Humanitext Reader

Plato · Statesman §296

Justification of Beneficial Coercion Beyond Written Laws

Passage 25 of 34 · Greek

Summary

The Stranger extends the medical analogy to politics, arguing that if a ruler forces something beneficial upon the ruled against written laws, it cannot be called a political error or injustice, and that the beneficial actions of a wise ruler constitute the truest standard of governance.

§296ΞΕ. τῷ δὲ τὰ δίκαια δὴ καὶ ἄδικα καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ γράψαντι καὶ ἄγραφα νομοθετήσαντι ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀγέλαις, ὁπόσαι κατὰ πόλιν ἐν ἑκάσταις νομεύονται κατὰ τοὺς τῶν γραψάντων νόμους, ἂν ὁ μετὰ τέχνης γράψας ἤ τις ἕτερος ὅμοιος ἀφίκηται, μὴ ἐξέστω δὴ παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερα προστάττειν;
STRANGER: But for the one who has written what is just and unjust, and beautiful and ugly, and good and bad, and has legislated unwritten laws for the herds of men—as many as are shepherded in each city according to the laws of those who wrote them—if the one who wrote with art, or someone else like him, should arrive, should it not be permitted for him to prescribe other things contrary to these?
ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀπόρρημα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἂν ἐκείνου τῇ ἀληθείᾳ γελοῖον φαίνοιτο;
Or would this prohibition also appear no less ridiculous in truth than that former one?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τί μήν;
YOUNG SOCRATES: How indeed not?
ΞΕ. οἶσθʼ οὖν ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγον τὸν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον;
STRANGER: Do you know, then, the argument on such a matter that is spoken of by the many?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἐννοῶ νῦν γʼ οὕτως.
YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not have it in mind just now.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν εὐπρεπής.
STRANGER: And yet it is plausible.
φασὶ γὰρ δὴ δεῖν, εἴ τις γιγνώσκει παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν βελτίους νόμους, νομοθετεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν ἕκαστον πείσαντα, ἄλλως δὲ μή.
For they say indeed that, if someone knows better laws than those of his predecessors, he must legislate for his own city after having persuaded it, but otherwise not.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
YOUNG SOCRATES: What then?
οὐκ ὀρθῶς;
Is that not correct?
ΞΕ. ἴσως.
STRANGER: Perhaps.
ἂν δʼ οὖν μὴ πείθων τις βιάζηται τὸ βέλτιον, ἀπόκριναι, τί τοὔνομα τῆς βίας ἔσται;
But if, then, someone, not by persuading, should force what is better, answer me, what will be the name of this force?
μὴ μέντοι πω, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν πρότερον.
But do not do so yet; first, let us discuss the former case.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
YOUNG SOCRATES: What kind of thing do you mean?
ΞΕ. ἄν τις ἄρα μὴ πείθων τὸν ἰατρευόμενον, ἔχων δὲ ὀρθῶς τὴν τέχνην, παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα τὸ βέλτιον ἀναγκάζῃ δρᾶν παῖδα ἤ τινα ἄνδρα ἢ καὶ γυναῖκα, τί τοὔνομα τῆς βίας ἔσται ταύτης;
STRANGER: If someone, then, not persuading the patient, but possessing the art correctly, should force a child or some man or even a woman, contrary to the written rules, to do what is better, what will be the name of this force?
ἆρʼ οὐ πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ παρὰ τὴν τέχνην λεγόμενον ἁμάρτημα τὸ νοσῶδες;
Is it not anything rather than the so-called error contrary to the art, namely what is diseased?
καὶ πάντα ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἔστι πρότερον τῷ βιασθέντι περὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πλὴν ὅτι νοσώδη καὶ ἄτεχνα πέπονθεν ὑπὸ τῶν βιασαμένων ἰατρῶν;
And is it possible for the one who was forced in such a matter to say everything correctly except that he has suffered diseased and unscientific treatment by the doctors who forced him?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
YOUNG SOCRATES: You speak most truly.
ΞΕ. τί δὲ ἡμῖν δὴ τὸ παρὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην ἁμάρτημα λεγόμενόν ἐστιν;
STRANGER: And what is for us the so-called error contrary to the political art?
ἆρʼ οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἄδικον;
Is it not the ugly and bad and unjust?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. παντάπασί γε.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Most certainly.
ΞΕ. τῶν δὴ βιασθέντων παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ πάτρια δρᾶν ἕτερα δικαιότερα καὶ ἀμείνω καὶ καλλίω τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, φέρε, τὸν τῶν τοιούτων αὖ ψόγον περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης βίας, ἆρʼ, εἰ μέλλει μὴ καταγελαστότατος εἶναι πάντων, πάντʼ αὐτῷ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἑκάστοτε πλὴν ὡς αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἄδικα καὶ κακὰ πεπόνθασιν οἱ βιασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν βιασαμένων;
STRANGER: Now, as for those who have been forced, contrary to the written rules and ancestral customs, to do other things that are more just, better, and more beautiful than the previous ones, tell me, as to the blame again of such people concerning such force, if it is to avoid being the most ridiculous of all, must one not say everything rather on each occasion except that those who were forced have suffered ugly, unjust, and bad treatment by those who forced them?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
YOUNG SOCRATES: You speak most truly.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα ἐὰν μὲν πλούσιος ὁ βιασάμενος ᾖ, δίκαια, ἂν δʼ ἄρα πένης, ἄδικα τὰ βιασθέντα ἐστίν;
STRANGER: But is it that if the one who forced is rich, the things forced are just, but if he is poor, they are unjust?
ἢ κἂν πείσας κἂν μὴ πείσας τις, πλούσιος ἢ πένης, ἢ κατὰ γράμματα ἢ παρὰ γράμματα, δρᾷ σύμφορα, τοῦτον δεῖ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὸν ὅρον εἶναι τόν γε ἀληθινώτατον ὀρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως, ὃν ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ διοικήσει τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων;
Or whether someone does what is advantageous, whether having persuaded or not having persuaded, whether rich or poor, or according to written rules or contrary to written rules, must this be the truest boundary concerning these things for the correct administration of a city, by which the wise and good man will administer the affairs of those who are ruled?

Notes

  1. 296aτῷ δὲ τὰ δίκαια δὴ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ γράψαντι — The dative noun phrase τῷ ... γράψαντι functions as the indirect object (or dative of reference) for μὴ ἐξέστω (should it not be permitted) in the main clause of the conditional sentence. Although the insertion of the conditional clause ἂν ... ἀφίκηται complicates the syntax, the structure sets up the argument assuming the original legislator and the newly arrived expert ruler are either the same or equal.
  2. 296cπλὴν ὅτι νοσώδη καὶ ἄτεχνα πέπονθεν — The conjunctional phrase πλὴν ὅτι (except that) correlates with the preceding πάντα ... πλὴν (anything rather than). Since the forced treatment itself was medically correct, the patient cannot truthfully claim to have suffered diseased and unscientific treatment, meaning any other blame (such as the harshness of the force itself) could be correctly said except this one.
  3. 296eὅρον ... ὃν ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ διοικήσει τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων — The relative pronoun ὃν refers to the antecedent ὅρον (boundary/standard) and functions as a cognate accusative (or adverbial accusative of manner) with the verb διοικήσει (will administer). The direct object of the verb is τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων (the affairs of the ruled), showing that performing beneficial governance is the true standard according to which the wise man will rule.

Cite this passage

Plato, Statesman §296. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg008.humanitext-grc2:296

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.