕν, οὐδέ τι θαυμαστὸν λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ἅπερ ἂν πάντες ὁμολογοῖμεν· ἐὰν δέ τις ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ τὰ εἴδη, οἷον ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων.
If, then, someone attempts to show that such things as stones and sticks and the like are both many and one, we shall say that he is demonstrating that they are many and one, not that the one is many or the many one, and that he is saying nothing wonderful, but only what we should all admit; but if someone should, as I was saying just now, first separate the forms themselves by themselves, such as likeness and unlikeness, multitude and the one, rest and motion, and all such things, and then show that these are capable of being mingled and separated among themselves, I should," he said, "be wonderfully amazed, Zeno."