§263ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται κατὰ δύναμιν.
THEAE. That shall be done to the best of my ability.
ΞΕ.
Θεαίτητος κάθηται.
STR. Theaetetus sits.
μῶν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος;
Surely the statement is not long?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος.
THEAE. No, but moderate.
ΞΕ. σὸν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου.
STR. It is your task indeed to say what and whom it is about.
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ἐμός.
THEAE. Clearly about me and mine.
ΞΕ. τί δὲ ὅδʼ αὖ;
STR. And what about this other one again?
ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖος;
THEAE. What sort?
ΞΕ.
Θεαίτητος, ᾧ νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πέτεται.
STR. Theaetetus, with whom I am now conversing, flies.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτον οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ἄλλως εἴποι πλὴν ἐμόν τε καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.
THEAE. And this one too, no one would say otherwise than that it is mine and about me.
ΞΕ. ποιὸν δέ γέ τινά φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν λόγων.
STR. But of what quality did we say each of the statements must of necessity be?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. τούτων δὴ ποῖόν τινα ἑκάτερον φατέον εἶναι;
STR. Of these, then, what quality must we say each of them is?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸν μὲν ψευδῆ που, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ.
THEAE. One false, I suppose, and the other true.
ΞΕ. λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ.
STR. And of them, the true one says the things that are, as they are, about you.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAE. Of course.
ΞΕ. ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων.
STR. And the false one indeed says things other than those that are.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. τὰ μὴ ὄντʼ ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.
STR. So it says things that are not as being.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.
THEAE. Just about.
ΞΕ. ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ.
STR. Yes, but things that are, yet other than the things that are about you.
πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.
For we said that there are many things that are about each thing, and many that are not.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
THEAE. Exactly so.
ΞΕ. ὃν ὕστερον δὴ λόγον εἴρηκα περὶ σοῦ, πρῶτον μέν, ἐξ ὧν ὡρισάμεθα τί ποτʼ ἔστι λόγος, ἀναγκαιότατον αὐτὸν ἕνα τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι.
STR. Now, the statement which I spoke last about you, in the first place, from the terms by which we defined what a statement is, must of necessity be one of the shortest.
ΘΕΑΙ. νυνδὴ γοῦν ταύτῃ συνωμολογήσαμεν.
THEAE. At least we agreed on that just now.
ΞΕ. ἔπειτα δέ γε τινός.
STR. And in the second place, it must be about someone.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
THEAE. So it is.
ΞΕ. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν σός, οὐκ ἄλλου γε οὐδενός.
STR. And if it is not about you, it is about no one else.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ;
THEAE. For how could it be?
ΞΕ. μηδενὸς δέ γε ὢν οὐδʼ ἂν λόγος εἴη τὸ παράπαν·
STR.
ἀπεφήναμεν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἦν λόγον ὄντα μηδενὸς εἶναι λόγον.
And if it were about nothing, it would not be a statement at all; for we showed that it was of the things impossible that a statement, being a statement, should be a statement about nothing.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα.
THEAE. Most correct.
ΞΕ. περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα, λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, παντάπασιν ἔοικεν ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἔκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.
STR. Now, since they are spoken about you, yet spoken as other things instead of the actual things, and as things that are not instead of things that are, such a combination, arising from verbs and names, seems altogether really and truly to become a false statement.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.
THEAE. Most true indeed.
ΞΕ. τί δὲ δή;
STR. What then?
διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, μῶν οὐκ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε ψευδῆ τε καὶ ἀληθῆ πάνθʼ ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται;
Is it not already clear that thought, opinion, and appearance, all these arise in our souls as both false and true?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
THEAE. How?
ΞΕ. ὧδʼ εἴσῃ ῥᾷον, ἂν πρῶτον λάβῃς αὐτὰ τί ποτʼ ἔστιν καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων.
STR. You will know more easily in this way, if you first grasp what they are and how each differs from the other.
ΘΕΑΙ. δίδου μόνον.
THEAE. Only give it.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν·
STR.
πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια;
Are not thought and speech the same, except that the inner dialogue of the soul with itself, which takes place without voice, has been named by us "thought"?
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAE. Absolutely so.
ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἀπʼ ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος;
STR. And on the other hand, the stream from that, which goes out through the mouth with sound, is called "speech"?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
THEAE. True.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις γε αὖ ἴσμεν ἐνὸν—
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
STR. And further, we know that there is in speech, again— THEAE. What sort of thing?
ΞΕ. φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.
STR. Assertion and denial.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσμεν.
THEAE. We know.
§264ΞΕ. ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅτι προσείπῃς αὐτό;
STR. When, therefore, this occurs in the soul through thought in silence, have you any other name to call it than "opinion"?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;
THEAE. How could I?
ΞΕ. τί δʼ ὅταν μὴ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ διʼ αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινι, τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος ἆρʼ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;
STR. And what when it is present to someone not on its own but through perception? Can such an affection, in turn, be rightly called anything else than "appearance"?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.
THEAE. Nothing else.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν καὶ ψευδής, τούτων δʼ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις,
φαίνεται
δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων ψευδῆ αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι.
STR. Therefore, since speech was true and false, and of these, thought appeared to be the dialogue of the soul with itself, and opinion the completion of thought, and what we call "appearance" is a mixture of perception and opinion, must it not be that of these also, since they are akin to speech, some of them are sometimes false?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
THEAE. Of course.
ΞΕ. κατανοεῖς οὖν ὅτι πρότερον ηὑρέθη ψευδὴς δόξα καὶ λόγος ἢ κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἣν ἐφοβήθημεν ἄρτι, μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήνυτον ἔργον ἐπιβαλλοίμεθα ζητοῦντες αὐτό;
STR. Do you observe, then, that false opinion and false speech have been found sooner than according to the expectation which we feared just now, lest we were undertaking an altogether endless task in seeking them?
ΘΕΑΙ. κατανοῶ.
THEAE. I do observe.
ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν μηδʼ εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυμῶμεν.
STR. Let us not, then, lose heart for what remains.
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφανται ταῦτα, τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀναμνησθῶμεν κατʼ εἴδη διαιρέσεων.
For since these things have become clear, let us recall our previous divisions according to forms.
ΘΕΑΙ. ποίων δή;
THEAE. Which ones?
ΞΕ. διειλόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν εἰκαστικήν, τὴν δὲ φανταστικήν.
STR. We divided the image-making art into two forms: the likeness-making and the appearance-making.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἴπομεν ὡς ἀποροῖμεν εἰς ὁποτέραν θήσομεν.
STR. And we said of the sophist that we were in doubt to which of the two we should assign him.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν ταῦτα.
THEAE. That was so.
ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦθʼ ἡμῶν ἀπορουμένων ἔτι μείζων κατεχύθη σκοτοδινία, φανέντος τοῦ λόγου τοῦ πᾶσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς οὔτε εἰκὼν οὔτε εἴδωλον οὔτε φάντασμʼ εἴη τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς μηδέποτε μηδαμοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι.
STR. And while we were in this doubt, an even greater dizziness of darkness was poured over us, when there appeared the argument which disputes against everything, claiming that there is absolutely no likeness, nor image, nor appearance at all, because falsehood in no way, at no time, in no place exists.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις ἀληθῆ.
THEAE. You speak the truth.
ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γʼ ἐπειδὴ πέφανται μὲν λόγος, πέφανται δʼ οὖσα δόξα ψευδής, ἐγχωρεῖ δὴ μιμήματα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ τέχνην ἐκ ταύτης γίγνεσθαι τῆς διαθέσεως ἀπατητικήν.
STR. But now, since there has appeared false speech, and false opinion has been shown to exist, it is indeed possible for there to be imitations of things that are, and for a deceptive art to arise from this state of affairs.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγχωρεῖ.
THEAE. It is possible.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γʼ ἦν ὁ σοφιστὴς τούτων πότερον, διωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦν.
STR. And indeed, that the sophist belonged to one or the other of these was already agreed between us in what went before.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.